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l . lNTRODUcnON 
Listening to !he hysteria from !he Western powers, one 
might be forgiven for thinking this was a re-run of the ra-
cist 'yeUow peril' propaganda that arose at the time Africa 
was being colonized ... I'm against the singling out of the 
Chinese. I think that much is a Western con trick. It's a 
pretty neat trick, trying to turn one formerly imperialized 
people against another." 
-Prof. Steven Chan, University of London Africanist' 
A globaUy-prorninent Zambian economist, Dambisa Moyo, 
has remarked that "When I speak to Chinese policy-makers the 
thing that annoys them the most about Western policy-makers is 
that they're not given any credit for anything. There's always bad 
news. "2 That is especiaUy the case regarding Chinese activities in 
Africa, about which a negative narrative, !he China-in-Africa dis-
course, pervades Western media and guides global discussions.3 
Scholars have gauged how biased• and inaccurate' the discourse is 
and many dismiss it as based on ignorance of facts and methods, 
political posturing. or disregard of professional standards. The dis-
course, however, has intensified lately, as Western politicians and 
media ratchet up !he rhetoric of strategic rivalry with China in Af-
rica. The US government bas bad several tactics in that rivalry, one 
1. "Is China Good for Africa," New lnternotionalist (Oc:t. 2012): 3().32. 
2. "Economist Dambisa Moyo on lhe Life and Death Battle for the World's Re· 
sourees." Telegraph (UK), July 2, 2012. Among many Chinese "there's a real frustra· 
don with the West and a sense that China can never do right in its eyes. •• Oarissa Tan, 
"China's Civilising Mission," Spectator (UK), June 30, 20U. Lu Sllaye, head of Airi<:an 
Affain at China's Ministry of Foreilll' Affairs, has stated that bad behavior by Chinese 
"LS tile kind of thing the Western medta like to report on ... even when in most cases 
these tncidents are isolated .. . " "ChUla Warns Otizens Abroad." Dati)' Mail (OM. 
Zamboa), Nov. 9, 2012. 
3. Te·Ping Olen, "China 111 AI...,. Podeast: Undentandm& the Negative Narra-
llve," China Talking Points, June 12, 21:110. www.cbinataJkin&points.com/ehina·inollfrica· 
podcast-the-negative--narrali\'e/. 
4. On bias in UK print medio coverage of Chinese activities In Africa, see Emma 
Mawdsley,"'Fu Manchu versus Dr Livin&>tone in tbe Dark Continent? Representing 
China, Arrlca and the West in British Broadsheet Newspapers." Political Geography 27 
(,), 2008: 509·529. Our survey of two hundred 200S-2012 articles in Ove leading US 
newspapers has produced similar findtnp. 
' · Deborah Brautigam, The Drt~~on 's Gift: 1M Rml Swry of China in Africa (Ox· 
ford: Oxford University Pre$$. 2009): Jan Taylor, China's Ntw Roltln Afr= (Boulder: 
Lynne Re10er. 2009); Axel Hamett.Soe•ers. et al (eels.). ChiMs• tmd A/nc<Jn P<,..p«· 
""' on China in Afric• (Oxford: Fahamu Books, 2010). 
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of which is "to criticize China's practice publicly,'>6 as Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton did in Zambia in 2011: 
China's foreign assistance and investment practices in Af-
rica have not always been consistent with generally ac-
cepted international norms of transparency and good 
governance. [China] bas not always utilized the talents of 
the African people in pursuing its business interests. It is 
easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders 
and leave. And when you leave, you didn't leave much be-
hind for the people who are there. You don't improve the 
standard of living. You don't create a ladder of opportu-
nity. We don't want to see a new colonialism in Africa."' 
Ex-colonial European powers have made similar statements.8 
A key aspect of the negative China-in-Africa discourse is the 
2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) study of labor abuses at copper 
mining firms in Zambia parented by state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
China Nonferrous Metal Mining Co. (CNMC).9 CNMC's $2b in-
vestment in Zambia represents some 15% of the $13b total out-
bound foreign direct investment (OFDI) of Chinese firms in Africa 
6. Zhang Cll.un, "Preparing for Competition, Working for Cooperation: US Eyes 
on China-Afri<:a Relations," FrttnUJn Report 10:10 (2011): 2, csis.orglpublicationlfree-
man-report-oc:tober-2011-volll•noiO. 
7. "Cat Fight over Africa Mounts Between US and Otina," New York Amsterdam 
News, June 16~ 2011. Sbib Cb.ib-Yu, "Harmonious Racism," The Newslater 60, lnterna· 
tionallnstitute of Asian Studies (llAS)(2012): 28-29 bas observed, ''The notion of tbe 
new colonialism implies, likely correctly, that the new colonialism mimics the old one.,. 
The Chinese presenre in Africa however does noL See Barry Sautman and Yan 
Hairong, East Mountain nger, West Mounlilin Tiger: China, Africi4 the West and 
«Colonialism..., Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 186 (Baltimore: 
Univer>ity of Maryland School of Law, 2007). 
8. A German ambassador stated in 2011 that "China's dealings with African coun-
tries such as Zimbabwe are imbalanced and exploitative [and) his country was con-
cerned about China's underhanded approach to trade wbicb left African countries 
poorer ... Most of the Qj!reements signed today by China will buy out the whole world's 
raw materials and block other countries from having access to these raw materials." 
"China Exploiting Africa: Germany," Doily News (Zimbabwe). June 3, 2011. He added 
in 2012 that "It is up to Africa's new elites to explain to China that African copper and 
cotton should not be shipped overseas before added value bas been created in situ~·· 
Albrecht Conze, "Emergence and Emancipation: a Fresh Look at Africa," 2012. pro-
grams.wcfia. harvard.edulfellowslfileslconze.pdf. It is however Western-based firms 
that export 95% of the copper from Africa's largest producer. Zambia. 
9. HRW, "You'll be Fired if You Refuse': Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese 
State-owned Copper Mines." Nov. 3, 2011. www.brw.org/reports/2011/JliOOiyou-ll-be-
fired-if-you-reruse. 
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Chinese "neocolonialists""; US conservatives called the miners the 
Chinese Communist Party's "serfs."18 A month after it was issued, a 
Polish member of the European Parliament's right-wing group de-
manded to know, in light of the HRW report, what the European 
Commission would do to bring about decent working conditions for 
Zambian miners.'9 Zambia's Vice-President Guy Scott said of uthe 
Chinese" that "at present, they don't really think they should pay 
tax, or be guided by labor laws. "20 
As a centerpiece of the China-in-Africa discourse, the HRW 
report should be empirically analyzed using a sound methodology 
that accounts for similarities and differences in the operational con-
ditions for CNMC and other foreign mining firms in Zambia. That 
analysis yields explanations that should not be taken as a general 
defense of CNMC. In fact, all foreign mining firms in Zambia are 
doubly exploitative. Contrary to what has been implied by a Chi-
nese government official {discussed below),~' foreign-owned mining 
firms do not provide Zambian miners with a living wage, let alone 
one that allows for savings.22 Facilitated moreover by what is per-
17. "Zambian Minen Resist New Colooiatists." A World to Wm. Mar 27, 2012. 
_,.,aworld towin.netlbk>&fZambian-maners-resut-oew-<X>Iomaii>IS.htmL 
18. The Federalist, "The Chinese Communist State owned Noo-Ferrous Metals 
Mining Corporation Works their "Serfs" in Brutally Long Shifts" Feb. 3, 2012, http:// 
thefederalist-aary.btoaspot.com/2012102/chinese-stavery-in-afrlca.htrnl. 
19. Filip Kaczmarek. "ExploiUttlon of Zambian Minen by Chinese Corporations.· 
European Parhtmeoc ParhamenUtry Questioos, Dec. 14, 2011, www.europarl.europa. 
eu/sideslgetDoc.do?pubRef:.//EP/fTEXT + WQ+E·2011-011860+0+00C+XML-+ VOl/ 
EN. 
20. "Zambia's Test to Bridge Gap with Chinese," Wu/c~nd llwtra/1on, Mar. 31. 
2012. 
21. "fbe Records of Jeune Afnque's Intemew with Dirc<:tor-General Lu Shaye," 
Ministry of Foreign Allain, PRC, Oct. 21, 2012, www.fmprc.gov.cnlenglwjblzzjglxoo/ 
gjlb/3291/3293/t8706:23.htm. 
22. Zambia's Jesuit Centre for Theological Renc<:tioo Basic Needs Index sbo»-.d 
2012liYing <XJOts for a Lusaka family of fi\·e as alnlo<t K4m (US$710) a month. • After 9 
Months of PF, JCfR Says Cost of Uving Increases," Zambian Watchdoa (ZW), June 
29, 2012. Many miners make less than that and live in areas, such as Sotwezi. with C<XIlS· 
of-living bi&her than in Lusaka. "Solwezi - Anotber Copperbelt?" Zambia-advisor. 
com. 2011, www.zambia-adY150r.onm/Solwczio1Zambia.html; each employed Zambian 
on ~>·erage supports .,..o depeodents; each employed black South African supports 3.2. 
"Employed South Africans Have High Number of Dependents," Voice of America 
(VOA), Jan. 22, 20123. In mining, dependency rati<XI are bl£her. Each South African 
miner supports 7-10 dependents. Meaan Lim, et at., "Unnatural Deaths in Soutb Afri· 
ctn Platinum Mmen. 1992-2008." PL.oS One 6:9 (2011), •-ww.plosone.orJIIanidelciUt· 
tiOI'IUst.actioo?anicleURt-info%3Adoi'\2FIO. 1371 %2Fjoumal.pone.0022807. The 
Znmbia ratio seems similar. Sec "$2.Sb Reserves Show Economic Growth: Rupiah," 
/..usa/co Timer (LT), July 3. 2011, post 31. 
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haps the world's most "business friendly" host state,23 these firms 
also remove the country's chief wasting asset without adequate 
compensation to the host nation and often without adequate con-
cern for the environment.24 
The main conclusion of the analysis of HRW's report that fol-
lows is thus not that CNMC is blameless. Rather, it is that among 
foreign copper mining firms in Zambia, CNMC is not, as HRW 
would have it, especially blameworthy. In presenting that evidence-
based conclusion, our critique does not differ from other empirical 
studies that disconfirm commonplace understandings within the 
larger negative narrative of "China" and "the Chinese." Recent ex-
amples include Cambridge University economist Peter Nolan's 
findings that China is not "buying the world"2' and Harvard Uni-
versity political scientist Gary King's massive study that concludes 
that the Chinese government does silence social media posts that 
advocate collective action, but does not generally censor online crit-
icisms of the government. 26 
HRW is assumed to be empirically accurate, methodologically 
sophisticated, and politically independent. A week after its report 
emerged, an official Zambian newspaper reported that the govern-
ment of President Michael Sata, the historically anti-Chinese head 
of Zambia's Patriotic Front (PF),27 had "stepped into the Chinese 
23. For example, Deputy Fmance Minister Miles Sampa noted in 2012 that "We 
boast of a free market economy with very Uttle prohibitive industry regulation and we 
have virtually no exchange controls. You can repatriate a hundred percent of your 
dividends from Zambia as a business and our labo.r coots are low." Anthony Mukwita, 
"Scratching the Surface: are Zambians about to Get their Dues from Foreign Miners?," 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, June 15, 2012, www.thebureauinvestigateS.<om/ 
2012/06/lS/scratebing-the-surface-are-zambians-about·to-get-their-dues-from-foreign-
miners/. 
24. World Banlc and UKaid, "Wbat would it take for Zambia's Copper Mining In· 
dustry to achieve its Potential?" 2011, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT 
ZAMBWResources/oopper-mining-summary-note (online-copy).pd~ "Increased In· 
vestment in Zambia's Resources Means Displacement of Rural Poor,'1 Inter Press Ser· 
vice (IPS), June 22, 2012. 
25. Peter Nolan, Is China Buying the World? (London: Polity, 2012). Nolan's find" 
ings contradict a view held by both "China Bashers," and more balanced scholars, sucb 
as Dambisa Moyo, Wiruur Taker All: China'• RI>Cll for Reso"""'-' and What it Means for 
the World (New York: Basic Books, 2012). 
26. Gary King, et al., "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but 
Silences CoUective Expression," forthcoming in Amtrican PoliJical Scknce Review in 
2013. 
Zl. On anti-Olinese agitation in Zambia, see Rohit Negj, "Beyond the 'Chinese 
Scramble': The Political Economy of anti-China Sentiment in Zambia. • African Geo-
graphical RevU!w 27 (2008): 41-63; Barry Sautman and Yoon Park, Dragon Slayers: 
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and the Human Rights Watch's row, with Minister of Labor Facli:-
son Shamenda demandinJ a stop to the abuse of Zambians working 
I for) Chinese investors." Another organ of the Government of the 
Republic of Zambia (GRZ) assured readers, quoting verbatim (but 
without attribution) irom HRW's own publicity, that 
Human Rights Watch established in 1978 is a non-profit, 
independent, non-governmental human rights organiza-
tion renowned for its accurate fact-finding, impartial re-
porting, effective use of the media and targeted advocacy 
often in partnership with local human rights groups.29 
These assumptions about HR W are problematic as to its report 
on CNMC in Zambia, which draws empirically inaccurate conclu-
sions and uses a dubious methodology. Despite HRW's verbal ges-
tures distancing itself from the China-in-Africa discourse, the 
report appears to reflect a political agenda, which sets out to pro-
voke inferences based on that narrative. Thus, HRW avers (p.l} 
that through the report, it "begin[s) to paint a picture of China's 
broader role in Africa." 
The report implicitly re-invigorates highly racialized claims 
made about the CNMC and Chinese investments in Zambia. These 
were described in 2fJY1 by John Lungu of Zambia's Copperbelt 
University and Alastair Fraser of Oxford University, leading spe-
cialists of mine labor conditions in Zambia, writing when the sole 
CNMC firm there was NFCA: 
NFCA are commonly claimed to be 'the worst investors', 
usually one step ahead of 'the Indians' ... on a ladder of 
shame of abusing the workforce, ignoring local businesses 
and labor, and showing little interest in environmental 
protection. Swiss, British, South African, Canadian and 
other Western investors are typically labeled 'white' and 
... despite plenty of poor practice ... are assumed to have 
a more sympathetic style of management. The debate is 
Anti·C1tina/anti 4 Chincsc Sentiment in Southern Africa, book ms. in progress. Sata is 
SJlid to have "swept to power on a largely anti.Cbinese, populist ticket." Andrea Hotter, 
"Zambia's Sata Faces Test of Mining Mettle," The Source (IVu/1 Strut Journaf) (WSJ), 
Oct. 20,2011, bttp:/lblogs.wsj.com/ source/2011/IM01umbia%E2%80%99s-sata-r..,.,.. 
lest--of4 min.ing·mettle/. 
28. "Kanyant.a Katongo. "Work within the Law, Cbtnese Told," OM. Nov. 9. 201 t. 
29. "Chinese Labor Abuse True: Human Rights Wotdl," Timn of Zambia {TOZ). 
Nov. 9, 2011 , quotin& HRW. "Wbo are we," www.luw.org/nodei7SI36. 
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clearly heavily informed by racist assumptions ... and a 
fair sprinkling of frequently repeated urban myths.30 
9 
In this paper, we examine conditions at CNMC and Zambia's 
mining enterprises, with an eye to assessing charges of CNMC be-
ing "the worst." We do not conclude that CNMC firms have not 
engaged in labor malpractices, but that, if the empirical evidence is 
engaged through a sound comparative methodology, they cannot 
properly be deemed "the worst." Empirically, we examine CNMC 
practices implicating rights related to safety, wages, hours, unions, 
and job security, finding that the binary approach taken by HRW of 
CNMC vs. the rest is inappropriate.31 At the level of explanation, 
we interpret our findings in the context of the development and 
configuration of Zambian copper mines and find wanting HRW's 
interpretation that CNMC's practices are a result of trivializing 
safety and exporting labor abuses from China. HRW's binarist ap-
proach also does not allow readers to consider a possible rough 
equivalence of rights-affecting practices among foreign mining 
firms in Zambia32 and ignores that practices at CNMC firms are 
generally better than at Zambian-owned companies, whose mines 
are even smaller than those of CNMC,33 not to speak of the mines 
in and across Zambia's borders.34 
30. John Lungu and Alastair Fraser, "For Whom the WindfaUs: Winners and Losers 
in the Privatization of Zambia's Copper Mines." Civil Society Trade Network of 
Zambia, 2008, www.liberationafrique.org/ IMG/ ... /Minewatebzambia.php. 
31. Many media presentations on Africa/China links are explicitly binary. See, e.g. 
"China in Africa: Friend or Foe?" BBC. Nov. 26,2007, http://news.bbc.oo.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
7086777.stm; "China in Zambia: Jobs or Exploitation?" BBC. Dec. 13, 2010, http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/newslworld-africa·ll898960. A number of Western academic analyses, 
including some even~baoded ones. also present readers with a binary in which Clioa's 
role in Africa is either positive or negative,. See, e.g., David Haroz, .. China in Africa: 
Symbiosis or Exploitation?" FleJcMr Forum 011 World Affairs 35:2 (2011): 65-88; Pat· 
rick I. Keenan. "Curse or Cure? Otina, Africa and the Effects of Unconditional 
Wealth," Btrkeky Journal of lmernatio11al Law, 27:1 (2009): 84-126. 
32. We treat this equivalence in a monograph in progress, Red Dragon, Red Metal: 
China's fnyeslmtnl in Zambiiln Copper Mining. 
33. See Munyindei Masialeti, "SmaU Scale Mining in Zambia," Southern African 
Network for Training and Research on the Environment, 2001, www.casmcblna.org/ 
attach..view.asp?IDa49. 
34. See Pan Jibua and John Fogacb, "Going Global, Going Green: CCICED on 
Investment, Trade and Environment," lntematiooallnstitute for Sustainable Develop-
ment, 2012, : 4.3.l("in relative terms, tbe Zambian copper belt was still considered 
'heaven' as a wort location. when compared to the mines in neighboring DR Congo 
and Zimbabwe"), www.iisd.org/pubUcations/pub.aspx?pno;161S. 
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Comparisons of Zambia's mining labor conditions moreover 
become almost beside the point when the abuses that HRW ad-
dresses in its study are viewed in the context of human rights in 
Africa generally. Chinese-owned mining assets are a tiny propor-
tion of all foreign-owned mining assets in Africa. In 2010, the assets 
of the top 40 mining companies in Africa exceeded one trillion US 
dollars and their profits were $110 billion. Chinese investment in 
mining in Africa is a very small proportion of the total investment 
by the top 40 firms; Chinese firms' investment in mining in Africa 
was 29.2% of China's $9.33 billion total stock of all investments in 
Africa in late 2009, i.e. $2.9 billion, compared to $25 billion for the 
US and Euro 11.7 billion for France.3s As a 2011 UN study 
recorded, 
Chinese mining investments abroad are small relative to 
those from other countries. Less than 1 percent of total 
world mine production outside China is controlled by Chi-
nese companies. (Despite rapid growth in recent years, it 
was from an almost zero base). It will take years before 
Chinese companies and China become powerful global 
players in international rnining.36 
Chinese investment in mining in Africa, calculated at about $2.9 
billion in 2009, is also a small ~art of global Chinese mining OFDI, 
which was $41 billion in 2009.3 Chinese investment in Zambia, the 
bulk of it in mining, has also been far behind that of several other 
countries. In 2009, 64% of FDI stock in Zambia was derived from 
five countries, all of whose investment was largely in mining: Ca-
nada: 19%; India 17%; Australia 11 %; Switzerland 11 %; China: 
8%.38 
35. Wu Fang. Chinese Investments: 6,7!}. Outward stock of FDI is the value of 
capital and reserves attributable to a parent enterprise resident in a host economy. If 
measured as cumulative investment flows however, there may be serious measurement 
errors. Sheila Page and Dirk Willem te Velde, .. Foreign Direct Investment by African 
Countries," Overseas Development Institute (London), 2004, www.odi.org.uklre· 
soureesldoc:s/5739.pdf 
36. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "The International Study 
Group Report on African Mineral Regimes, 2011: 34, 36, ISGReporLEng.pdf. 
37. Michael Custer, "The China Syndrome: EffectS of Chinese Investment on Gov-
ernance in Africa," Journal of Polirics and /nrernarional Affairs 9 (2011): 11-41 (13). 
38. Judith Fessebaie, "Development and Knowledge Intensification of Industries 
Upstream of Zambia's Copper Mining Sector.• University of Cape Town, MMCP Dis· 
cussion Paper No. 3, 2011: 21, www.cssr.uct.ac.za/ .. J MMCP%20Paper%203_0.pdf. 
FDI flows in 2006-2010 ranged from S600m to $1.3b a year, 90% for mining and (often 
mining-related) manufacturing. From 2000-2010, about 115,000 new jobs were created 
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Much more egregious violations of labor and community rights 
exist in mining elsewhere on the continent than at CNMC facili-
ties.39 Indeed, the African Union Commission on Human Rights 
and People's Rights stated in 2010 that "Mine workers in most parts 
of Africa work in deplorable conditions often prone to accidents."40 
HRW, however, bas chosen to report on much less deplorable con-
ditions affecting several thousand Zambian miners and, in doing 
so, it shores up the hegemonic China-in-Africa discourse. As one 
scholar has effectively described it, this discourse is 
accompanied by a 'surfeit of poor and tentative scholar-
ship' ... much of which has exotica as its hallmark, involv-
ing generalized analyses of China and 'Africa'- as if there 
were relationships between two countries, instead of be-
tween one and 54. Whilst remaining fiercely critical of a 
Chinese 'resource grab' in Africa, the US and UK media 
have constructed 'China Inc' as a monolithic beast with an 
insatiable appetite for African resources in ways which 
draw upon wider Orientalist discourses.41 
In the end then, the HRW report tells us less about CNMC in 
Zambia or China-in-Africa than about HRW's political agenda. The 
politics of HRW, while avowedly universal and independent, are in 
fact incorporated in global governance as "the capillary ends of the 
in the formal sector; FDI was responsible for about 20% of that. OrganJzation for £co. 
nomic Cooperation & Development, OECD lnV<Srmenr Policy Reviews, Zllmbia 2012: 
29-30, bttp://www.keepeek.com!Oigital·Asset·Managementloecdlfinance·and·invest· 
menl/oeed-investment-policy-reviews-zambia-2012_ 9789264169050-en. 
39. See, e.g., Khadija Sharife, "Zimbabwean Diamond Workers Treated No Differ· 
ent to Prisoners." Pambazuka News (PN), Nov. 3, 2011, www.pambazuka.orglenlcate-
gory/comment/77644/print; War on Want, "Fanning the Flames: the Role of British 
Mining in Conflict and tbe Violation of Human Rights,'' 1JX!I: 2().23, www. waronwanL 
orgl . . JFanning%20the%20Flames.pdf. 
40. "African Union to Tackle Human Rights Abuses of Mineworkers,'' Coal Moun-
tain, Oct. 2.5, 2010, http://coalmountain.wordpress.com/2010110f25/african-union-to-
tackl .. human-rights-abuse-of-mine-worken/. 
41. Marcus Power, "Angola 202.5: The Future of the 'World's Richest Poor Country' 
as Seen Through a Chinese Rear-View Mirror," Antipode 44:3 (2012): 993-1014 (994). 
A widely-viewed BBC presentation on Chinese in Zambia has cast Chinese "both as 
exploiters of African workers and as an 'influx•, thar is, a quasi·natura1 •tidal' threat to 
the continent's indigenous population. • Stepben Harper, "The Chinese are Coming: 
Representations of Cbinese Soft Power in a BBCTelevision Documentary," in Lili Her· 
nandez (ed.), Chintl and tlu West: Encounttrs with the Othu in Culruu, Arts Politics 
and Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge Scbola,.. Publishing, 2012): 33-44 (36). 
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contemporary networks of power."42 The binarist HRW report and 
the discourse in which it is embedded are a Manichaeist obstacle to 
understanding Chinese activities in Africa and give rise to another 
entrapping binarism that dismisses criticism as a defense of the Chi-
nese state. 
n. EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS 
Days after HRW issued its CNMC study, Mineworkers Union 
of Zambia (MUZ) President Oswell Munyenyembe responded to it 
by saying that "his union cannot entirely blame the Chinese compa-
nies because other mining houses are equally culprits." He added 
We cannot wholesomely condemn the Chinese-owned 
mining houses. Remember when we had the global crisis 
no worker was retrenched at any Chinese mine [unlike at 
other mines]. Yes, they have their own problems like mis-
treating workers and not following labor laws, but other 
mining houses are also culprits in this area. It is not only 
the Chinese mining companies.43 
The MUZ President thus disputed HRW's central argument: that 
CNMC, among the foreign investors that dominate Zambian min-
ing, is almost uniquely culpable of abusing workers' rights. That 
argument is based on HRW's proclaimed "accurate fact finding," 
yet Zambian union leaders and monitors of mining, who know 
more about practices across the industry than do the individual 
workers interviewed by HRW, differ with it factually- and with its 
conclusions that single out Chinese-owned firms as the worst 
employers. 
Even Minister of Sport Chisamba Kambwili, the PF's most 
consistent baiter of "the Chinese,"44 has indirectly negated HRW's 
42. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Empire (cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2000): 313. On NOOs in Africa bolstering neoliberal hegemony, see Issa 
Shivji. "Silences in NOO Discourse: the Role and Future of NOOs in ACrica," 2iXJI, 
www.pambazuka.org/enlpublications/pz_sr_l4.pdf 
43. "'Cbjnese Firms not that Bad. says Miners' Union,'' OM, Nov. 4, 2011. See also 
"Minister, Union Defend Chinese Labor Conditions," ZW, Nov. 5, 2011 ("(Deputy 
Minister of Labor Rayford Mbulu] says not only Chinese mining companies have been 
Ooutiog labor laws but all employe~ should try and ensure their workers are properly 
looked after"), www.zambianwatchdog.com/archives/2.S835. 
44. Kambwili stated in a 2010 Parliament debate that "the miners in Luanshya and I 
have declared war on the Otinese . .. These boo. Ministers must listen to us. We liYe 
with these Cbinese and when we tell them that these Otinese are bad, they must listen 
and not defend them.'' Nov. 25, 2010. www.parliameot.gov.zml index.php? op-
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conclusions. During his stint in 2012 as Minister of Labor, he paid 
many surprise visits to enterprises in Copperbelt, the center of 
Zambia's mining industry. Several visits were to Chinese-owned 
firms, but many were to non-Chinese firms. Kambwili concluded 
that "three quarters of the companies owned by foreign nationals 
he visited on the Copperbelt were not complying with labor laws. "45 
A. Safety Records Compared and Contextualized 
Among Zambia's foreign copper mining firms, CNMC is a rel-
atively small producer. Like other foreign investors, its entry into 
Zambia was facilitated by a World Bank-ordered privatization of 
Zambian SOE's. In the 1990s and early 2000s, 280 parastatals, ac-
counting for 85% of Zambia's economy, were privatized through a 
corrupt process"'~: 6% of firms were closed, 65% were sold to Zam-
bians, and 29% went to foreign firms, with firms of Zambia's ex-
colonizer Britain the leading beneficiaries.•' Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines (ZCCM), the country's largest parastatal, was di-
vided and sold to seven foreign investors.~ 
Scholars of mining in Zambia attribute worsened conditions in 
mining since the 1990s to privatization,49 a result that parallels 
worsened conditions for miners in China due to privatization and 
marketization. Western media, however, have a history of claims 
that safety conditions at CMNC mines in Zambia, but not mines of 
tionECOm_oontent&task;view&id;1316&Jtemid;86&limit;1&!imitstart.o3. 
Kambwili's anti-Chinese stance continued after the PF attained power in 20ll. See 
Barry Sautman, "The Chinese Defilement Case: Racial Profiling in an African 'Model 
Democracy,'" forthcoming in the Rutgen Journal of RDct Dnd Law. 2013. 
45. "Kambwili Justifies Stance on Investors," The Post (TP; Zambia), Feb. 3, 2012. 
46. Miles Larmer, Mimworken in Zambio: LAbour and Political Change in P<m-
O>Ionlal Afrltll, 1964 - 199/ (London: LB. Tauris 2007): 5; John R. Craig, "Evaluating 
Privatization in Zambia: a Tale of Two Processes," Review of African Political Economy 
27 (85) (2000): 355-366. See also 1R Craig, State Ent<rprise and Privatitation in 
:!Ambia, 1968-/998, unpub'd diss., University of Leeds, 1999, http:lletheses.whiterose. 
ac.uk/46111luk_bLethos.)41205.pdf; RAID-UK. "Privatisation in Zambia: What it 
Means for the Majority," s.d. 1999?, raid-uk.org/docs/Zambia/FacLSMets.pdf. 
<f'l. Ton Dietz. "Revisiting Peripheral Capitalism in Zambia," in Paul Hebind<, et 
a!., Taks of Developmeru: People, Power and Space (Assam, Netherlands: Van Oorcum, 
2008): 61-78 (70, 72). See also UNCTAD, Investment Polley Review :!Ambia, 2006: 9 
(list of privatized firms), unctad.org/enldocsliteipc200614_en.pdf. 
48. See Luka Powanga, "Divesting the Zambian Mining Industry," Ivey School of 
Business, 2004. www.smcmba.com/index.php?option:com, 
49. Fraser and Lungu, For Whom: 21-31. Mine community residents also complain 
that "'standards of living in their towns have deteriorated since ZCCM.'' i.e. since priva· 
tization. "Riots Rock Cbingola," LT, Mar. 15, 2012. 
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Western-based firms, are in general abysmal. In 2011, for example, 
a "trusted" UK business journal asserted that 
At Chinese-run mines in Zambia's copper belt [employ-
ees] must work for two years before they get safety hel-
mets. Ventilation below ground is poor and deadly 
accidents occur almost daily. To avoid censure, Chinese 
managers bribe union bosses and take them on 'study 
tours' to massage parlors in Cbina.50 
No evidence accompanied these assertions. As we will show, deadly 
accidents at Chinese-run mines occur not daily, but 2-3 a year on 
average. Miners have helmets from the onset of their work.51 
CNMC Zambian employees sent to China who we interviewed 
went there to learn about CNMC and China's development and did 
so. 52 We will compare CNMC's fatality rate with the overall fatality 
rate of foreign-owned mines in Zambia from 2001-2011, and also 
compare Zambia's fatality rate with that of other countries, particu-
larly China. We will then interpret CNMC's safety records in the 
context of mining development in Zambia. We find not that 
CNMC mines have no safety problems, but that they are not the 
worst in that regard. 
/. Falalities as a Key Indicator of Safely 
Many HRW study readers have doubtless been impressed that 
it was based on interviews with miners. Indeed specific observa-
tions of miner interviewees about safety deficiencies they exper-
ienced or witnessed, such as having to work in unsafe conditions, 
cannot be wholly dismissed. The interviewees cannot however relia-
bly infer from their experiences that CNMC operations are less safe 
than those at other firms. Any such inferences are highly suspect, 
given the climate of intense anti-Chinese prejudice present where 
they work and live. 
A better measure of whether one mining firm is safety defi-
cient, compared to others, is whether the firm accounts for a highly 
disproportionate share of fatalities. A leading sociologist of indus-
SO. ''Trying to Pull Toselhcr: 1hc Otinese in Africa." The &onoml3t. Apr. 23, 2011. 
51. See Deborah Brautigam, "The Chinese in Afriea: tbc EconomiSI Gets Some 
Thinll' Right, Some Thinll' Wrong.," China in Africa: the Real Story. May 20, 2011. 
www .chinaalrica!ealstory.axn/. 
52. Interview. Mr. Maupa, NFCA Operations Superinteodent, Otambishi. Aug. 23. 
2008. An NFCA employee stated in 2008 tbat the fum seods lour :Z.mbtans to China 
per month. Didtens Kauoda, Knv.e, Aug. 13, 2008. 
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trial injuries has put forward that "The data which are the most 
reliable indication of safety are those for fatalities."~3 Less-than-se-
rious injuries may go unreported, but firms in Zambia cannot avoid 
reporting fatalities, while serious injuries correlate with deaths, as 
both mostly result from rock falls. 54 Fatalities data are thus indica-
tive of safety practices, although the logical principle of ceteris 
paribus (other things being equal) must also be applied, to account 
for the differing features of mines. Given the small number of 
Zambian mine fatalities, comparison of rates between firms is not 
useful,~~ comparing CNMC firm fatalities and the 2001-2011 to-
tal for foreign-owned copper firms does not indicate that CNMC's 
safety record is extraordinarily bad. 
According to union-provided statistics, fatalities in all foreign-
owned copper firms from 2001-2011, with corresponding figures for 
the CNMCowned operations, were: 
53. Tbeo Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Industry (London: Mansell, 1997): 
126. 
54. H.B. Miller, et al., "Identifying Anteoedent Conditions Responsible for the 
High Rate of Mining Injuries in Zambia," lnternatwnal Journal of Occupa!ionol Envi· 
ronmental Health 12:4 (2006): 329-339. 
55. The HRW report author agrees. "Rights Group Blast Cbinese Mines in 
Zambia," Associated Press (AP), Nov. 3, 2011. 
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Table 1: Total Fatalities in Zambia Copper Mining 
and CNMC Zambia Fatalities 
Deaths in all Foreign-owned 
Mines and their Total CNMC Firm Fatalities and 
Workers (Higher & Lower Total Workers (Higher & 
Years Estimates) Lower Estimates) 
2001 23 (21,000) 13,500 1 (2800) 2300 
2002 17 (21,000) 13,500 2 (2800) 2300 
2003 21 (26.000) 13,500 4 (2800) 2300 
2004 19 (30,000) 13,500 2 (2800) 2300 
2005 34 (50,000) 40,000 1 (2800) 2300 
2006 18 (52,000) 40,000 3 (2800) 2300 
2007 15 (58,000) 40,000 0 (2800) 2300 
2008 22 (59,000) 38.000 1 (2800) 2300 
2009 17 ( 40,000) 32,500 4 (5800) 5800 
2010 14 (55,000) 53,000 3 (5800) 5800 
2011 19 (55,000) 53,000 4 ( 5800) 5800 
Total Fatalities 2001-2008: 169 Fatalities; 2001-2008: 14 Falalities; Ave. 
and Ave. No. Ave. Total Workers (39,600) CNMC Workers (2800) 2300 
of Workers 26,500 2001-2011:25 Fatalities; Ave. 
for 2001-2008 2001-2011: 219 Fatalities: CNMC Workers (3618) 3255 
and 2001-2011 Ave. Total Workers (42.700) 
31,900 
Sources for Fatalities:56 
From 2001-2008, before CNMC acquired CLM and operation-
alized CCS, we estimate that its firms averaged 2,800 employees -
7.1 o/o of foreign-owned copper mining firm employees, which ac-
cording to one source averaged 39,600.'7 Using the 39,600 figure 
for all foreign copper mining firms' average employment in 2001-
2008, CNMC firms had 8.2% of the 169 fatalities and 7.1 o/o of the 
56. For 200!-2010, MUZ. "Statistics of Mine Accidents by the Mine/Division lor the 
Past 11 Years." photocopy, MUZ, Lusaka. Aug. 17, 2011: for 2011. Mine Safety Oep't 
(MSO). "Mining Industry Safety Record from the Year 2000 to August 19, 2011." 
photocopy. Kitwe, August 23.2011 and interview, Wilford B<:sa, Inspector, MSD, Aug. 
19, 2012. There were 46 fatalities in a 2005 explosion at BGRIMM dynamite plant, 
which was 60% BRIMM-owned, 40% NFCA-owned and BGRIMM·managed. MUZ 
does not attribute BGRlMM fatalities to NFCA and we omit them. W<.e MUZ. we 
include fatalities at (white-owned) Ox Drilling Co. 
57. Nicholas Wilson. "Economic Growth and tbe HIV/AIOS Pandemic: Evidence 
from the Early 21st Century Copper Boom,'' 2010: Figure 4, mitsloan.miLedulneudc/ 
papers/paper _302.pdf. 
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workers. It thus bad a slightly higher than average fatality rate, but 
that is before taking into account the key safety-affecting factor of 
mine operation configurations: whether a firm's mines are under-
ground, an open pit or a mix (see below). 
The 39,600 average of miners in 2001-2008 is uncertain how-
ever. 1n 2011, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce 
Trade and Industry Lubasi Sakwiba told a parliamentary committee 
that "An estimated 13,500 people were employed in the mining sec-
tor between 2000 and 2004. "58 While that may seem too low anum-
ber, a 2002 business journal article also stated that Zambia's mines 
then had "about 10,000 full-time employees and 4,000 contrac-
tors,"59 numbers which do not include the 30,000 small-scale miners 
in the country.60 Zambia's Chamber of Mines stated in 2010 that 
total employment in mining at the end of2007 was 40,017 and at the 
end of 2008, 37,751.61 Assuming 40,000 employees in Zambian min-
ing for 2005 and for 2006,62 average mining employment for 2001-
2008, using these alternative figures, would be 26,500. Given an esti-
mate of 2,800 CNMC employees for 2001-2008, but an average of 
26,500 for Zambian copper mining's total 2001-2008 workforce, 
CNMC would have had 10.6% of Zambia's mining workforce, but 
8.2% of fatalities. If the estimate for CNMC workers is also low-
ered, to say 2,300, the CNMC firm share of the total mining 
workforce would be 8.6% and, again, 8.2% of fatalities. 
58. "Zambian Mining Sector Creates 44,000 Jobo in 4 Years," UKZAMBIAN$, 
Feb. 6, 2011, www.uk%ambians.ro.ulclbomei2011/02Rl6/zambia·mining-sector-create .. 
44000-jobo-4-years/. 
59. Ous Selassie, "Mining Oiant Agrees on Exit Deal witb Oovernment," World 
Markets Analysis, Aug. 20, 2002. See also Brian Denny, "Mining Oiant Plans Exit from 
Zambia," Morning Star (UK), Jan. 26, 2002 (more tban 10,000 permanent employees 
and 4,1Xl0 contractors in Zambian mining). 
60. Munyindei Masialeti and Crispin Kinabn, "The Socio-Economic Impacts of 
Small-Scale Mining: the Case of Zambia," in Oavin M. Hilson (ed.), n,. Soci()o&f>. 
nomic Impacts of Arti.sanal and Smal/4 Scole Mining in Developing Countries (London: 
Taylor & Francis, 2003): 325·334 (331). 
61. 01amber of Mines of Zambia, "The Mining Tax Debate: an Endless Tug of 
War?" Presentation to the Public Discussion Forum, July 16, 2010, Solwezi: 8, www.eaz. 
org.zml ... 1201007230426570.CMZ. %20PRESENT A Tl0N%200N%. 
62. A study indicates Zambia had 38,000 miners in 2005, all formal sector miners, 
but not only copper miners. Maarten van Klaveren. et at, "An Overview of Women's 
Work and Employment in Zambia: Decision for Ufe MD03 Project Country Report 
No.4," University of Amsterdam, 2009, OecisionsJor..Ufe_Country_ Report-Zambia. 
pdf; Lungu and Fraser, For Whom: 22 reoord almost 39,000 Zambian oopper miners in 
September, 2006. 
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In any case, for 2001-2008, CNMC's share of fatalities appears 
to roughly approximate its share of Zambia's copper mining 
workforce. That may actually be better than expected, as NFCA's 
managers during that period, unlike many of the managers at other 
mines, began working there with no experience of the idiosyncra-
sies of the long-closed Chambishi mine. A study of de-Nazification 
of Germany has described how the victorious Allies in 1945 re-
moved Nazi mine managers and replaced them with others who 
lacked experience of the mines where they were placed. Many 
mine accidents occurred, including, in early 1946, the Peine cage fall 
that killed 46 miners and Unna explosion that killed 418 miners.63 
In 2009-2011, CNMC's proportion of fatalities was higher, be-
cause its workforces grew and incorporated more inexperienced 
workers. New mines built at Chambishi and Luanshya meant more 
workers doing construction, which raises the likelihood of fatalities. 
From 2001-2011, using the higher average total foreign mining firms 
workers (see Table 1), CNMC firm workforces averaged 8.5% of 
total Zambian copper mining foreign investor employees, but 
11.5% of total fatalities. Using the lower estimates of total foreign 
firms' workforces and the CNMC workforce for 2001-2011, CNMC 
had 10.2% of the total workforce and 11.5% of total fatalities. For 
2001-2011 then, CNMC had a slightly higher than average fatality 
rate, but without taking into account differences in mine operation 
configurations. 
These figures in themselves make it unlikely that CNMC firms' 
safety conditions are markedly worse than those at other mines. 
Fatalities statistics also put paid to fantastically inaccurate recollec-
tions such as "NFCA used to have fatalities almost every month. "64 
Zambian foreign-owned mines averaged ten fatalities a z,ear 
from 1997-2002, but by 2004 that number increased by 70%. s A 
study of a large, non-Chinese-owned mine showed 20 fatalities from 
63. Frederick Taylor. Exorcising Hltltr: The Occupation and Denazificatwn of Ger· 
many (London: Bloomsbury Press. 2011): 309. 
64. Goodwell Kaluba, General Secretary of NUMA W, quoted in Mary Kay Magis· 
tad. "Mining in Zambia: One Year alter Collum Coal incident." PRJ's The World, Oct. 
4, 2011, www.theworld/org/2011/ lOfmining·in·zambia-one·year·after..collum-coal-inci-
dent/. 
65. Otristopher Adam and Anthony Simpasa, "The Economics or the Copper Price 
Boom in Zambia/' in Alastair Fraser and Miles Larmer, Zambla. Mining, and Neoliber· 
a/ism: Boom and Bust on tlu: Globalized Cop~rbelt (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010): 59-90 (90. fn. 29). 
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January 2005-May 2007.66 Then-MUZ president and now Deputy 
Labor Minister Rayford Mbulu stated, with only slight exaggera-
tion, that in the 2000s "at least two employees per month [were) 
dying" in the whole set of privatized copper mines.67 His successor, 
Acting President of MUZ Charles Mukuka told us in 2011 that 
''The current investors don't invest in safety. They're in a burry to 
make money ..... Now every month there are fatalities. "68 
Zambia is not however a high mining fatality country by world 
standards. It is not among the 60 most dangerous countries for 
miners listed in 2011 by the International Federation of Chemical, 
Mining and General Workers Unions {ICEM).69 ICBM has annu-
ally tracked, 12,000 or 15,000 reported fatalities in mining as a 
whole. In many countries, a lot of mining deaths are not recorded 
however, because firms pay miners' survivors to keep quiet.'0 No 
accurate figure for the world total of miners exists either, as ar-
tisanal miners may or may not be included. A union federation bas 
guessed at a 20 million miner total.71 Assuming that number and 
20,000 fatalities, the annual world death rate would be 100 fatalities 
per 100,000 miners. Zambia foreign-owned mine fatalities are now 
at about 16 a year, among some 55,000 copper miners or 29 deaths 
per 100,000 workers. It is a much higher rate than in Australian 
mining (3.5 deaths per 100,000 workers in 2009-2010),72 where the 
death rate may be especially low, not only because of very ad-
vanced technology, but also because of the predominance of open 
66. Prudence Micbelo, et al., "Occupation Injuries and Fatalities in Copper Mining 
in Zambia," Occupational Medicine 59:3 (2009): 194. 
(il. Frederick Mutesa, "China aod Zambia: Betw«n Development and Politics," in 
Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, The Rise of China and India in Africtl: Challenges, Opportll· 
nities and Critical Interventions (Uppsala: Nordiska Alrikainstitutet, 2010): 167-1&0 
(176). 
6&. Interview, Charles Mututa, Acting MUZ President, Kitwe, Aug. IS, 2011. 
69. ICEM, "Mine Safety and ILO Convention 176: a Continued Priority Cor 
ICEM," Apr. 24, 2011, www.icem. org/en/209-!L0/4383-Mine-Safety-and-ILO-Conven-
tion-176:-A-Continued-Priority-for-the-ICEM; ICEM, "World Conference for the Min-
ing Industry: Global Mining, Global Otallenges, Global Union Action," 2004: 24, www. 
icem.org/files/PDF/Events .. .12004MineEN.pdf . 
70. "Fatalities Go Unrecorded in Mining Industry: Experts, • Reuters, Oct. 11, 2010. 
For Ch.irul, see Tim Wright, ~ Polili<al Economy of the Chinese Coal Industry: Black 
Gold and Blood-Stained Coal (London: Routledge, 2012): 161. 
71. "Purpose, Otaracter and Aims of an International Miners' Conference," Inter-
national Coalminers, May 24, 2010, www.minersnet/org. 
72. Karen McNab and Magaly Garcia-Vasquez, "Autonomous and Remote Opera-
tion Technologies in Australilln Mining,": 15, Nov. 2011, www.csrm.uq.edu.au/Link 
Oick..aspx?fileticket. 
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cut mining.13 The fatality rate is however lower than in South Af-
rica's platinum mines in 2008.74 Zambia's rate is half that of US 
mining" and the rate in Chile, the world's largest copper producer, 
may be up to four times higher than in the US.76 
Zambia's fatality rate is much lower than in China, a world 
center of mining fatalities due to poor governance, remote rural 
mines,n fast expansion of small township and village enterprise 
(TVE) mines and a huge mining workforce - up to 3 million in the 
mid-2000s in coal alone, working in thousands of legal and illegal 
mines.78 China's coal mining fatality rate, for example, even just for 
key SOE mines, exceeds the rate for all US mines, although 90% of 
Chinese coal mines are underground, while two-thirds of US mines 
are open-pit.71> Moreover, China's top eight mining groups ac-
counted for only around 20% of national coal output in 2010 ... 
whereas in the U.S. just three companies produced 70%." Thus, in 
addition to other factors, the comparatively high fatality rate in 
China also reflects much more scattered control over safety condi-
tions, "the difficulty of regulating 12,000 mines, and the fact that its 
coal veins are so deep underground. "so 
Ownership also matters: China's national SOE mines are on 
par with other developed countries and safer than local SOE mines, 
which are in turn safer than the (disguised privately-owned) TVE 
73. "Mining Rights," Dally Examiner (Grafton, Australia), Nov. 5, 2011. 
74. Unnatural Deaths. ICEM uses fatalities per 100,000 workers "because what 
matters to a miner in considering whether a mine is safe or unsafe is whether be or she 
goes home intact at the end ol the day. The number ol tons mined in that day is secon· 
dary to that fact." ICEM, Mine Safety. 
75. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 
2010," Aug. 25,2011. 
76. Gideon Long, "Mining Safety: What Ues Beneath?" AmCham Chile, Oct. 2010, 
www.businesscbile.cllenl news/mining-safety-what-lies-beneath. 
77. See Andrew Horner, ''Coal Mining Safety Regulation in China and the USA," 
Journal of Comemporary Asia 39:3 (2009): 424-439. 
78. Vincent Kolo, "Privatization and Greedy Officials Responsible for Coal Mining 
Accidents," China Worker, May 28.2007, httpJ/chinaworker.info.enloontent/newsll91; 
Jeffrey Hays. "Coal in China," Facts and Details," 2008, httpJ/factsanddetails.coml 
china.php?itemid:322&catid:J3&subcatid:85. Some 80% of mines in China are said 
to operate illegally and without safely regulations. Edward Wong, .. Chinese Mine Dis-
aster Ends with 74 Dead," N•w York Times (NYT), Feb. 24. 2009. 
79. Wright, The Political Economy: 163·164. In the US, 97% of all metals come 
from OC mines; in the world, two-thirds come from OC mines. Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy Network, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office ol Industrial 
Technologies, website on mining. http:J/www.oit.doe.gov/mining. 
80. James Areddy, "China Coal Sector has Safety Setback." WSJ. Sept. 3, 2012. 
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mines.81 For coal mining fatalities, in per million tons terms from 
2001-2009, the rates were key SOEs 0.7, local SOEs 2.2 and TVE 
mines 3.9.62 Put another way, 
Large, government-run coal producers in China recorded 
a fatality rate of 0.28 per million metric tons mined in 2010 
while small operations killed five times as many people, or 
1.4 . . . China's national average in 2010 was 0.75 deaths 
per million tons, down sharply from 7.6 deaths per million 
during the mid-1980s.83 
Responding to growing public concern, China's central govern-
ment took measures over the past decade to reduce fatality rates,84 
by revamping the regulatory framework for work safety and closure 
of tens of thousands of TVE coal mines.85 Reported fatalities 
dropped from 6,000 in coal mining alone in 2005 to 1,973 in 2011.!6 
It is unlikely the drop is due to mine bosses being more successful 
at covering up deaths, as "the discrepancy between reported coal 
mine deaths and true fatality levels has been narrowed down in re-
cent years"87 and there is now more public scrutiny and tougher 
penalties for cover-ups.88 
Some 65% of copper worldwide is mined in open pits, which 
are less dangerous than underground mines. China has just seven 
open pit copper mines, accounting for 10-20% of its mined cop-
81. UNCfAD, World Investment Repon 2(}()7 (Geneva: UNCfAO. 2(}()7): 149. 
82. Wright, The Political Economy: 169. 
83. Areddy. 2012. 
84. Wang Shaoguang, "Regulating Deaths at Coal Mines: O>anging Mode of Gov· 
ernance in O>ina," Journal of Contemporary China 15:46 (2006): 1·30. From the mid· 
2000s, officials who covered up mine deaths were executed and mine managers ordered 
to go down the shafts. The Iauer practice was strengthened in 2010. "China Official 
Executed in Accident Cover-up," NYT, Feb. 21, 2004; "Mine Bosses to be Scot Down," 
Nov. 8. NYT, 2005; "China Introduces Mine Safety Rule," BBC News, Oct. 7, 2010. 
SS. For example, Otinese regulations now ban temperatures above 26 degrees in 
mines and require iostaUation of cooling systems. See "Fir>t Central Mine-Cooling Sys. 
tem with Siemag Tecbeg Technology in China," Siemag Tecberg. s.d., www.siegmag-
tecberg.com/ inforcenter/tecbnical-infromation/tL31-liuzbuang.html. 
86. "Mining the Story of King Coal," Shanghai Daily, Juoe 6, 2012. 
81. Tu Jiaojun. "Coal Mining Sarety: China's Achilles' Heal," China S.curily Re-
view 3:2 (2007): 36-53 (38). 
88. See "Cbina Mine Cove.r-up Leads to Dismissal of Officials," Xinhua, May 2, 
2011; "Mine Cover-up Exposed," Bon, June 3, 2010, www.bonlive.con/116712465-mine-
cover-up-exposed.sl!tml; Wright, The Political Economy: 169 ("it seems certain that the 
industry bas substantially improved safety over the past eight yean;"). 
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per.89 No figures exist for copper mining fatalities alone, but with 
500,000 workers in non-ferrous mining and dressing, which includes 
copper, China's non-ferrous reported fatalities are 83 per 100,00090 
or 2.9 times the Zambian copper mining rate.9 t This difference indi-
cates that if CNMC officials are determined to disregard human life 
by trivializing safety and bent on exporting China's mining condi-
tions to Zambia, they are doing a poor job of it.92 The argument of 
exporting China's practices is also ironic given changes in safety 
conditions in China's mines. The leading Western specialist of coal 
mining in China has observed that 
There has been a spectacular improvement in China's coal 
safety record over the last decade - the number of deaths 
has fallen by about two-thirds during a period when out-
put has more than doubled. Although one has to remain 
skeptical about the details of the official statistics, at least 
a major part of the decline in fatalities does reflect a real 
improvement. This improvement has been due to a num-
ber of factors: high profits creating the resources to invest 
in safety; the beginnings of labor shortages allowing 
workers to demand better conditions; the higher priority 
89. Martin Streicher-Porte and Hans Jorg Althaus, "Ollna and Global Markets: 
Copper Supply Chain Sustainable Development," International Institute for Sustaina-
ble Development (Winnipeg: !ISO, 2010): 16. 
90. The State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) website show< that China's 
non-coal minins sector ill 2009 had 1,540 fatalities. www.cbznasafety,aov.en. Non-fer-
rous milling aa:ounled for 27% of 2010 non-coal fatalities, Telephone illterview wilh 
SAWS, Beijing. Nov. 16,2011. U that percentage also applied m 2009, non-ferrous min-
'"' had 416 fatalities. Around 2008, lhere were 116.600 emplo)ees 111 copper mining 
and dressing. Shang Fushan, et al., •Sustainable Development of the Olinese Copper 
Market," (Winnipeg; IISD. 2010): 16. 
91. No one reties only on reported fatality rates in China however. When reported 
deaths in mining in China still topped 6,000 annually in the mid-20005. it wa.• noted that 
•·unorricial data provided by a senior wort~safety bureaucrat suggests that as many as 
20.000 miners actually die each year." Tu. Coal Mine Safety. 38. 
92. Managers at CNMC rlrms are aware they cannot replicate Chinese practices in 
Zambia. An NFCA executive hos stated that "The Chinese way doesn't work here. and 
copying it will make trouble." Another bas said " We can't apply Chinese standards 
v.hen making demands of Zambtan workers.· HAN Weo and SHEN Hu, "China's 
Harsh Sque= in Zamboa's Copperbelt," Csiltin. Nov. 10. 2011. hn.p:llcbina-wire.org/ 
?p-16823. 
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put on social and safety issues by the WEN Jiabao - HU 
Jintao government; and collaboration with foreign safety 
experts.93 
2. Operational Configurations and Fatality Rates 
23 
Unlike NFCA and CLM, non-CNMC foreign-owned Zambian 
copper mining firms do not have only underground (UG) mines. 
Some have open cast (open pit, open cut, or surface) mines; others 
are mixed. The two firms with mixed configurations are KCM and 
MCM: KCM Nchanga is OC (55% of production) and UG (45% of 
production). MCM Nkana also has both UG and OC mines. 
Chibuluma South (in operation from 2004), Kansanshi (in opera-
tion from 2005), and Lumwana (in operation from 2008) have only 
OC mines.94 
HR W's compares safety in terms of attitudes or practices, but 
operational configurations also determine outcomes: UG mines 
usually have many more casualties, including many more fatalities, 
than OC mines. A mining safety journal explains that "The main 
factors contributing to high injury and fatality rates in underground 
mines are the confined spaces people work in, the lower degree of 
visibility and that personnel may work directly beneath (unde-
tected) unstable grounds."95 The deeper the UG mine, the more 
likely there will be casualties. 96 At over 900 meters, NFCA 's 
Chambishi Main is a deep UG mine. CNMC Luanshya's (CLM) 
main Baluba mine, at 580 meters, is also a fairly deep UG 
operation.97 
93. "Eight Questions: Tim Wright on China's Blood-Stained Coal," Otina Real 
rune Report, Feb. 2, 2002, http:/lblogs.wsj.cornlcbinarealtime/2012102102/eigbt-ques-
tions-tim-wrigbt-blaclc-gold·and·blood-suined-coall?mod= WSJBiog. 
94. MUZ, Statistics and Mine Safety Dep't. Mining Industry. 
95. "Incident Alert," Minesafe (Australia) 12:1 (May, 2001): 12. 
96. See S.K. Puri, "Safety Management in Indian Coal Mines," in Pradeep 
Chaturvedi (ed.), Challences of Occupational Safety and Health (New Delhi, Concept 
Publishing Co., 2006): 161-168 (166). 
IJ'I. CLM commissioned an OC mine, Mulyashi (Mulia.shi) in early 2012. Its initial 
workforce was to be~. but by April, 2012, 800 young Zambians had been hired, many 
from the workforce of the CNMC.affiliated mine construction flfiD 15MCC. The Muly-
ashi workforoe is expected to reacb 1,500, all pensionable permanent employees, when 
the mine is fully operational. "$368m Mulia.shi Mine Opens this Months-End," OM, 
Feb. II, 2012; "Muliashi Mine Opening: Is this the Rebirth of Luanshya?" Zambian 
Guardian Weekly, Mar. 23, 2012: "Muliashi Leading Luansbya to Lost Glory," TOZ. 
Apr. S, 2012. 
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Mining firms in Zambia are well aware that UG mmmg is 
much more dangerous than OC mining. KCM, which has two UG 
and three OC mines, has stated that its safety "record was impres-
sive considering that 70 percent of its workforce is involved in un-
derground operations where the risk factor is high. "98 Zambian 
officials also know UG mining is more perilous: Minister of Mines 
Maxwell Mwale noted in 2010 that Collum Coal Mine "was exper-
iencing a lot of accidents especially underground and urged CCM 
management to consider having an open pit mine lilce their counter-
parts at Maamba Collieries . ...,., 
Exactly how much more dangerous Zambia's UG mines are 
compared to OC mines is not certain, as we lack documentary data 
for the Mopani Copper Mine disaggregated as to UG and OC 
workers. Even reports of MCM's number of UG and OC mines are 
not necessarily accurate. It has been said to have four UG and four 
OC mines."X> More precisely it seems, MCM has four UG and four 
OC mines in its Nkana concession, but only the four Nkana OC 
mines produce copper. The UG mines produce cobalt. MCM also 
has three copper-producing UG mines at Mufulira,101 which "cur-
rently" employ either 5,000 or 8,000 workers.102 Breakdowns for 
workers in Nkana·s UG cobalt and OC copper mines, as well as at 
the Nkana Concentrator and Nkana Cobalt Plant have apparently 
not been published. 
Nevertheless, in 2012 MSD inspectors provided us fatality 
figures by mine for 2006-2011 that identified those that are OC and 
UG. These indicate that 12 died in OC mines and 92 died in UG 
mines, a ratio of 7.7:1, while we estimate that for the non-CNMC 
foreign-owned mines as a whole, half of the workers arc in UG and 
98. "KCM in Safely Pcrfonnanee Reoo<d as Employees Que>IIOO 11," LT. Mar. 1. 
2010 
99. "CCM 10 Re-open Soon, say• Mwale." TP, Jan. 2A, 2012. 
100. The Nkana OC llllilOS appear to be designated as Areas A, D and J. as well as 
Mindola. while the Mufulira UG mines are Mufilira Central, Mufilira East and Mufulira 
West. Golder Associates, "MOP"ni Copper Mines Pic,": 61S, 625, 740, psh.hkex. 
oom.hk/userpages/eipo/englishl Glencore_2_e.pdf: John Chadwick. "Cuprum Zambia," 
lnrtmatlonol Mining (July, 201 1): 46-52 (48). 
101. "Gieocore: the Value in Volatilily Initiating wilb a Buy." Deutsch Bank AGI 
London, June 6. 2011:89, www.$Crtbd.eomldoc/S72S4342132/Mopani-%E2%80%93-Up-
JT&ding-and..:onsolldatiog·lo-lamot-eost·infiatioo. 
102. "Mopani Copper Mme." Wokopedia, updated to Jan. 21, 2012, bupJ/en ... iki 
pedoa.orlf"'iki/Mopani_Copper _Mone ; "Mopani Needs 10 Caleb Second Wind," Africa 
Monong lm~Uig<na, Sep1. 22. 2010. 
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half in OC mines. The inspectors themselves put the UG/OC fatal-
ity ratio for the copper mining industry over the years at 8-9:1.103 
Statistics from other countries that distinguish fatality rates by 
UG and OC mines show much higher rates in UG mines. In the 
US, the fatality rate of UG mining is nearly three times that of OC 
mining.104 US copper mining is concentrated in Arizona, where 
"Copper represents the lion's share of the state's mineral produc-
tion" and fatality rates are low. The Arizona Department of Mines 
and Mineral Resources director has "said the fact that Arizona has 
few underground mines also could be a reason for lower fatality 
rates. "Surface mining is always ... in general safer than under-
ground. "1os In Australia, the fatality incident rate (fatalities per 
1,000 employees) for the metalliferous sector from 1997-2007 shows 
deaths in UG mines were 6.3 times higher than in OC mines.106 
Another indication of the fatalities rate differential between 
UG and OC mines in Zambia is found in a study of KCM from 
January, 2005 to May, 2007, when 6,338 KCM's workers were in the 
Underground Department and 2,601 in the Open Pit/Construction 
Department. There were 17 fatalities among the UG miners and 
one fatality among OC miners, a fatality ratio of 7:1 when the rela-
tive size of the UG and OC workforces are taken into account.107 
Another way to show that fatalities are more likely to occur in 
Zambia's UG copper mines than its OC mines is to compare fatal-
ity records of firms that only have OC mines with the overall fatal-
ity rate in Zambian copper mining. Such comparisons will still yield 
a significant underrepresentation of the UG/OC difference in fatal-
ity rates, because the fatality rate for OC mines only is not being 
compared with the fatality rate for UG mines only, which is pre-
103. Besa interview. 
104. See table "Mining Fatalities: AD U.S. Mines Accident/Injury Oasses• in "Brief-
ing Book for the Niosb Mining Program" (section 1.4 "Research Needs'') (Atlanta: 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005), http://www.edc.gov/niosblnaslmin-
inglpdfslwbatis-resean:bneeds.pdf (We calculate fatality ratios for 1990-2004 using 
1992-2002 employment fogures). See also a 20-year US study, V.K. Karra, "Analysis of 
Non-Fatal and Fatal Injuries Rates for Mine Operator and Contrac10r Employees and 
tbe Influence of Location," Journal of Safety Research, 36:5 (2005): 413421 (418} (sur-
face mine fatalities are 64.3% lower than UO mine fatalities}. 
105. "Arizona Mining Fatalities have Declined, Injury Rates Up," Arkoflll RepublJc, 
Oct. 17, 2009. 
106. Minerals Council of Australia, "Safety Performance Repo.rt of the Australian 
Minerals Industry 2006-2007": 15. www.minerals.org.au/safety. 
107. Michelo, et al., Occupational injuries: 192. 
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eluded by the lack of published data on the workforce breakdown 
of MCM's UG/OC. 
Kansanshi, an OC mine with about 4,000 workers has operated 
since early 2005. In 2005-2011, there were four fatalities, for a fatal-
ity rate of .00014. Using the higher estimate of miners at all UG 
and mixed UG/OC foreign-owned copper mines, which had 130 fa. 
talities in 2005-2011, their fatality rate was .00042, i.e. three times 
the Kansanshi rate. Using the lower estimate of miners at the UG 
and mixed UG/OC mines, the fatality rate at these mines was 
.00055 or almost four times the rate for Kansanshi. 
Lumwana, an OC mine with about 3,800 workers, bas operated 
since late 2008. In 2009-2011 it had two fatalities, for a fatality rate 
of .00017. Using the higher estimate of miners at all UG or mixed 
UG/OC foreign-owned copper mines, which had 44 fatalities in 
2009-2011, their fatality rate was .00035, i.e. twice the Lumwana 
rate. Using the lower estimate of miners at the UG and mixed UG/ 
OC mines, the fatality rate average at these mines was .00039 or 
almost three times the rate for Lumwana. 
Chibuluma South, an OC mine with about 600 employees bas 
operated since mid-2004. In 2005-2011, it had one fatality, for a 
fatality rate of .00023. Using the higher estimate of miners at aU 
UG or mixed UG/OC foreign-owned copper mines, which bad 130 
fatalities in 2005-2009, their fatality rate was .00042, i.e. almost 
twice the Chibuluma rate. Using the lower estimate of miners at 
the UG and mixed UG/OC mines, the fatality rate at these mines 
was .00055 or about two and a half as high as at Chibuluma. 
The above comparisons were between each of these three OC 
mines and the combined fatality rates of all Zambian UG and 
mixed UG/OC foreign-owned copper mines. Much higher UG/OC 
fatality ratios would be found if comparisons could be made be-
tween the overall fatality rate of the three OC-only mines and the 
overall fatality rate of the UG mines. That is especially so given 
that the mixed UG/OC mines are KCM and MCM, which employ 
roughly two-thirds the total of Zambia's foreign-owned mines' 
workforce and had two-thirds of the fatalities in 2001 -2011 (145 of 
217). 
CNMC firm facilities have bad a high level of rehabilitative 
and new construction. Deaths are more likely among building, 
rather than working in mines, because mine construction in Zambia 
is done mainly by less-skilled contract workers and because, as a US 
SIUdy notes, mine construction has ·•a relatively high frequency and 
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severity of worker injuries and fatalities from acx:idents."108 Skill 
levels affect safety and are lower at CNMC mines than at other 
mines, in part due to salaries, 109 but in large measure because most 
of Zambia's non-CNMC mines have been open continuously; for 
example, Mopani has operated since 1932. 
NFCA Chambisbi Mine was closed for 13 years before its ac-
quisition in 1998 by CNMC and was the first African mine bought 
by a Chinese company.11° CLM had been abandoned repeatedly by 
former owners. Luanshya mine was acquired in 1997 by Ramcoz, 
whose main investor was the UK/Indian firm Binani. Ramcoz went 
into receivership in 2000 and the mine was flooded, closed and 
stripped until 2004. Its next owner, Switzerland-based J&W 
("Enya"), abandoned it in 2008, during the global financial crisis. It 
was stripped again, requiring a year of refurbishment before CNMC 
could fully resume operations. Continuously opened mines create 
more skilled, experienced and higher-paid workers;'" when mines 
close, skilled workers drift away or are de-skilled and are often hard 
to recruit again, especially in Zambia which, like many mining 
countries, is acutely short of skilled miners.112 A longer develop-
ment of technicaVmanagerial expertise in a particular mine setting 
may also matter.113 
to& Pllilip Udo-lnyana and Toulolope Adenubi, "Safely Chanctcriotia of Mine 
Constructloll Sites, • ASC Proceedlll&S, 40th Annual Conference, 2004, http://asc-
proO.ascweb.org/an:hiveskd/200412004pro/20031 Udoinyang04.hrm. 
109. See Rozemarijn Apntbeker, "Foreign Copper Mining Companies in Zambia: 
Who &nefilS7" unpub'd MA thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2009: 60, dare.uva.nV 
document/134161. 
110. Kopinski and Polus: ISS. 
Ill. Due to long continuity of employment by ooo.cNMC miners and discontinui· 
tieS at OIMC mines created by former owoers. mo<e non-0-IMC mu>ers bave IDO\'ed 
up tbetr salary lacldets. Interview, Waq JIDJUD, Deputy CEO (prndiiCIJOII) and Robert 
Ko.manp. Deputy CEO (technical), CLM, Luansbya. August 17. 2012; Interview. Fred-
crick Chola, Human Resoun:es MlDaJer, CLM, Luansbya, AuJ. 17,2012. 
I 12. "Zambia KCM Launcba Onve to Boost Stills of Local M1nen." Tenderslnfo, 
Mar. 25, 2010. It bas been noted that "Low productivity am<liiJ Zambian workers eau 
be due to lack of sttills and social ottitudes or culture ... The World Ba.nt ... puiS tbe 
value added per Zambian worker at US$2,700 per annum, far below countries lil:e Ke-
nya, India and China. Similarly, stilts shortages bave been obocrvcd by oome local and 
foreign investors ... " Sebastian Kopulandc and Chilesbc Mulengo, "Impact of Snutb-
Snulh Cooperation and Integration oo tbe Zambian Economy: the Case of Chinese 
ln,·estment," Background Paper No.4 for UNCTAD, 1be Least Developed Countries 
Report 201 I, Idcr.)OI IJ<opulande'!f.20an<l'lf._CD(I).pdf. See abo Wbat 10'0Uid it Take: 
7 ("Low productivity is in larJe part driven by pps in worken' udts tbat arc rooted in 
.. eat technical and vocatiooal trau11na from industry and tninina inotltulioas"). 
I 13. See WriaJ>t, 1be Polital Economy: 172. 
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Fatalities are also linked to subcontracting, as accidents dispro-
ponionately occur among contract workers. who are not perma-
nently employed by a mining firm. 114 Zambia's MSD Director bas 
noted that "Most companies do little work on their own. This bas 
contributed to accidents, because contractors are poorly supervised 
and don't employ people on a full-time basis. Their workers might 
get a quarter of the regular salary ... Most accidents occur with 
contractors' employees."'" Many accidents occur because contract 
workers' bosses try to meet unattainable targets in order to collect 
bonuses.1' 6 MUZ's CLM branch chairman bas also pointed to sub-
contracting as hazardous: 
There's a quite OK safety record in the main mine (but] 
the contractors [constructing a new CLM mine] are not 
good in safety. Both foreign and Zambian contractors 
need to understand our standards ... With Chinese, you 
just need to convince them. Then they will give you 
whatever safety equipment you want." 117 
Fatalities rise with work expansion and the pressure to pro-
duce, especially when copper prices are high. 118 The MSD Director 
has stated that "Supervisors in mines are all supposed to be safety 
officers, but are often pressured to maintain production schedules." 
He did not single out Chinese-owned mines in that regard. When 
mining firms push to expand, fatality rates rise as new workers are 
brought in to boost production. For 22 months, from October, 2006 
114. Similarly, in China, mining accident very disproportionately occur among mi· 
srant workers and contract workers. Wright, The Political E<>onomy: 187·188. In the 
US. the fatality nne among contract mtners is about 3.3 times higher than among per· 
mancnt mine employees Karra. Analysis: 420. 
liS. Interview with Mr. Mooya Lumamba, August 19.2011, who ated shaft sinking 
by South Afri<:ao ooolnlelors 11 KCM and Brazilian oootroctors 11 MCM. edding that 
·Fon:igners take the btg ooouacu. Zambians have small and mcdtum •ized oonlriCIS." 
The Dislrict Commissioner of Sol•·ezi. home 10 Kansansbi DllOe, cril.az.ed its owners 
tor twng fO<eign oonttac~ors for tub $UCh as cleaning and stated that "the former 
Zambian oootractors were PIY"'i their employees between Kl.2 mtlhon to K2 million. 
but the new foreign investors are paying the same workers K400.000 net.'' He added 
that Kansa.nsbi sources supplies from South Africa and Ghana. "Zambians Being 
Treated Like Children." 1.. T. Jun. 21. 2008. 
116. Apotheker, Foreign Copper: 67. 
117. Interview. Stanislas Mwinbe. Luanshya. Aug. 17. 2011. The contract workers 
referred to did mine construction, not mining. 
lt8. In China. reduced demand for coal in the 1990s led to strapped mines reducing 
.. pendllures for and adversely tmpacltn8 safety. The boO<n tn demand for coal in the 
2000s resulted in a dme for tncre...,d production and that too negatively affected 
safety. Wright. The PohiJcal Economy: 188-189. 
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to August, 2008, NFCA had no fatalities, an industry rarity. In Au-
gust, 2008 GAO Xiang, then NFCA vice CEO for human resources, 
stated "Now we pay special attention to safety. We would rather 
spend the money on preventive measures than spend it on the after-
math. The good conditions [including this record] we have don't 
come easily. We value them." 119 In a 2011 interview, referring to 
this past experience and expressed determination, we asked CEO 
WANG Chunlai about NFCA's fluctuating safety record. He said 
The amount of work that we have is much greater than 
before. Before, we only had one ore body to work on; 
now we have two which are in operation and a third one is 
in development. With the main ore body, as you go 
deeper there is more stress on structures. Now we go 
down to more than 1,000 meters. The ceiling there gets 
unstable and that can create injury. We do try to look for 
weaknesses in our safety work. As the scale of work en-
larges, we've recruited more new workers, so our trainin:£ 
may be lagging and we have to invest more in training.1 
3. Health & Safety Compared 
In 2011 interviews, union leaders and mining regulators held 
views on safety and other labor matters more in keeping with MUZ 
President Munyenyembe's than those of HRW. MUZ Acting Presi-
dent Charles Mukuka said labor abuses occur mostly because the 
law permits them and added "I don't blame the Chinese for what 
they're doing, because of what they found in terms of our labor 
law."121 Zambia's Chief Mining Engineer said NFCA is "doing well 
now around these issues. They're raising the bar. "122 The MSD 
Chief Inspector of Mines singled out NFCA in terms of its first five 
years of operation (2003-2008), when he said it "was the worst mine 
in terms of safety. It didn't want to do sufficient support work. And 
it didn't have proper ventilation." Now, however, he said "NFCA is 
OK" and "no longer stands out.'' 123 When asked which Chinese 
firms comply with the country's labor laws, Zambia's Assistant La-
bor Commissioner listed only CNMC firms: CLM, NFCA and CCS, 
119. Interview, Gao Xiang. Cbambishi, Aug. 19, 2008. 
120. InterView, Wang Olunlai, Cbambishi, Aug, 15, 2011. 
121. Interview with Charles Mukuka, August 15, 2011. 
122. Interview, Delax Olilumbu, Lusaka, Aug, 10, 2011. 
123. Interview, Mr. Kal.,;, Kitwe, Aug, 16, 2011. 
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three of the four companies HRW says are labor abusers.' 24 Simi-
larly, two scholars in the US have noted that "Roy Mwaba, General 
Secretary of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, acknowledged 
that the larger Chinese enterprises were abiding by local labor 
law."125 
MUZ's Director of Occupational Health and Safety told us 
that at Chambishi mine, the firm was still not doing well in terms of 
ventilation systems, but that the safety situation at Chambisbi was 
better now than it was during the period from the 1970s to late 
1990s, when Zambia's copper mines were state-owned. Safety 
training had particularly improved.126 The president of the main 
union at Chambisbi, the National Union of Mine and Allied Work-
ers (NUMA W), also stated that safety was improving there. 127 The 
MSD Director stated that 
Chinese mines have some of the most advanced technol-
ogy. For example, CLM has got the best winder, having 
replaced the old one that was in place since the 1930s. 
NFCA has the best trolley line. CLM has introduced the 
best dust abatement system. They've done a good job in 
terms of dust control.128 
GAO Xiang, then-CLM Vice CEO, related that "When we 
took over the mine, there was so much dust underground that it was 
impossible to stay there." Displaying then-and-now pictures in 
CLM's newsletter, Gao remarked that ''The local Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) didn't seem to interfere with the previous 
owners in that regard. Had we been like that, the EPA would cer-
tainly have come to us. CLM spent $60 million on updating equip-
ment and now when you go down the shaft, it's much better." On . 
safety, he noted that from June 2009-December 2010 there was only 
124. Interview, Venus Seti, Lusaka, Aug. 12, 2011. 
125. Deborah Brautigam and Tang Xiaoyang, "African Shenz.ben: China's Special 
Economic Zones in Africa," Journal of Modem African Studies 49:1 (2011): 27-54 (45). 
126. Interview, Webby Mushota, IGtwe, Aug. 16, 2010. A 2011 study of Zambia min· 
ing concludes that "The standards of safety have declined since privatization and con· 
Iribuled to an increase in aecideniS and fatalities." Swedish Trnde Council, Gabrone, 
Botswana, "Pre-Study of the Mining Sector in Zambia for Geological Survey of Swe-
den," SGU-Pre-Study-Zambia-Mining-Final-Version-September-2(}.2011-Short-Ver-
sion-Final(! ].pdf. 
127. Interview, Goodwell Kaluba. NUMAW President, IGtwe, Aug, 19, 2011. 
128. Interview. Mooya Lumamba, Kitwe, Aug, 19,2011. A winder or hoist raises or 
lowers conveyances. such as the cage containing miners, into a shaft. TroiJey lines feed 
trolley trucks thai carry cargo. 
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one fatality, also that "We've been complemented on the health 
and safety front" and that "this record bas completely changed the 
situation from what was obtained earlier, when we weren't in con-
trol of the situation. "'29 
Health and safety remain industry-wide problems. Lungu and 
Fraser found it improved in recent years, largely due to technical 
advances; yet, substantial problems remain, because the privatiza-
tion of the mines in the late 1990s and early 2000s allowed new 
owners to bring in many contract or casual workers, whose firms 
are often paid by how much tunnel they develop.130 There have 
been several studies of conditions at foreign-owned copper mines in 
Zambia that have drawn conclusions about health and safety gener-
ally or about specific mines. NGOs that studied conditions at KCM 
around 2()(J7 reported that 
Some contract workers told us their firms had given them 
insufficient equipment. .. underground workers said they 
are meant to have two pairs of disposable gloves a week 
but are given only one pair a month; and they often have 
to buy protective clothing from their own meager wages. 
The unions sbare this concern about the safety of contrac-
tors. NUMA W general secretary Albert Mando told us 
that contracting firms 'do not put much interest on [con-
tract workers') safety; they want to do the job, take the 
money and forget about the safety of their workers'. Offi-
cials from the Mines Safety Department have also said 
that the use of contractors is their biggest worry.131 
129. Interview. Gao Xiang. Luanshya, Aug. 17, 2011. 
130. Lungu and Fraser, For Whom: 24. A UN report bas stated that "Casualization 
has been described as one of the 'salient results' of privatization on tbe Zambian Cop-
perbelt, with traditional •permanent' positions reportedly accounting for only half of all 
mining jobs in the five major copper companies in 2fX)8. .. Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA), "Minerals and Africa's Development: the International Study Group 
Report on Africa's Mineral Regime" 2011: 62, www.africaminingvision.org/amv •. J 
AMV/ISG%20Report_ eng. pdf. "Contractors are paid 'by the meter', so some will driU 
ahead in tunnels as fast as tbey can to maximize their wages. without stopping to prop-
erly reinforoe the roof sheets. leading to collapses and rock-falls." "Zambia Conned for 
Copper," Azaonline. Dec. 4, 2011. www.azaonline.org{Jndex.php?option:com_content 
&view---article&i(i;68:z.ambia·conned .. for .. copper&catid•3S:demo-oontent 
131. Action for Southern Africa, et a!., "Undermining Development? Copper Min-
ing in Zambia, Oet. 2007, www.actsa.org/Pictures/Uplmageslpdf/Undermining%20de 
velnpment%20report.pdf. An NOO stated in 2007, abnut mines generally, tbat "Condi-
tions on health and safety are of concern. Workers are given insufficient equipment or 
nothing at all." Apotbeker, Foreign Copper: 63. citing "Annual Report 2007 Caritas 
Ndola." The HRW reports devotes much attention to the failure of three of the four 
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Another NGO did a study of. MCM, published in 2010, which stated 
that 
working conditions are difficult. 1n the mine they are de-
scribed as "pathetic" due to the lack of ventilation and the 
heat. A worker explained: "They will tell us to go ahead, 
where there is no ventilation, as long as they're producing 
. . . When there is an inspection, they show other parts 
underground (than those not ventilated)." Many miners 
complain of leg pain and respiratory problems . . . A study 
in 2008 revealed however that in mines managed by the 
company ... levels of silica in the air exceed rates author-
ized by US regulations. This means that emission controls 
are insufficient, and that miners are ex~sed to greater 
risks of lung diseases, especially silicosis. 32 
A study by still another NGO of the (white) South African firm 
Metorex's Chibuluma mine in Zambia concluded that 
The company has no clear policy on occupational health 
and safety. Union officials claim the company bas done 
away with safety committees that used to be in place dur-
ing the (state-owned) regime and now arranges ad hoc 
safety meetings at sections underground . . . contrary to 
(Tnternational Labor Organization] Convention 176.133 
CNMC firms to replace workers' personal protective equipment (PPE) more than an· 
oually. According to a Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions spokesman. the failure 
to even provide PPE is common in Zambian industry. "'Strikes are Avoidable: ZCfU," 
TP. Jan. 12, 2012. ZAN Baosen, general manager of Zambia·Olina Economic and 
Trade Cooperation Zone Development Ltd., the firm managing the Chambishi Mulli-
Facility Eoonomic Zone (MFEZ) where the Chambishi Copper Smelter is located. has 
declared that MFEZ enterprise managers who allow workers to report for work without 
the PPE issued to them will be fined. He noted that some workers leave their PPE at 
home. others report it stolen when it was not been, and still others stU their PPE and 
expect to be issued more. "Chinese Developer Speaks Tough on Safety Standards," 
TOZ, Dec. 26,2011. While dnmaged PPE should be replaced promptly, it is far.fetched 
to claim, as HRW does.. that a failure to do so more than once a year. without cost to 
the worker, necessarily amounts to a huma.n rights violation. 
I32. Counter Balance. "The Mopani Copper Mine, Zambia: How European Devel-
opment Money has Fed a Mining S<:andal," Dec. 2010: 16-17, www.oounterbalance-eib. 
org/?1"'347. 
133. Austin Muneku, "South African Multinationals in Zambia: the Case of 
Chibuluma Mines, Pic." in Devan Pillay (ed.) South African MNCs Labour and Social 
Performance, 2005: 258-283 (275), www.gurn.info/ ... lmining-africa-south·african·mo<s-
labour-and-society. 
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No one, including CNMC, asserts there are no health and 
safety problems in its Zambia facilities or that at these and other 
mines such problems do not require urgent attention. Yet, a 2010 
study monitoring the underground environmental in Zambian cop-
per mines "revealed that very little is being done by the owners of 
the mines to ensure a safe working environment for the miners ... " 
and "that the current methods are not very effective and a number 
of accidents that could have been avoided were recorded in the past 
five years."134 
Taking into account fatality figures and differences in the con-
figuration of mines, there is no empirical basis for labeling CNMC 
the worst in terms of safety. There is also a logical contradiction 
between HRW's acknowledgment that safety at CNMC firms is be-
ing improved and its assertion (pp. 1-2) that these firms "have 
tended to treat safety and health measures as trivial" and "appear 
to be exporting abuses along with investment." In any case, HRW's 
assertion of exporting abuse does not square with fatality rates in 
China and Zambia. The assertion about trivialization not only ig-
nores different structural conditions of mining development, but 
also calls to mind hoary stereotypes, which have been around for 
more than a century in the West and spread to Africa, that the Chi-
nese are cruel and have a disregard for human life.'3' 
Such stereotypes are found in both contemporary Western 
journalism about China-in-Africa and in the minds of Zambians in-
fluenced by the PF anti-Chinese campaigns. For example, workers 
at Chambishi Mine told a researcher in 2008 that "the Chinese do 
not value life because there are so many of them in China. "136 The 
father of a worker injured in a 2010 shooting by two Chinese super-
visors at a small, privately-owned Zambian coal mine told journal-
ists that "The Chinese don't care about human life and do just what 
they want."137 
Referring to the HRW report, then-Minister of Labor Fackson 
Sharnenda "said the ruling party (PF) had been 'vindicated' for its 
134. Nchimunya Olaamwe, et al., "An Assessment of Underground Mine Environ· 
mental Monitoring Methods at Zambia's Copper Mines." Rtseorch Journal of Applied 
Sciences 5:5 (2010): 345-351. 
135. We extensively discuss past and present notions of Chinese cruelty and disre-
gard for human life, including in Africa, in a paper in progress "Bashing the Ollnese: 
Contextualizing Zambia's Collum Coal Mine Shooting," forthcoming in 2014 in the 
Journal of Contemporary Chino. 
136. Jamie Whitloelr., "Digging for Prosperity: Mining and Labor Practices in 
Chambishi, Zamiba," unpub'd MSc thesis, Unive,.ity of Oxford, 2008: 9. 
137. '1'he Dark Side of Coal," TP, Nov. 15,2010. 
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hard stance on Chinese investment ahead of the polls."138 Thus, the 
PF now proclaims that the HRW report shows that it was right to 
engage in years of anti-Chinese incitement. Judged by global re-
portage, the main result of the HRW report has been to bolster 
anti-Chinese sentiment, rather than to improve safety in the mines. 
B. The Wage Gap: Factoring in Contract Workers, Productivity 
and Profits 
The HRW report contends there is a large pay gap between 
CNMCowned firms and other foreign copper mining investors, as-
serting that "Chinese copper mining companies offer base salaries 
around one-fourth of their competitors' for the same work" 
(p.24).139 In contrast, in 2011, John Lungu compared miners' 
CNMC mine salaries with those at MCM and KCM, the two largest 
foreign-owned copper firms in Zambia. 
MCM and KCM are the best payers among the mine own-
ers. But the Chinese have responded to criticisms. The 
lowest wage in Chambishi went up from 400,000 Kwacha 
to Kl.S million and there've been later increments ... Chi-
nese companies have not caught up completely with the 
Western companies in terms of incomes in the mines, but 
they're not lagging behind too much. There's been great 
improvement.14<l 
A wage gap continues. It is explicable, however, in terms other 
than the desire of CNMC - and by extension, Chinese enterprises 
more generally, to export China's labor standards, as claimed by the 
HRW report and larger China-in-Africa discourse. Factors that 
mitigate and explain - but do not excuse- the wage gap, include 
I38. ••we are Good Guy: China," OM, Nov. 9, 2011. 
I39. Base salary or basic pay excludes subsidies for housing, transporl and medical 
care that all foreign-owned mines pay in Zambia and that amount to much of miners' 
IOta! income. Base salary or basic pay figures quoted are Iypically for the lowest paid 
miner at a given firm. The HRW report itself contains contradictions and makes gener-
alizations about pay not supported by the specifics it provides; for example, the report's 
generalization that "Chinese copper mining companies offer pay base salaries around 
one-fourth of their competitors' for the same work." This unqualified statement applies 
only to CNMC processing plants. wbere only 20% of CNMC firm employees work and 
which bave particular difficulty turning a profit. The report's wage annex differentiates 
between pay in processing plan IS and mines. Large pay hikes at the CNMC processing 
plants in 2012 have narrowed the difference in pay between these small enterprises and 
the mines. 
I40. Interview with John Lungu, Kitwe. Aug. IS, 2011. 
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the presence of a much larger number of low-paid contract workers 
at several non-CNMC mines141and lower productivity and profits at 
CNMC mines than at other foreign-owned mines in Zambia. 
HRW did not taken these factors into account when comparing 
wages at CNMC and other firms. Yet, as MUZ president Charles 
Mukuka has observed, "It is common knowledge that undertakings 
141. CNMC firm openotions on Dec. 31, 2011 had 10,716 workers. Contrary to a 
common assumption, Chinese are only a small proportion: NFCA 3,433 (Chinese 388); 
CLM 4,889 (Ch 458); CCS 1,995 (Ch 347) and SML 399 (Ch 47); total: Chinese 11.6%; 
Zambians 89.4%. Yet, 732 of the 1240 Chinese were mine construction-exploration 
firm workers who leave on project completion. In mine construction. lSMCC bad 1.320 
workers (Cb 370; Zm 950) at CLM and 804 workers (Ch 212; Zm 592) at CCS. A mine 
construction contractor at NFCA, Tongling Zhongdu, bad 90 Chinese and 205 Zambi-
ans; exploration firm Sinomine Resources had 60 Cllinese and 192 Zambians. "Web 
Proof lnfonnation Pack, Chi.na Nonferrous Mining Corp. Ltd.," June 29, 2012: 185, III-
148-150, iis.aastocks.com/20120629A:)()1454807-0.pdf. As Zambia's Minisler of Mines 
pointed out in 2011, "whenever there are big projectS being undertaken at any opera-
tion, there is an increased number of expatriates." Zambia Parliamen~ Debate, May 31, 
2011, www.partiamenLgov.zm/index.pbp?option=CODLCOntent&task=view&id;;1440& 
ltemid><U&limit-l&limitstart-4. Disregarding construction and exploration firm em-
ployees, CNMC employees were 6.3% Chinese (508 of 8,045), in acoord with CNMC's 
claim that 6.3% (324) of its 5,137 direct employees in Zambia are Chinese and all others 
Zambians. Ibid: 145, 181, 183. As of June 30, 2012, locals were 94% of all direct 
CNMC employees in Zambia (6,194 total: 379 Chinese and 5,815 Zambians). See 
China Nonferrous Mining Corp. Ltd, "2012 fnterim Report'': 25, http://nuodayir.com/ 
todayinlttachmenUtk/cltinanonferrous/attacbment/20120914170201001503963_en.pdf. 
That ratio also acoords with local-to-Chinese ratios at large Otinese SOEs operating 
abroad. See "Getting the Balance Right," Chlt~afrlca 4 (June 2012} (20:11ocal: Chinese 
ratio at Sinohydro operations in Africa); "Chinese Firms Build Bridges witb Commurti-
ties in Africa," ChinD Daily (CD), Nov. 3, 2011 (local: Chinese ratio 15:1 at China Road 
& Bridge Co. in Kenya); "Annual Report 2011," China National Petroleum Corp., 
2012: 16 (non·Chinese 91% in CNPC overseas), www.cnpc.com.cn/enlpress/publica 
tlons/annualreport/20111. Non-directly employed workers (5,579) at CNMC operations 
in Zambia are "subcontractors' employees." Web Proof: 145. Most have the same con· 
ditions as direct CNMC employees or else do ntine construction/exploration. Since 
early 2011, most workers in NFCA 's operations (1,907 [176 Chinese) of 3,433) work for 
JCHX Mining Construction, a .. long·-term cooperative partner" of CNMC lbat does 
mining at NFCA. "Otarnbisbi Copper Mine in Zambia, Africa (Under Construction)," 
2011, www.tjskl.org.cnlproducts-search/czae93f5/cbambishi....copper..mine_in...zambia_ 
africa_under_construction-pz2709502.htrnl. NFCA said then that tbe transfer of its 
mining workers to JCHX "was purely administnoth-e and ... would not in any way 
disadvantage or alter the status quo of all the employees concerned in terms of condi-
tions of service." JCHX workers' permanent and pensionable status seems to have not 
been affected and they are part of labor contracts covering NFCA employees. 
"Chambishi Workers End Strike," Plarts Metals Week, Jan. 24, 2011; "18 Miners Ac-
cused of Damaging Property at Otinese Nonferrous Metals in Zambia, • Steel Guru, 
Feb. 22,2011. In contrast, many contnoct workers at non-CNMC mining firms do min-
ing. bul are paid much less than permanent miners. 
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or employers have unique productivity and unit cost profiles and 
their ability to pay differs from employer to employer, due to nu-
merous factors."142 Even after critiques of its report pointed out 
these factors, 143 HRW still ignores the presence of large propor-
tions of contract workers at non-CNMC firms who sharply diminish 
average wages, as well as these firms' much higher levels of produc-
tivity and profitability compared to CNMC companies. 
1. Making Contract Workers Visible 
Zambia's Vice President stated in 2005 that J&W, the then 
Swiss owner of Luansbya, was the lowest payer in the copper min-
ing industry.'44 There were structural reasons for that and no one 
has yet claimed that it reflected stereotypical Swiss financial pro-
bity. Luanshya was closed from 2000-2004, and from 2004-2008 fi-
nancially-strapped J& W imposed a wage freeze.'•~ Thus, workers 
could not progress up the pay scale and their pay was the lowest. 
CNMC argues it has not been the lowest payer in Zambia's 
copper mining industry and that pay is related to its mines' circum-
stances. NFCA 's CEO stated in 2011 that "Our production scale is 
fifth in the industry and our salaries are at mid-level, corresponding 
to our position in the industry." He added that the firm's average 
basic pay is about half that of KCM, the highest payer. 146 Former 
Vice-CEO of CLM GAO Xiang had averred that average basic pay 
there is about 80% of KCM's level.147 CNMC's assertion that its 
mines, where 80% of CNMC Zambian employees work, pay 50-
142. "Don't Take Advanl8ge of President Sata's Threat to Dismiss Civil Servants. 
MUZ Cautions Employers," OM. Mar. 12, 2012. 
143. See, e.g. our short essays "Barking up the Wrong Tree: Human Rights Wateh 
and Chinese Copper Mining in Zambia," Pambazuka News No. 563, Dec. 14. 2011. 
www.pambazuka.orglenlcategorylfeaturesl78660; "Gilded OuiSide, Shoddy Within: the 
Human Rights Watch report on Chinese onpper mining in Zambia.'' Asia-Pacific Jour· 
nal, Vol. 9, Dec. 26,2011, www.japanfocus.orgi·Yan-Hairong/3668; "Wrong Answers to 
the Wrong Question: Response to HRW" Pambazuka News No. 568, Feb. 2, 2012, www. 
pambazuka.orglen/category/ features/79602; "One Dog Barking Sets the Whole Street 
A-barking," China-in-Africa: the Real Story. Feb. 7, 2012, www.chinaafricarealstory. 
comi2012102Jhrw.meets<ritics·report-on .. chinas.btml. 
144. '"Stop Employing Casual Workers,'" TOZ, May 6, 2005. 
145. "Zambia Mining Making R()8ring Profits from the Sale of Copper," SteeiGuru, 
Mar. 24, 2011. 
146. NFCA CEO Wang Cbunlai and tile unions interviewed in "Zhongse Zanbiya 
bagong shijian" (The Incident of Strike at NFCA in Zambia). Xin shi ji Nov. 7. 2011, 
http:i/magazine.caixin.cn/2011·11.0S/100322640.html. 
147. Interview. Gao Xiang, Beijing, Oct. 20, 2011. 
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80% of what is paid at KCM contradicts HRW's claim of a larger 
gap based on the companies' apparent wage scales. 
The estimates of CNMC firm workers earning 50-80% of what 
miners at the highest-paying KCM earn are because, unlike at 
NFCA and CLM, workers at KCM (and at MCM and other mines, 
as of 2011, and Lumwana, since 2010)148 include many low paid 
contractors'. NFCA's CEO and the CLM Vice-CEO have said 
however that almost all their firms' workers are permanent.149 
Comparisons about pay that fail to take into account the large num-
bers of contract workers at some mines, but not others, are 
misleading. 
Table 2: Permanent Employees and Contract Workers 
("Contractors"), 2009-2011 
FU11ls/Mines Permanents Contractors Contractors % 
Vedanta: KCM 9696 {2010) 11,081 {2010) 54 
Glencore; MCM ca. 8,250 {2011) ca. 8,250 {2011) 50 
FQM: Kansanshi ca. 3,000 {2011) ca. 1,000 {2011) 25 
Equinox: Lumwana 1,347 {2009) 1,764 {2009) 57% 
Metorex/Chibuluma 621 {2010) 222 {2010) 26% 
Sources:150 
148. "Lumwana Reaches Deal," M<tals W«k, Jan. 25, 2010. 
149. Except managers above age SO, who had contracts, and builders of new [acili-
ties, wbo no firm regards as permanent. CNMC firms do bowever bite permanents 
from among contract workers wben mine conslruction projects are finished. Wang 
Chunlai and Gao Xiang August2011 interviews. From 2008, NFCA made the vast ma-
jority of its workers permanent. In that year, o( 2,062 employees {probably locals only) 
were permanent; 167 were contract workers. Apotheker, Foreign Copper: 41. In Octo-
ber, 2009, it was announced that CLM would hire 2,300-3,000 employees and that all 
would be "pensionable." Zambian Parliament, Debate, Oct.!, 2009, www.parliament. 
gov.un/index.pbp?option...,om_content&task=view&id=1022&Itemid=86&1imit=l& 
limitstart=2. In early 20!0, CLM stated that 2,300 workers were permanent. "Labor 
Laws should be Reviewed," TOZ. Jan. 8, 2010. The Deputy Minister of Labor noted in 
2009 that at CNMC firms "only those that have passed the retirement age of 55 would 
be engaged on special contracts of between two and three years. • "Chinese Firm to 
Build $300USm Leach Plant," OM, Aug. !9, 2009. 
ISO. Konkola Resources Pic, "Announcement of Initital P\lblic Offering on the 
London Stock Exchange,": 2, s.d.Nov. 2010?, www.bloomberg.com/appslnews?pid=co 
newsstory&lkr=VEO:LN&sidaamCdCrSNif4M; Rob Davies, ''The Other Face of 
Glenoore Mining that Investors Never See," Daily Mail {UK), Nov. 21, 2011; Felix 
Ngosa and James van Alstine, •·Seeking Benefits and Avoiding Conflicts: a Community-
Company Assessment of Copper Mining in Solwezi, Zambia," 2011:23, www2.1se.ac.uk/ 
geographyAndEnvironmenthesearcb!Sustainable%20Syoergies/PublicationsiZambia% 
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Regarding contract worker's wages, the HRW report (p. 119) 
states that "government officials and business representatives told 
(HRW) that the Ministry of Labor outlined in 2008 that subcontrac-
tors had to pay salaries that were at least 80% of that paid by the 
main company to their permanent employees, reducing the previ-
ous disparity." In fact, according to MUZ, while Zambia's Ministry 
of Labor did make such a proposal in 2008, the policy was never 
implemented.151 In 2012 the then-Minister of Labor "bemoaned the 
high levels of casualization of labor in mining companies, saying the 
Ministry of Labor will review labor laws to resolve the problem."152 
Even in countries with laws requiring narrow contract-perma-
nent worker pay disparities, the laws may not be enforced. For ex-
ample, Thailand's labor code has, since 2008, required firms to pay 
equal wages to "agency" workers doing the same jobs as permanent 
workers. The law however has been "severely undermined" by 
company practice, so much so that Thailand is now a focus of an 
international confederation of unions' contract labor project.153 
With casualization so prominent in recent years and a huge gap 
continuing to be seen between the wages and benefits of permanent 
20Community-Company%20Assessment.pdf; Zambian Parliament, "Report of the 
Committee on Economic Affairs and Labor ..• September 23, 2010,": 19, www. 
parUarnent.gov.zm!index.php?option:com_docman&task;doc_view&gid=867; 
"Equinox: Annual Report, 2009," 2010: 19, btlp:lica.hotstocked.comidocs/EQN/ 
equinoJLminerals_limitedlannua(Jeport/annual2010.pdf. See also "Mopani Copper 
Mines." E-Biz Guides, s.d. (MCM has 17,600 worker.;: 8,200 "employees." 9,400 
contract worker>}, s.d., 2011? www.ebizguides.com/ebizpartner.;_see.php?id_country_ 
sponsor.;=15&ebizpartnersid=336; "KCM Launches New SIOOm Concentrator," OM, 
Jan. 20, 2012 (KCM has "over 22,800 permanent and contractor workers"). Before 
J&W closed Luanshya in 2008, it bad 1,740 direct employees and 1,000 contract 
workers. Apolheker, Foreign Copper: 99. 
151. Telephone interview, Charles Mukuka, in Ndola, Dec. 20, 2011. See also 
Mine Watch Zambia, Apr. 2008 (discussing proposal), bttp~/minewatchzambia.blogspot. 
com/20Q8_()4_01_arcbive.btml. 
152. "Expatriates Face 'Audit,'" OM, Jan. 8, 2012. 
153. "Special Newsletter: Developments in the Global Contract and Agency Labor 
Project," Sept. 15, 2010, www.icem.org/eni73-/Contract-and-Agency·Labour/400S.Spe-
cial-Newsletter-Developments-in-the-Giobai-Contract-and-Agency-Labour-ProjeC1. 
Lower·paid contract miners also exist in developed countries. Equal pay for contract 
workers (50% of the workforce) and prevention of a seven·day-on, seven·day..off work 
schedule were goals of a 2011 strike by BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Australian coal miners. 
"Coal Miners Go on Strike in Queensland, Australia," The Militant, July 4, 2011, www. 
themiUtant.com12011n524/752432.hlml. 
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and casual workers, the World Bank has come to consider casual 
employment as part of the informal sector. 154 
In Zambia, casuals seem to not be deemed as employees under 
the law155 and "little has been done to compel mine owners to en-
gage more permanent employees."156 In the 2008 presidential elec-
tions, the PF "promised laws that would compel mine owners to 
respect Zambia's labor laws by hiring workers on a permanent ba-
sis, with full benefits. "157 Casualization in mining continues how-
ever under the PF: in 2012, Copperbelt minister Davis Mwila still 
had to "urge mining firms to employ workers on a permanent basis 
to ensure development in the country,"158 as none of the promised 
laws were enacted.159 The head of the United Mineworkers Union 
of Zambia stated in 2012 that "There's been too much casualization 
in our country in all sectors of the economy, and the mining sector 
is no exception. 160 
Researchers for a European NGO have stated that "When we 
visited [Mopani's J Mufulira in 2009 and 2010, the miners confirmed 
that their wages were still far from sufficient, and that those em-
ployed by sub-contractors could be paid as little as half the wages of 
permanent employees, for the same work. " 161 The Deputy Commis-
sioner of Labor said in 2011 that contract workers may get as little 
154. Franco Barchiesi, "Informality and Casualitation as Olallenges to South Af-
rica's Industrial Unionism: Manufacturing Workers in Ute East Rand/Ekurhuleni Re-
gion in the 1990s," African Studies Quarterly 11:2·3 (2010): 67-85 
ISS. "Revised Labor Laws to Stimulate Production," TOZ. Dec. 24, 2012. 
156. "Examining Zambia's Mining Industry," Consultancy Africa, Aug.2, 2010, www. 
consultancyafrica.coml index.php7option"""'m...con1ent&view=article&id..499:examin-
ing-zambias-copper-industry·&catid=82:african·industry-a-business&ltemid=266. The 
MMD government did "implore KCM to ensure that Ute mining firm employed people 
on pensionable permanent jobs. "Veep Tells KCM to Give Zambians Key Positions." 
TOZ, Jan. 12, 2007. It also launch an investigation in 2010 into KCM's use of cootract 
workers, but nolbing seems to have come of it. See "Zambia Launches Probe into 
KCM Outsourcing," Teoderslnfo. Aug. 23, 2010. 
157. Neo Simutanyi, "Copper Mining in Zambia: Ute De\'lllopmental Legacy of 
Privatization," Institute for Security Studies Paper 165, July, 2008: www.iss.co~za/ 
uploads IP APER16S.pdf. 
1S8. "CB Minister Urges Mines to End Casualisation," TOZ. Feb. 14,2012. 
159. Casualization in fact remains common even in the few remaining prominent 
Zambian parastatals, where some workers have been very long·term casuals and assur· 
edly earn less than the minimum wage. See Zesco Casual Workers Protest," TP, Nov. 
20, 2012; "Zesco Casuals Demand Minimum Wage," OM, Nov. 20. 2012. 
160. "UMUZ Backs Sata's CaU for Permanent Jobs." TP, July 5, 2012. 
161. Counter Balance, The Mopani: 17. 
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as one-fourth the pay of permanent employees.'62 A UK journalist 
who interviewed MCM miners in 2011 found they were "typically 
paid" three British pounds per day.'63 That is only US$120 
(K600,000) a month, too low a figure for regular MCM miners, who 
earn several times that, but likely the basic salary of contract work-
ers, who constitute half MCM's workforce. In 2011 also, the Labor 
Ministry reported "[L]abor offices have recorded a number of re-
ports, especially in areas such as Mopani Copper Mines and 
Konkola Copper Mines, where several sub-contracted companies 
have been paying below the Government's minimum wage require-
ments,"164 which was then only K419,000 or about $82 a month.16! 
When KCM contract workers went on strike in October, 2011, 
they stated that no contract worker was paid more than K500,000 or 
about US$100 a month.'66 In 2012, striking Kansanshi miners de-
manded all workers be placed on "permanent and pensionable con-
ditions of service as opposed to working on contract."167 They 
added that they were paid between Kl million-S million monthly, 
indicating that the contract workers among them were likely receiv-
162. Siti interview. Zambia's minimum wage in 2011 was K419,00>. Contract work-
ers paid that made less than one quarter of what most permanent employee miners 
made. 
163. Davies, The Other Face. 
164. "Labor Ministry ·war-Front' Opens over Minimum Wages," TOZ, Oct. I , 2011. 
165. The minimum wage for the lowest level .. general and shop workers,,. was in-
creased in July, 2012. The lowest basic minimum wage was upped in January, 2011 from 
K268,800 to K419,000. There was also severalaUowances: housing at 30%, i.e. 125,700, 
transport at K102,000, lunch at K120.000 and subsistence at K19S.OOO. for a total of 
K961,700. In 2012, the basic minimum wage rose to K700,000, plus housing at 210.000. 
transport at K102,400, and lunch at 120,000, for a total of K1,132,400, representing a 
17.7% increase. "Minimum Wages," MyWage.org/Zambia, 2011, http://m.mywage.org/ 
zambia/main/salary/ minimum-wage! minimum-wage-2011/new-minimum-wage-for· 
zambian-worlc.ers-in-2011; "Domestic Workers in Windfall, Minimum Wage lncreased1'" 
OM, July 12, 2012. 
166. "KCM Contractors' Workers Down Tools." TP, Oct. 18,2011. See also Zambia 
Conned for Copper ("Subcontracted laborers at Vedanta's KCM mine receive an aver-
age of £63 a month [$95], but often less"); "Konkola Copper Mines, Zambia," www. 
banktrack.org, Apr. 18, 2011, ("some sub-contracted skilled laborers [claim) they are 
paid as little as £37 per month"), www.banktrack.org/show/dodgydealslkonkola _copper 
_ minesl_blank. 
167. "Miners Paralyze Kansanshi Ops." TOZ.Jan. 3. 2012. There were no such de· 
mands raised at CNMC firms during Zambia's strike wave from fall 2011 through win· 
ter 2012. For example, the principle demands of miners at NFCA were salaries equal to 
those paid at KCM, standardization of grading of miners. and the localization of some 
jobs being done by Otinese. "Government Directs NFCA to Increase Salaries," TP, 
Oct. 11, 2011. As discussed herein, the salaries gap with KCM was subsequently 
narrowed. 
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ing half or less than half of what permanent employees' were being 
paid.168 CLM's Deputy CEO and its Zambian Human Resource 
Manager have both stated that before CNMC got Luanshya in 
2009, contract workers there were paid half of what permanent 
workers made.169 According to Hamilton Musenga, a longstanding 
MUZ activist at Luanshya, "the new [CNM~ owners ... have in-
creased wages, in some cases fourfold ... "1 
When it is taken into account that CNMC mines employ only 
permanent workers and that KCM, MCM and other larger firms 
employ contract workers who are paid low salaries, the actual wage 
gap between Chinese-owned firms and these much larger ones di-
minishes significantly. The HRW report however bases its conclu-
sion on the apparent wage scales differential, ignoring the impact 
on average basic pay of actual workforce compositions in these 
firms. 
2. Productivity Differences 
CNMC's NFCA and CLM together produced 4.5% of 
Zambia's copper output in 2010, but had 10.5% of the foreign-
owned mines' total workforce. Their productivity is significantly 
lower than industry averages in both Zambia and China. 
168. "Strike Halts FQM Copper Production; DM, Jan. 3, 2012. The strikes also 
stated that some expatriate managers earned Kl5().250m a month, i.e. about $30,000· 
$50,000. Ibid. 
169. Gao Xiang interview, Oct. 20, 20U; Chola interview. Permanent workers are 
largely unionized; contract workers are not. Pay for contract workers may however be 
specified in union contracts; at NFCA in 2008, basic salary for the lowest paid contract 
worlr.er was about half that for the lowest paid permanent worker. Apotheker, Foreign 
Copper: 59. 
170. "Hig)l Hopes for Zambia's Copperbelt Ghost Town," Mail & Guardian (South 
Africa), July 23, 2010. 
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Table 3: Productivity and Wa.ges in China, Zambia, 
NFCAand CLM 
Copper Productivity 
Country or produced No. of (ton/ 
Company (tons) Workers person) Monthly Wage 
China (2009) l,(XX),()(X) 76,769 13 $398 
(average) 
Zambia (2010) 676,198 55,000 12.3 
NFCA (2011) 23,243 3500 6.6 $229-$485 
($334 
average) 
CLM (2011) 18,680 2350 (in 7.9 $358-$712 
mining) 
Sources171 
As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, except for CNMC, other major copper 
mining firms in Zambia are all near, above, or far above the aver-
age in terms of productivity. The two CNMC mines are the only 
ones far below the average; even more so if one uses the 2010 Zam-
bian government figures of 22,0:>0 tons for NFCA and 10,000 tons 
for CLM. 
Table 4: Productivity in non-CMMC Foreign-owned 
Copper Mining FIJ1IIS 
2010Tons 2010Tons/ 
F'lnns/Mines 2010 Total Employees Copper Worker 
Vedanta: Konkola 2o.m 217,000 10.4 
Glencore: Mopani 16,500 198.000 12.0 
Metorex: Chibuluma 843 17,000 20.2 
Equinox: Lumwana 3,800 147,000 38.4 
FQM: Kansanshi 4,000 233.000 58.3 
Sources172 
171. Shang, Sustainable Developmen~ China Data Online (2011), "Copper Ores 
Mining & Dressing/Basic Condition," China Yearly Industrial Data, All China Data 
Center. sourced from National Statistics Bureau; Wang Otunlai interview, Interview, 
GAO Xiang, Executive Vice General Manager, CNMC International Trade Ud., 
Beijing, Oct. 21. 2011; Ministry of Mines. 2010 Mineral Production tables: Interview. Hu 
Aibin, Company Secretary, China Nonfenous Mining Corp. Lid, Beijing, November 27, 
2012. 
172. 2010 Mineral Production; Konkola Resources Pic, Announcement, "KCM not 
Decided on Next Step Towards IPO Yet," Steel Guru, May 27, 2011; "Giencore 
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In copper mining, differences in the mineral contents level of 
mining concessions greatly affect productivity. CNMC concessions 
have a low content, which they have to extract from deep under-
ground.t73 An NFCA engineer told us that "With 1.8% copper 
content, the former [owner] didn't think it was worth their while to 
mine it. 1.8o/o in Zambia is considered a tail mine. They don't think 
it was worth their effort if it's lower than 3o/o. Other mines had 4o/o 
or So/o."t74 Mines with lower copper content are more labor inten-
sive, require greater extractive effort and incur higher cost of pro-
duction. A mining giant had abandoned Chambishi mine and 
NFCA's Vice-CEO GAO Xiang commented on how his firm re-
vived it: 
Anglo-American had given up on this mine because it 
couldn't go further in here. They were very dogmatic and 
didn't adapt conventional methods. NFCA found a way to 
explore this mine by adapting conventional methods to lo-
cal geological conditions, but it requires labor intensive 
work underground. We managed to improve the mining 
efficiency by working harder. "t75 
Besides copper content, the other major factor in productivity 
is whether a mine is OC or UG. A study of productivity in Austra-
lian mining has noted that for its growth, "An increase in the use of 
open-cut mining has been a key development," that became eco-
nomic after the discovery of solvent extraction-electrowinning 
ForecasiS 23% Increase in Mopani Copper Output in 2015," Metals Bulletin, Apr. 15, 
2011; "More Jobs Coming at Lumwana." TradeMark Southern Africa, July 2 2010, 
www.trademark.sa.orgl news/more-jobs-coming-lumwana; Zambian Parliamenl, 
Committee on: 19;Ngosa and van Alstine, Seeking Benefits: 23. "Kansan 
173. CLM's Baluba mine reportedly bas a1-2% copper contenL Pan and Forgacb, 
Going Global: 4.3.1. 
174. Interview, Section Engineer Xu, Cbambis:hi, Aug. 23, 2008. Tailings are materi· 
als left over after most copper bas been removed from ore and are profitably extracted 
when copper prices are high. 
175. Interview, GAO Xiang, August 19,2008. Due to low copper content and deple-
tion, NFCA bas never been able to come close to producing the 38.ooot pe.r year that 
Chambisbi mine was said to produce before its closure in 1985. See "State Firm Buys 
Zambian Mine," South China Morning Post, July I, 1998. In the first half of 2012, it 
produced 12,600t. "China Nonferrous Mining Corporation Ltd. Announces 2012 ln· 
terim Results," Aug. 29, 2012, http://bk.todayir.com/enlpress_pop.pbp?id:l23307&1ang 
•O&tYP""l. KCM produced seven times that amount (86,0001) in the same period. 
"KCM in 20% Copper Production Rise," TP, Oct. 18, 2012. 
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methods of ore extraction, which enabled metal to be produced 
from lower grades of ore.176 
There is a world-wide tendency for highly productive enter-
prises to pay higher wages than less productive ones. For example, 
productivity and wages in China and Zambia are very low by the 
standards of some other copper producing countries. Chilean min-
ers produce about 100 tons each per annum.177 The same appears 
to be true in Peru, where at the major Antamina mine in 2010, pro-
ductivity was a lso 103 tons per worker,178 fourteen times the aver-
age at CNMC mines. Yet, although the industry average pay for 
Peruvian miners (including benefits) is some $30 per day;179 the av-
erage pay for the much less productive CNMC miners is not far 
below at about $23 a day. In 2005, US copper miners produced an 
average of 150 tons.'80 In 2009, Canada's Highland Valley Copper 
(HVC) feroduced 118,000 tons with 880 employees or 134 tons per 
worker, st more than twice the level of productivity of the Cana-
dian-owned K.ansanshi mine in Zambia, more than ten times the 
China or Zambia average, and about eighteen times the average at 
CNMC mines in Zambia. Basic salaries for HVC miners in 2011 
were $5,700 a month or some fourteen times that at CNMC Zambia 
mines.ta2 
176. Vernon Topp. et al., "Productivity in the Mining Sector: Measurement and In· 
terpretation," Australian Productivity Commission. 2008: xiv, SS, http://www.pe.gov.au/ 
_data/assetslpdLfilel0005/84911/mining·productivity.pdl 
1n. "Mining Industry Woos Five Billion in Past Decade," TOZ, Mar. 16, 20I2. See 
also What Would it Take: 7 ("In Chile, annual production of copper per worker is al· 
most seven times greater than in Zambia. A difference of this magnitude cannot be 
explained solely by variables like scale, nature of resources and better equipment"). 
I 78. "Antamina," 2012, bttp://es. wikipedia.org/wiki/Antamina. 
179. Amos Irwin and Kevin P. Gallagher, "Chinese Investment in Peru: a Compara· 
tive Analysis," Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas. 
Discussion Paper no. 34, Dec. 2012: 14. http:Jiwww.cbinaafricarealstory.com/2012/12/ 
chinese-mining·investment-in-peru-in.html. 
180. "Copper Ores: SIC 1021," ffighbeam Business, s.d., bttp:/lbusiness.highbeam. 
com/industry·reportslmining/copper-ores. 
181. "Highland Valley Mines," 2011, www.informine.com/minesite.asp?sitechvc. 
182. "Highland Valley Workers Approve 'Unprecedented' Five-Year Contract," 
Kamploops Daily News (Canada), Oct. 17, 2011. Due to relatively high wages, "labor 
costs for mines in developed countries account for around 40 percent of the total, 
whereas 20 percent is more typical in developing economies. The proportions for ... 
Zambian copper miners are more typical of de••eloped economy mines." .. Cost Inflation 
to Bite Miners' Results in 2013," Fitch Ratings, Nov. 29,2012. http://www.Citchratings. 
comigws/en/fitchwire/fitcbwirearticle/Cost-lnflation·to?pr_id=775683. At NFCA, labor 
costs are 25-30% of the total cost of production, while in mines in China, labor costs are 
10.20% of total production cost. Interview, WANG Chunlai, Chambishi, Aug. 13,2012. 
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Productivity in China's copper mines is generally a bit higher 
than in Zambian copper mines, but substantially higher than at 
CNMC mines in Zambia. If, as HRW alleges, CNMC merely ex-
ports to Zambia the labor standards of China, where the more pro-
ductive mines pay better than less productive ones,'83 CNMC 
would pay much lower wages in Zambia than it pays in mining in 
China. CNMC's salaries in Zambia are however about the same as 
those paid at copper mines in China (see Table 3).'84 
3. Profits Large and Small 
In late 2010, a Wall Street Journal article observed that "The 
mining industry is printing money: Citigroup expects it to have ag-
gregate net cash of $70 billion by the end of 2012."1ss 
Among the foreign-owned mining enterprises in Zambia how-
ever, some firms are printing much more money than others and 
that affects wage levels. The continuing wage gap reflects sharp dif-
ferences in profit levels between CNMC mines and the larger for-
eign-owned mines and that profit levels are correlated with frrm 
size. 
Everywhere in the world, ceteris paribus, large enterprises can 
and most often do, pay workers much more than substantially 
smaller enterprises. The size of the enterprise often is a critical fac-
tor in both pay and working conditions.186 The US garment industry 
is a good example. There were 350,000 US garment workers in the 
early 2000s, down from a million in 1950.187 Only 8% have a union 
183. See David Creedy, et at., "Transforming China's Coal Mines: a Case History of 
the Sbuangliu Mine." Na1ura/ RtSOiltUS Fomm 30:1,2006: 15-26; Wright, The Political 
Economy: 152. 
184. Bven if any given Chinese firm did reflexively pay in Zambia or otber African 
countries what it pays in Cbina that would generally be a boon to African workers, as 
.. African workers cost one--fifth of the price of their Cbinese counterparts." ••Chinese 
Companies Bring Job5to Africa," CD, Apr. 22, 2012. In any case foreign companies do 
not invest in Zambia mainJy because of low wages. as .. Zambia's low wages offer no 
advantages to investors. because tbey are offset by low productivity." "Zambia Invest-
ment Qinuue Assessment," World Bank, 2005: 1-2, www·wds.worldbank.orglservlel/ 
WDSContentServer/WDSP/lB/2005/10/031000090341_20051003144616/Rendered/PDF/ 
336750AfTPSOnotel5.pdf. 
185. "BHP's Problem is Caterpillar's Opportunity." WSJ, Nov. 16,2010. 
186. In the Chinese context, see XUB Hong. "Local Strategies of Labor Con trot a 
Case Study of Three Electronics Factories in Olina," lnremationol Labor and Working 
Class History 73 (2008):85· L03. 
187. Robert Ross, Slaves 10 Fashion: Poverty and Abuse in lhe Ntw Sweatshops (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004): 
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contract.188 In Los Angeles in 1993, some 120,000 garment workers 
labored in 5,000 factories, an average of 24 workers per factory.189 
By 2005 however, the average Los Angeles garment factory had 
only 12 workers.190 Hourly wages in 2008 among workers (le~al and 
underground) in Los Angeles garment shops averaged $3.28. 91 The 
US's largest garment factory, American Apparel, with about 5,000 
workers, is also in Los Angeles. The finn has 10,000 employees 
world-wide, 275 stores in 20 countries, and earned $545 million in 
revenue in 2008.192 It pays its factory workers $10-12 an hour,193 yet 
its owner emphasizes that "American Apparel is not an altruistic 
company. I believe in capitalism and self-interest."194 This self-de-
scribed "hyper-capitalist" firm pays more because its size permits it 
to do so. By paying higher than average wages, its owner creates 
low turnover among the mainly skilled and semi-skilled workers 
and maintains his enterprise as a non-union shop.195 
The same logic applies in Zambia's copper industry. GAO Xi-
ang has stated, 
We know that KCM pays more than we do. But to use 
KCM as the bench mark is like comparing a small-time 
trader to a billionaire. [I] remember that in 2005 KCM's 
profit was 10 times that of NFCA. KCM's profit is US$450 
million, while NFCA's is US$45million. Is their workers' 
wages 10 times of our workers?196 
Zambia's most productive copper operation in 2010, the Cana-
dian-owned Kansanshi mine, had net sales of $1.66 billion and an 
operating profit (net sales minus operating expenses, before inter-
188. Liza Featlterstone, "The Ten Worst Jobs in America," AlterNet. Sep~ 13,2005. 
www.altemet.org/module/ printversion/24927. 
189. Riehard Applebaum and Edna Bonacieh, A Tale of Two Citi<?s: the Garment 
bulu.srry in Los Angeles (L.os Angeles: Repor1 to the Haynes Foundation 1993). 
190. Natalie Allen. " DPCS Internship Stories and Reflections," s.d. (2005?), www . 
• dartmouth.edu/-tucker/ tellowshipsldpcsinternshipslnatalie-allan.htmiM<>stl..os Ange-
les. Moot LA garment factories are sweatshops: 67% do not comply with minimum 
wage and overtime laws; 98% do not abide by health and safety eodes. Ibid. 
191. "Pop-Ups: Fair Trade Shop Debuting Thursday." Racked LA. Dec. I , 2008. 
192. Jim McEigunn, "Canada's Entrepreneurs of the Decade," Profit (28:6 Dec. 
2009/Jan.2010):46. 
193. " Broken in USA," NYT, Oc~ I. 2009. 
194. McEigunn, Canada's. 
195. See "Benign Clothing Capitalist." B~tsiness and Finance (June 30, 2005). 
196. Ibid. 
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est and taxes) of $997 million.197 Higher copper prices in 2011 re-
sulted in Kansanshi paying $611 million in taxes, of which 85% or 
$519 million was corporate tax. Zambia's corporate profits tax rate 
is 30%, based on profits declared after deducting costs, as well as 
royalties, then paid as 3% of the value of copper ore produced. 
That implies that Kansanshi's 2011 operatin~ profit was much 
higher than the near $1 billion earned in 2010. 98 
In contrast to Kansanshi's high profitability, CNMC's NFCA 
reportedly had a 2010 profit of about $40 million.199 NFCA's profits 
began in 2005, seven years after CNMC bought Chambishi mine. 
The firm stated in 2011 that it had made a total about $200 million 
in profits over the years, which it had reinvested at Chambishi.200 
Given that productivity at CNMC's other mine, CLM, is about the 
same as Chambishi (see Table 3), profits there are likely to be no 
higher than at NFCA. CLM's CEO has said production costs at its 
main (UG) Mine, Baluba, are so high it has been working at a loss, 
with profits on11:, expected from 2012 onwards from its new OC 
Mulyashi Mine. 1 In five years of tax-paying till 2011, FQM's re-
197. See "ZCCM·IH Presentation: 15 June 2011," http://forum/about=mih.com/ 
viewtopic .php?f=78&t .,i,747. FQM has much h.igher shareholder returns than even 
the largest mining companies in the world. See FQM, "Investor Presenlation, Novem· 
ber, 20ll: slide 3, "Shareholder Presentation www.slideshare.netiFirstOuaotum/ inves-
tor-presentation-november-2011. 
198. "First Quantum Pays more than US$600m in Taxes to Zambia," Steel Guru, 
Dec. 6, 2011. FQM said in early 2012 that it produces 700t of copper and has $5m in 
sales a day, i.e. $7,143 per ton. ''Kansanshi in $10m Loss as Strike Bites," TOZ, Jan. 5, 
2012. The cost of production in 2011 was $1.15/lb., i.e. $2,535 a ton; production was 
about 250,000t. "First Quantum Profit Ufted by Higbe.r Copper Price," Business Day, 
May 10, 2011. After a four day strike in 2012, Kansanshi sued the heads of the ZCTU 
and PF in Solwez.i for $20m for allegedly inciting workers to strike, claiming that it lost 
$5m a day during the strike. ''Kansanshi Mining Sues ZCTU and PF Officials over 
Strike," TP, Mar. 27, 2012. 
199. Zhang Zhe, "Oiaoyue zhengyi de Feizhou kaifa: Zhongguo zai Zambiya zhen-
shi cunzai" (Beyond the controversy of Africa's Opening up: Olina's actual situation in 
Zambia), Nanfang Zhuomo, Nov. 4, 2010. CNMC bas reported that for 2009, it derived 
from Africa $34.3m of its S696m in revenues; for 2010. it was $22Am of $1.36b and for 
2011, $38.8m of $1.28b. Web Proof Information Pack: 2. 
200. Han and Shen, China's Harsh Squeeze. Profits in relation to taxes are another 
matter, however. According to Deputy Minister of Finance Miles Sampa, as of 2012 
.. All mining companies in the country $8\'e for First Quantum•s Kansanshi Mines are 
still recording losses." "Zambian Revenue from Mines Up by 46 Percen~" SteelGuru, 
June 6, 2012. 
201. Interview, Luo Xing'En, CEO, CLM, Luansbya, August 17, 2012. CNMC has 
indicated that all the firms it owns in Zambia together made a $118m profit before tax 
and $103m profit after tax in 201 l . CNMC. "Global Offering, • July 25. 2012: 285, 259. 
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ported total was $1.6 billion;202 in about the same period of tax-
paying, CNMC firms' reported total was $90 million.203 
Like other mining companies, CNMC firms have made invest-
ments that diminish profits. Investment levels of CNMC firms, in 
relation to their output, may however have been quite high, how-
ever. The observation of a Consultancy report on this score may not 
be far off the mark: "The majority of investments in the copper 
mining sector originate from the Chinese owned CNMC."204 Major 
expenses began with the costs of rehabilitating Chambishi Mine, 
closed for 13 years and flooded before CNMC acquired it. NFCA 
spent $132 million restoring it.20s NUMA W's president told us in 
2008 that "NFCA's production cost is high, as it had to reconstruct 
an abandoned mine. In other mines, such as Kansanshi, there is an 
open pit that is not deep and there is naked copper on the top. 
NFCA is not making much profit. KCM and Mopani have higher 
profits. "206 
A World Bank analysis involving Zambian copper mining 
noted that 
Production costs can differ significantly between mines, 
depending on the type of mine and nature of the deposit 
... A mine's cost production is a function of the resource 
(the quality of the ore, its depth, etc.) and the extent to 
which the most accessible resources have been exploited. 
The depletion of resources at the older mines means that 
they now need to mine at considerable depth and distance 
from the mine head, leading to high costs.207 
The CNMC mines are old and with relatively low ore quality 
and, as discussed above, through 2011 CNMC's Chambishi and 
Luanshya facilities were both UG mines, while all other firms had 
either OC or a mix of OOUG mining operations. Operating costs 
are significantly higher in UG mines than in OC mines. As a lead-
hllp://m.todayir.comltodayirauachment_hkltodayir/auacbment/201206201044044_en. 
pdf. 
202. '"Kansanshi Pays about K8bn in Taxes Daily: Oen 01inkuli."" TP, Dec. 28,2011. 
203. "'CNMC Making Massive Zambia Investment Increase:· CD. Nov. 22. 2011. 
204. Denine Walters. '"Examining Zambia's Cnpper Industry."" Cnnsultaney Africa. 
Aug.2, 2010, www.consultancyafrica.comlindex.php?option;com_content&view=article 
&id=499:examining·zambias..copper-industry-&catid=82:african-industry·a-business& 
ltemid~266. 
205. Fraser and Lungu. For Whom: 48. 
206. Interview. Mundia Sikufele. [(jtwe, Aug. 27. 2008. 
207. What would it Take: Z. 
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ing textbook on mineral processing technology observes, mining 
costs "vary enormously a.nd are mucb higher for underground 
mines tban for open pit operations . ....., On average, UG operations 
are more than three times the cost of OC operations. The differ-
ence in productivity of course negatively impacts profits, wbicb in 
turn negatively impacts wages.209 
NFCA also spent $160 million to develop its West Ore Body, 
commissioned in 2011.2 t0 By 2012, it bad sourced $832 million for 
its Southeast Ore Body, scbeduled for commissioning in 2016 and 
set to employ 5,000 Zambians.211 By late 2011, NFCA had spent 
$500 million on Chambisbi's Multi-Facility Economic Zone 
(MFEZ).212 
Altogether, NFCA reckons that it bas invested $1.4 billion. 2l3 
In contrast, substantially more productive KCM and MCM did not 
invest much more (see Table 6). CLM spent $74 million to rehabili-
tate and refurbish equipment a.nd machinery at Luanya mine, ne-
glected by previous owners a.nd closed after J&W abandoned it in 
2008. It is spending $400 million to expand Baluba mine and con-
struct Mulla.shi mine a.nd invested $340 million in its smelting facil-
ity CCS.2' 
208. Barry Wills, et al. Wills' M'meral Prrx:csing T«hnology. 7th ed. (Ollford: But-
terworth·lfeineman. 2006): 22. 
209. K. Shahrior, "Effective Factors Investigation in Choice Between Surface and 
Undcraround Mining. Vllth International Conference SOEM, Sophia, Bulgaria, Apr. 
27, 2007, http://uut.academia.edufEueddinBokbtavar/ Papers/915012/Effee-
tivcJDCton_jnvestigation.Jn_choice_betweeuurface_and_underground_mining. 
Zambia's Vice President Guy Soon bas oommented, when discu.sing the insufficiency 
of job creal ion in mining, thai "You use tbese enormous machines in open cas1 mining 
to tear tbe rock of the hole and $tick it in a lorry to take it away. tOO tons 01 a time. It is 
""'Y automaled. Some of it is even run by GPS and all you've &ot is 10me chap sittin& 
there, read•na a eomJC boot, 10 press the te<l button should sometbin& co awry." "Guy 
Soot~ Vice Presklent, ZambU," FT Busit>ea, This ,. Arria. Sept. 2012. 
210. "NFCA to Invest S600m in Geology." TOZ. Nov. JO, 2010. 
211. "NFCA Annual Copper Prnd.uctioo Riles." TP, June 12. 2012. 
212. "NFCA Spends USSSOOm on MFEZ." M<flll World, Jon. 2009: 30. Zambia-
<llina Economic and Tl'lcle Co-operation Zone (ZCCZ), a firm allJCd wilh CNMC. has 
said it bas expended $130m of buildings. -oads. power mtions, etc. in the MFEZ. 
"$130m Pumped .nto O.ambisbi Economic: Zone," OM, Dec. 25, 20ll. For a brief 
overview of Zambia's MFEZ's, two of which are run by ZCCZ.. see OECO Investment 
Policy Revlews:47 
213. NFCA 10 Invest. 
214. Zombi• Review 201l, no. 12: 48, Sl www.scribd.eomfdoc/6426208l/Zambia·Re-
vicw·2011·12. 
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Table 5: Other Foreign-owned Mining Firms 2010 Operating 
Profits Compared to NFCA's 
CUx Op. Profits 
2010Tons NFCA's CU Operating x NFCA's 
Company/Mine cu (24,000) Profits 2010 S40m 
FQM/Kansanshi 233,000 9.7 $997m 24.9 
Vedanta!KCM 217,000 9.0 $309m 7.7 
Equinox!Lumwana 147,000 3.7 $529m 13.2 
Metorex/Chibuluma 17,000 .71 S47m 1.2 
CNMC CEO LUO Tao has said it incurred great costs in re-
storing Luanshya in one year, at the unions' request, rather than 
two years, as planned.216 MUZ's President confirmed that "the Chi-
nese owners of Luanshya are speaking truthfully about their need 
to buy equipment because, while Luanshya was shut down, its 
equipment was taken by the fo1mer owners or vandalized. The new 
owners had to buy a whole new set of equipment."217 The substan-
tial expenditures of CLM may explain why there is no indication 
that it made a profit in 2010. 
Outlays for CNMC mines have been very large compared to 
those made at the one almost comparably-sized copper mine in 
Zambia, Chibulumba (see Tabie 6). 
CNMC's firms play the principle part in making China the 
third largest investor in Zambia.218 The company's investment in 
215. Table 4 and "KCM Records t;.S. $309 Million Profit," TOZ. May 6, 2011; 
"Equinox Records U.S. $529m Profit," TP, Mar. 11, 2011; "Metorex Increase Copper 
and Cobalt Output at the End of 2010," Steel Guru, June 16, 2011; "CNMC Kicks of 
Production at Copper Mine in Zambia," CD, Nov. 28,2010. MCM has had no declared 
profit for some years and is being investigated for w evasion. See Erin Torkelson. 
"Copper and Capital Flight: How Corp<>rate Debt Becomes Public Debt," The African. 
org. July 2011, www.the·african. org!btoy?p=546. II did declare profits of $6.8 million 
in 2003, $85.7 million in 2004 and $28.1 million in 2005 and was then the only foreign· 
owned mining firm to do so. "Mine Investors Cheating on Dividends: Committee," 
TOZ. Aug. 21, 2007. Chibuluma wu more profitable in earlier years on less 
production. Its 2008 profit was $118m oo 14,600t of copper. Southern Africa Resource 
Watch, "Impact of the Global F'mancial Crisis on Mining in Southern Africa": 82, 
Metorex Group, "COmpetent Person's Report . . . " 2010:23, www.metorexgroup.coml 
... !Metore>LCPR_Chibuluma. 
216. Interview, LUO Tao, Beijing. Oct. 18, 2011. 
217. Mukuka interview. 
218. Kopinski and Polus: 184. 
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Zambia totaled some $2 billion by 2011.219 Yet, in 2011 CNMC 
mines J,roduced only about one-sixtb the copper produced by 
KCM, whose investment was not much more than CNMC's. 
Table 6: Foreign Mining Firms: Investment, 2011 CU Prod. & % 
of 2011 CU Production 
Company/Mine Total Investment 2011 Prod. %Total Prod. 
Vedanta/KCM $2b-2.5b 200,000 23.5 
Glencore/MCM $2b 204,000 24.0 
FQM!Kansanshi $3b 230,000 27.0 
Equinox, Barri.ck/Lumwana ca. $1.5b 152,000 17.9 
Metorex/Chibuluma $157m (1997-2015) 17,000 2.0 
CNMC/NFCA + CLM $2b ($2.5b by late 
2013) 
42,000 5.0 
Sources221 N.B.: Table's CU production total is 851,000 tons. Zambia's CU 
production in 2011 was 869,000 tons, the difference accounted for local SME 
miners' production. "Zambia to become World's Ftfth Top Copper Producer by 
2015," Tenderslnfo, July 11, 2012. 
219. Zambia's Investment CNMC has stated that from 2011-2015 it will invest an-
other $2b. "Zambia 2016 Copper Producti:>n Could Reach 1.6 Million Tons," China 
Mining, Jan. 7, 2012, www.gongehang.comlafricafmdustryttends/201Ul1.()7m65.bnnl. 
It has also said it will invest $1.65b from 2012-2016. SRK Consulting, ''Technical As-
sessment Report of CNMC's Copper Properties in Copperbelt Province, Republic of 
Zambia," Mar. 2012: IIT-17, www.hkexnew$hkllistedon/ .. JECHlNANONFER-201205 
14-22.pdf. 
220. The CNMC mines do not even supply most of the Zambian copper imported by 
China. Even had all the 42,000t it produced in 2011 been sold to China, that would 
have been less than a third of thel32,162t ol Zambian copper imported into China that 
year. "CNMC Eyes HK Listing for Africaa Copper Assets," Interfax China, May 15, 
2012, www.interfax.cn/node/20237. 01 coune, it should not be surprising if CNMC did 
ship much of the copper it produces to China, given that China uses 43% of the world's 
copper production. "·Global Copper Production under Stress." Proactive Investors, 
Nov. 9, 2012. 
221. "China Non-ferrous Metal Mining to Invest USD 2 bin in Zambia in 2011· 
2015," Xinhua, Nov. 11, 2011; "KK Commends Vedanta's $25bn KCM Investment," 
TOZ, Feb. 4, 2012; "KCM Boasts of $2bn Investment," TP, Dec. 21, 2011; "Otencore 
Comments on Mopani Tax Payments," June 2, 2011, www.glencore.com/ documents/ 
Glencore_Comments_On_.Mopani.pdf; "Zambia Set lor l.Sm Tonnes Copper Output," 
TOZ, July 9, 2012; "Metorex Investor Visit to Chibuluma Mine," Apr. 15, 2008, www. 
metorexgroup.coml .. JEMounsey-080416%20ChibVisit(I].pdf; "Technical Report on 
the Lumwana Mine, North-Western Provbce, Republic of Zambia," Roscoe Postle 
Assoc., Mar. 16, 2012, www.sec.gov/Arehi•esledgar/data/7568941000119312512137665/ 
d324012dex99J.htm; "$1 Bn Lumwana Project Raises Zambian Hopes of Resuscitating 
its Economy," Mining Weeki)' (MW), May 1, 2009; Barrick Gold Increases Investment 
in Zambian Mine," Xinhua, Aug. 4, 2011; "Kan$8nshi Operation Sheet," FQM, 2012: 4; 
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Some $6 billion in FDI flowed into Zambian mining from 2000-
2010,222 only $1 billion of it from the initial privatizations.223 Thus, 
CNMC's investment amounted to some one-third of the total FDI 
in Zambian copper mining, yet CNMC's mines contributed only 
about 5% of Zambia's total copper production. Such dispropor-
tions obviously inhibit the payment of wages at the levels of more 
productive and profitable firms. 
4. Other Factors Affecting Wages 
There are additional factors that explain the wage gap. Gov-
ernment policy has also been a factor in explaining the wage gap. 
NUMA W's Chambisbi Mine chairman told us in 2008 that 
The Government is responsible for the slow pay rise. It 
issues a bench mark every year and dictates the percent· 
age of increase, for example 15%. It announced that the 
inflation rate in 2fXJ7 is 9.8%. The government is actually 
afraid that much of an increase in wages will destabilize 
the single-digit inflation. The management relies on the 
government bench mark to negotiate pay raises \vith 
workers.224 
Indeed, in 2012, MUZ President Munyunyembe confirmed that in 
the past the MMD government"gave them (mine owners] the right 
to increase only up to 11 percent .. . "225 
After the PF government came to power in 2011, Sata also 
adopted a policy of calling on companies to not increase salaries at 
a rate higher than inflation, which in early 2012 was 6.4 o/o per an-
www.first-quantum.oomfTheme!FirstQuantum/mesldoc_downloads/Kansanshi..April% 
20..2012-FINAL.pdf; "Zambia's Copper Assets Intend to List in HK. Raising over $1 
Bo,"' AAstocks.oom, Feb. 7. 2012. www.aastocks.oomlenlnewslhk6/61/oow.472557.html; 
"China/Zambia Economic Relations wit~ Zhou Yuxiao," ABN Digital, June 19,2012. 
www.abndigital.com/page/multimedialvideolbeyond·markets/1229383-ChinaZambia· 
Economic-Relations·witb-Zbou-YuXiao; .. Olinese Mining Firm to List its Copper 
Assets in Hong Kong." TP, Apr. 18, 2012. 
222. OECD Investment Policies Review: 30~ Hu interview. CNMC's S2b investment 
is a sizeable part of the 2012 $3.4b stO<k of Chinese investment in Zambia. China/ 
Zambia Economic Relations. The firm projects that by the end of 2013, its S2.5b invest· 
ment will provide more than 20,000 jobs. Chinese Mining Firm. 
223. Anthony Ruffini, "The Revival of Zambia's Copper Mining Sector," Engineer· 
ing & Mining Journol 207:2 (2006): 39-4l (39). 
224. Interview, Mubanga Gillan, Chambishi, Aug. 27. 2008. 
225. "Miners Paralyze Kansanshi Operations." TOZ. Jan. 4. 2012. 
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num.226 Commerce, Trade and Industry Minister Bob Sichinga has 
stated that "Sata wanted salary increments that did not go beyond 
inflation levels because that would create cost-push inflation and 
whatever would be paid to the workers would be washed away.'>227 
MUZ President Munyenyembe also stated that the "Government's 
stance that the unions and management should use the prevailing 
inflation rate as the basis for negotiations has complicated the col-
lective bargaining process.'>228 CNMC firms in 2012 went much fur-
ther than others in defying this policy, apparently in order to meet 
CNMC's pledge to narrow the wage gap through that year's negoti-
ations (see below). 
When we asked NFCA CEO WANG Chunlai about his com-
pany's reputation as a low-wage operation, he pointed out that 
NFCA's young age and location are also factors: 
Wage levels have to do with the scale and age of the enter-
prise. In terms of scale, we're ranked number five and in 
terms of cost of labor, number five or six. With one com-
pany, their lowest wage is lower than ours, but their high-
est wage is higher than ours. This is because salary 
increases are a cumulative annual percentage. The longer 
one works, the higher the salary. If you compare us with 
other companies, if tlley've been around longer, their 
highest salary will be higher than ours, while the salary for 
incoming workers will be about the same as ours. An-
other case involves Kansanshi and Lumwana mines. Their 
starting salary is higher than ours. It's a strategic choice 
226. "'Don't Antagonise Investors, Sata Tells Ministers." OM, Feb. 1, 2012; 
"Zambia's Inflation Rate Down to 6.4 p.c.," Business Reporter, Jan. V, 2012, www. 
ukzambians.co.ultlhome/2012101mlzambias·in0atioo·rate-down·to-6-4-p-d. Despite a 
reputation for .. populism," the PF government also repeatedly directed strikers tore--
turn to work. Labor Minister Shamenda said that "'anyone who would be protesting 
after the directive would be breaking the Law. The GO\'emment ... would not protect 
workers lazing around in the name of protests ..... Widespread Strikes, What's tbe Solu· 
tion?" TOZ, Oct. 14, 2011. He also condemned unions for resisting his plan to raise 
retirement ages ... Shamenda Tells Off Unions over Retirement Age," LT, Dec. 21. 201 1. 
Sata bas stated that ""Strikes or industrial unrest have a very negative effect on a fragile 
economy like ours." "Sata Acts on Cbishimba Kambwili," OM, Feb. 4, 2012. Vice-
President Guy Scott "described the just-ended strilte aetioo by miners at Kansaoshi 
Mine in Solwezi as illegal and warned that Government would not defend those who 
would be disciplined by way of dismissals." "Kunda Panicking Says Scotl," TOZ, Jan. 
12, 2012. 
227. "Improve Workers' Pay, Sichinga Urges Investors, • TOZ, Feb. 4, 2012. 
228. "Mopani, Unions Agree on 17% Pay Rise, Workers Protest," OM, Feb. 3, 2012. 
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on their part, as they are remote and they need skilled 
people, so they try to attract them with a higher wage of-
fer. They can afford it. They have attracted a lot of peo-
ple from NFCA and we've already done the training for 
them ... A few years ago, we lost a lot of workers; 20% 
were lost per year. These days it's rather stable.229 
Wang put it that CLM's pay is higher than at NFCA, despite CLM's 
higher costs of production, because CLM "is an older enterprise 
and was taken over, so there are workers who have accumulated a 
lot of years. Their salary is higher because CLM acquired these 
workers, but the starting pay is about the same as [NFCA)."230 
HRW noted the relatively low wages at Chambishi Copper 
Smelter (CCS), a CNMC joint venture with Yunnan Copper Corp. 
and an independently registered firm. We asked about wages when 
we interviewed a CCS human resources employee in 2010 and were 
told that 
The average basic wage in 2009 was K600,000, not includ-
ing a 30% housing allowance, transportation, gratuity, etc. 
There was a 12% increase this year [2010) at CCS, so the 
present average basic was is now K672,000. The workers 
can also earn overtime (time and half ordinary overtime; 
double on Sundays), a production bonus (up to K200,000). 
If you add up all of these, the average wage is 1 million-1.1 
million. This is still 1 million lower than at other compa-
nies, including NFCA. The reason wages are lower is be-
cause the nature of the company is different from the 
Inining companies: other firms are mining companies, but 
ours is a processing company. The level of profit of the 
229. Wang Chunlai interview. His comparison is in "Zbongsc Zanbiya bagong 
shijian," Xln shiji, Nov. 5, 2011. A survey of 129 miners employed in Zambia at five 
Chinese-owned firms (NFCA. CLM. JCHX. 15 MCC and Jinchuan) and 84 at three 
non-Chinese firms (identified as Swedish, South African and Indian) found that "an 
individual employed by a Chinese employer has a wage approximately 44 percent lower 
than an individual employed by another foreign employer." The samples, chosen by 
MUZ and several employers, were not random however. Of the non-Chinese firms. it 
may also be only the "Indian" one (seemingly, KCM) that can be compared to the 
Chinese..owned firms. The Swedish and South African firms may be Sandvil< and AI-
rica Rainbow Minerals- Copper. U so. they did not have operating mines and had only 
small workforces at the time of the survey. Louis Granath and Maril<a Larsson, "Chi-
nese Foreign Direct Investment in the Zambian Mining Sector," Unpub'd Bachelor's 
Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, 2012: 48, https:// 
gupea.ub.gu.selbitstream/2077/ .. ./gupea_2077_3tm_Lpdf. 
230. Wang Chunlai interview. 
mines is directly linked to the (market] price, whereas our 
profits come only from a processing fee, which is US$100 a 
ton. Since we don't have our own mines, we buy copper 
concentrate from KCM, Mopani, NFCA, etc. and earn a 
gross profit of $100 a ton. The scale of production is dif-
ferent as well.231 
55 
A group of CCS Chinese employees affirmed in 2011 that pay is 
affected by CCS not having its own mine, unlike KCM and MCM, 
whose production is more than sufficient to feed those firms' smelt-
ers. The 40,000 ton production at CNMC-owned mines is insuffi-
cient to feed CCS, which opened with a 150,000 ton per year 
capacity and is e"xpanding to 250,000 ton. CCS thus must continue 
to seek to process, for a small fee, copper from the larger firms' 
mines.232 CCS Acting Managing Director Yang Xinguo stated that 
in 2011 "the company experienced a shortage of raw materials 
which were in erratic supply from the mining companies," that it 
"was also considering putting up a mine which could supply the 
smelter with raw materials unlike the current situation where it de-
pended largely on other mining firms" and that it would have to 
work with small-scale miners.233 
MUZ stated in August, 2011 that CNMC intended to reach the 
"industry standard" in salaries in 2012, although that does not nec-
essarily mean a uniform standard, as all countries have a range of 
mining wages. Basic wages of US unde~ound miners in 2010, for 
example, ranged from $15-$37 an hour. CNMC's CEO said that 
"Our production is about a third of KCM's and their mines are bet-
ter than ours. We are willing to be a high paying employer, but it 
must be reasonable, gradual and correspond to our level of 
development. •-= 
In October, 2011, LU Shaye, Director-General of African Af-
fairs at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented on general 
salaries at Chinese enterprises on the continent and the salary de-
mands of miners' in Zambia specifically. He noted that "The local 
231. Interview, CCS employee, Hong Kong, May 4, 2010. 
232. Interview, CCS Chinese employees, Chambisbi, Aug. 19, 2011. 
233. "$220m Chambisbi Q)pper Smelter on Track," TOZ, Jan. 3, 2012. Sino Metals 
has had a similar problem: an insufficient flow of ore from Otambishi Mine. .. Sino-
Metals Push for Ucense," TOZ, Sept. 3, 2012. 
234. Mukuka interview; Jack Caldwell, "2011 US Mine Wages," I Think Mining, Jan. 
14, 2011, bttp1/itbinkmining.com!2011/ 01114120ll·u-s-mine-wages-are-you-eaming-
your-wortb-in-miningJ. 
235. Luo Tao interview. 
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employees working in Chinese enterprises get lower salaries than 
those working in the western companies" and attributed that to 
"different national conditions. Because the salaries of Chinese em-
ployees are lower than the employees of Western companies." He 
also related the salary levels in Zambia and China: 
In some cases, the salary paid by Chinese companies in 
Africa for local employees is even higher than our domes-
tic workers of the same industry ... [T]he local employees 
in the Chinese-funded enterprises in Zambia went on 
strike to demand [a J wage rise. The salary and benefits of 
local employees in the Chinese enterprises in Zambia 
were more than 3 million kwacha, equivalent to $700 to 
$800. They required an additional 2 million kwacha salary 
rise, equivalent to an increase of about $400. $700 to $800 
is equivalent to 4,500 to 5,000 yuan. The minimum wage 
of Shanghai, the most developed city in China, is 1,100 
yuan. The average wage of construction workers in 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and other developed cities in the 
east of China is just over 2,000 yuan. The wage of manu-
facturing workers is between 2,000 to 3,000 yuan. What 
does 4,000 yuan a month mean? It is the wage of an ordi-
nary white-collar in China. $700 to $800 plus an additional 
$400 is as much as what I earn. This is the wage of a local 
Zambian miner. Is it realistic? Improving workers' in-
come is justified around the world. It is the high moral 
ground. But any government must take into account the 
level of their economic development and their own actual 
situation. They cannot go beyond reality; otherwise it will 
scare off investors. They cannot achieve their economic 
development.236 
Lu 's view is not that Zambian workers' salaries must be no 
higher than what equivalent workers in China receive because that 
is the proper reference point for Chinese firms. Rather, it is that if 
Zambians are more highly paid than Chinese for equivalent work, 
Zambia will not attract FDI as China has done, thereby limiting 
Zambia's development. The Director-General of African Affairs 
thus articulated the sole element of the putative "Chinese model" 
that Chinese officials actually endorse: 
236. The Records. 
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According to Chinese experience, it is important to attract 
foreign investors in order to gain knowledge. Foreign in-
vestment is attracted by favorable investment climates 
with competitive advantages, such as low labor costs and 
sympathetic tax laws, for eKample. Many Chinese inves-
tors in Africa complain about the poor investment climate 
due to the relative high wages, bad infrastructure and 
strict labor and environmental laws. Chinese investors and 
government representatives alike try to convince African 
governments that it is not yet the time for strengthening 
labor and environmental laws. They argue that Africa 
needs to temporarily compromise on these issues in order 
to attract the much needed financial and technological 
capital from abroad.237 
57 
Lu's argument, which jibes with all investors' short-term profit in-
terests, is not that Chinese firms should export China's labor prac-
tices or even wage standards to the world. Officials and managers 
do not hold to that, but know local practices must be taken into 
account. Rather, the argument- disputable wherever investors re-
alize large profits through high commodity prices - is that devel-
oping countries should self-limit wages to attract investment, a 
position that Zambia's political elites and even union leaders 
share.238 
In late 2011, CNMC Zambia head TAO Xinghu stated that a 
25% raise was reasonable,239 but in early 2012, NFCA and SML 
agreed to much larger wage hikes that lessened the gap with other 
foreign-owned firms, which agreed to much smaller increases. Be-
cause CLM gave a much lower wage increase than NFCA, the gap 
between the two firms was also largely narrowed. 
237. Sanne van der Lug~ "Otoose yo<r own Development Path: Providing Advice 
with Interference?" International institute for Asian Studies. The News/titer no. 60. 
2012: 21, www.iias.nllsitesldefaultl fileslllAS_NL60....2l.pdf 
23&. Fackson Sharnenda, "Ministerial Statement .•. Ministry of Labor, Youth & 
Sport, Nov. 2011. www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option:eom..docman&taskcdoc_ 
view&gid:912; "MUZ Asks Branch Lellden to be Reasonable When Making Demands 
for Improved Salaries; LT. June 28,2012. 
239. Private communication to the authors from a Chinese journalist, December 23, 
2011. 
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Table 7: 20U, 2013 Basic Unionized Miners Salary Increases 
Foreign-owned Zambian Copper Mining Firms 
Company 2012% 2013% 
NFCA 
CNMC Luanshya 16 14 
SML 100-150 
ccs 25 
Konkola Copper Mme 17 7.5 
Mopani Copper Mine 17 10 
Lumwana Mine 18 10 
Kansanshi Mine 12 13 
Cbibuluma Mine 17 11.5 
Source.sZ"l 
240. "Zambia Copper Mine Unions Acoept NFCA's 44% Pay Hike Offer: Union," 
Dow Jones Network (DJN), Jan. 2, 2012: "Zambia's Muliashi Copper Project to be 
Commissioned End Feb," Plans, Feb. 6, 2012; "Zambian Miners Agree Labor Deal 
with Chinese-owned Sino Metals Plant," DJN, Jan. 9, 2012; HRW Report: 128 
(breakdown of Sino Metals wages): "KCM Workers Get 17 p.c. Pay Rise." TOZ, Jan. 
27,2012: Mopani, Unions Agree: "Lurnwana Workers in 18% Pay Rise." OM. Feb. 8. 
2012; "Kansanshi Miners Win 22 p.c. Pay Rise," TOZ, Feb. 28, 2012: "More Money in 
your Pocket: Luansbya Mine Awards Workers 26% Pay Rise," Zambian Eye. Dec. 2, 
2012; "Mopani Unionized Workers in 10% Pay Hike," TOZ Dec. 28. 2012. The Act.ing 
MUZ President stated in August, 2011 :bat MCM's lowest salary was KJ.8m and 
KCM's was K2.1m. Mukuka interview. Using the latter figure, for KCM's lowest paid 
workers to reach K3m in 2012. an anomalous 43% increase would have been required. 
But the MUZ's late President Munyunyembe was quoted as stating that with the 2012 
pay increase, the lowest paid employee will now get 3 million Zambian kwacha ($590) 
per month." "Zambian Miners Win 17% Fay Rise," Reuters. Jan. 18, 20U. The HRW 
report (p. 119) states that the basic salary of the lowest-paid NFCA workers in 
September, 2011 was about K1.2m. In August, 2011, NFCA's CEO said that the lowest 
basic salary was KJ.Sm, as did Prof. John Lungu. WANG Chunlai interview; Lungu 
interview. Based on KI.Sm, a 44% pay rise would bring the lowest NFCA salary to 
K2.16m or 72% that of the lowest KCM (permanent) worker. An October, 2011 report 
stated that NFCA workers make KJ.67m. but did not make clear whether that is for 
lowest-paid workers. HAN Wei and SHEN Hu. "China-owned Mines in Zambia Beset 
by Strikes," CaWo, Oct. 21,2011, http://engJish. caWo.com/2011-J0-21/100316S09. html. 
Sino-Metals' increase for 2012 was KSOO.OOO acroos the board. Zambian Miners Agree. 
The lowest-paid worker there now makes Kl.3m or 43% that of the lowest-paid KCM 
worker. CB Minister Urges; "MUZ Describes 17% Pay Rise as not Impressive," TP, 
Mar. 23,2012. After the 2012 pay raise, the lowest paid worker at CCS earns a Kl.9m 
basic salary. but there is also a 1<230,000 vacation allowance, which does not appear to 
exist at other mining facilities. That meals thai tbe lowest pay at CCS bas risen to 
about K2.13m or virtually the same as at NFCA. "Cbambisbi Smelter Workers Hail 
State for Improved Conditions," OM, Apr. 19, 2012. 
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The 2012 salary increases meant that the lowest-paid NFCA 
workers would earn almost three-fourths the salary of the lowest· 
paid permanent worker at the much more profitable KCM and a 
significantly higher percentage compared to KCM's overall 
workforce. The proportion of CLM·to-KCM salaries should re-
main about the same, i.e. about 80%, according to CLM. That be-
ing said, it should also be noted that among all the foreign-owned 
copper mine that raised wages in 2012, only those provided by 
NFCA, CCS and SML represent substantial increases in dollar 
terms. As a blogger on a mining journal website explained in 
March, 2012, in reference to one firm's offer of a 17% pay increase: 
The 17% increase being talked about is in Zambian 
Kwacha, the country's currency. The exchange rate when 
the last increase was given stood at 4500 Kwacha per dol· 
lar. The Kwacha is now trading at 5260 Kwacha per US 
Dollar, a16.8% reduction of income due to exchange 
losses. Kansanshi, by offering less than this figure, will ac-
tually have a wage bill lower than that of January 2011. 
This less than 17% offer is being made against the coun· 
try's inflation of circa 9%. In short the Zambian worker at 
Kansanshi is earning less than they did in 2011.241 
Based on the salary tables in their respective 2012 collective 
agreements with the union and announced 2013 salary increases for 
CLM of 14% and KCM of 7.5%, the lowest-paid CLM miner 
should be receiving about 82% of the salary of the lowest-paid 
KCM miner.242 
As to one part of the mining workforce moreover, the pay at 
CNMC mines may now be roughly compared with that of other for-
eign-owned mines. A 2012 study states that "Chinese wages for 
skilled labor are comparable to other mines in Zambia, and the 
Chinese owned Luanshya mine even pays better than the Swiss/Ca-
nadian owned Mopani mine.'>243 
241. Haswellsikana. post to ''Two Top Copper Mines in Zambia Shut Down," Min-
ing.com, Mar. 4, 2012, www.miniog.oom/2012103104/two-top-copper-mines-in-zambia-
shut-<lown/. The Kansanshi offer later became 22%, but for two years, i.e. 11% a year. 
242. The lowest-paid KCM miner's 2013 basic wage - in rebased kwacbas denomi· 
nated at ooe one-thousandth of old kwacbas - should be some KR 3,284 (about 
US$630); the lowest-paid CLM miner should earn some KR 2,682 (about US$S18). The 
authors retain the basic wage rate tables of the 2012 collective agreements between 
1-.-!UZ and NUMA W and CLM and KCM. 
243. Gerard van Bracht, • A Survey of Zambian Views on Chin...: People and their 
Involvement in Zambia." Africall East Asian Affairs n: 1 (2012): 54-97 (77). 
60 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
C. Hours 
The HRW report states (p. 3) that "Most miners at Sino Metals 
and CCS reportedly work 12-hour shifts, compared to the eight-
hour shifts outlined in Zambian law and standard in every other 
copper mining and processing operation in the country." Its author 
has written that "Several Chinese-run copper mining companies re-
quire miners to work brutally long hours - 72-hour work week for 
some, 365 days without a off day for others ... "244 
Western media have expectedly played up this "cruel Chinese" 
theme. It is sweepingly inaccurate: the HRW report itself (p. 4) 
states only that "Miners in certain departments at Sino Metals work 
72-hour weeks without sufficient overtime, while those in other de-
partments work 365 days a year ... " The report (p. 78) is unclear on 
how many SML workers have had long hours, which affected work-
ers in only some departments of one of the smaller CNMC firms,245 
not "several" firms and not most CNMC workers, 80o/o of whom 
work regular 8-hour shifts in the Luanshya and Chambishi mines. 
There are also 12-hour shifts at CCS. A CCS employee has ex-
plained that 
The frontline workers have two night shifts, two day shifts 
and two days off. Thus they work 48 hours a week and 20-
21 days a month. That means there's eight hours of over-
time a week. A minority of workers might take a turn to 
have 60 hours a week. Chinese staff get only one day off 
per week. The reason for doing 12-hour shifts is for the 
sake of the smooth operation of the kinds of machines that 
we currently have. As CCS is a new plant, most local em-
ployees cannot yet independently operate the machines. 
So there are still Chinese at each shift, overseeing the op-
erations. Zambian workers prefer to work 8-hour shifts. 
The management has considered it, but it would be possi-
ble only when local workers have adequate skill for inde-
pendent operation. So the management is pushing for 
localization of skills.246 
244. Matt Wells, "China in Zambia: Trouble Down in the Mines." Huff Post World, 
Nov. 21, 2011, www.huffingtopost.comlmatt·wellslchia·in·zambia·trouble·d...b_ll02080. 
html. 
245. SML's 400 employees work in 14 departments, which in late 2011 ranged in size 
from 3 to 101 persons. Technical Assessment Report: Ill-150. 
240. E-mail from CCS employee to authors, Nov. 14, 2011. 
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In smelte~ in Zambia (MCM Mufilira) and Australia (ML 1sa 
Smelter) that use the same ISASMELT technology that CCS uses, 
employees also work 12-hour shifts.247 
The ho~ that Zambian mine~ work do not confirm the con-
trast HRW bas created between Chinese work-'til-you-drop bosses 
and more enlightened manage~ of Western-based firms. In 20CJ7, 
KCM mine~ reported that they worked more than 8 ho~. often 
up to 12 ho~. without overtime pay.248 1n 2008, a Zambian seek-
ing employment at Chambishi stated that "his countrymen prefer to 
be employed by the NFCA rather than other foreign companies. 
They say they would rather work the 8 bo~ demanded of them by 
NFCA than the 12 hou~ wbicb is commonplace in other 
companies.'""'9 
In 2008 as well, the managing director of Lumwana mine stated 
that miners there work 12-hour shifts and that "if the company bad 
its way, it would have wanted the workers to work for more than 12 
hours, but it was mindful not to go against labor laws of the coun-
try." This contradiction could be resolved however by having the 
mine~ work overtime.250 In 2009, KCM mine~ worked four 12-
hour days, then two days off.:z.s1 1n 2010, a permanent employee 
miner at Lumwana mine said that she and her colleagues work four 
12-hour day shifts, then four 12-bour night shifts, followed by four 
days off. She noted that in earlier years, they worked 10-hour or 
even 8-hour shifts, but hours increased because "in the operations 
and production phase, we are facing a lot of pressure.'>2.'l 1n 2012, 
striking miners at Kansanshi demanded that their 12-hou~ shifts be 
cut to 8 hours.:z.s3 
247. Interview, Robinson Mubtll, Man.aser of Safety and Envaronment, CCS, Aug. 
16, 2012; Philip Arthur and Li Yun. " YUOJI&O Cos>!- Carpcnl>OII's New Smeller.· 
Chana's F'arstJSAMELT." Paper YuaWI Symposium. San Dqo. .. "NW.-Iu:oml 
EN/. .ncr. ISASMELT_Paper YC'CTMS2003.pdf:l2. 
2A8. Undermining Development?: t4-IS. 
249. "Chma in Zambia: from C'om111des to Capitalists?" World News Review, Octo-
ber, 2008, http://oew-revicw. blogspot.conUO.Ot_arcbive.btml. It was reported in 2005 
that Chabuluma miners worked 48 hours a week, but the length of <hills, I.e. four 12-
hour or six 8-bours, was not specified. Muneku, South Arriean: 'l77. 
2!10. "Lumwana Intensifies Copper I'Toduetion,• OM. Dec. IS, 2008. 
251. Jcan-O>tistophe Servant, "Mmed Out in Zambia," u Mond• Dipwmarlq~. 
Moy 9, 2009. 
252. Kevin van N'aekert, "Fadn& ond o--oomi.Dg <llallcnp." D11«1ou 'Unabi<J 5: 
24-29. 
253. Maoers Paralyze. 
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A 2011 UK newspaper account of MCM noted that miners 
there "toll six-and-a-half days a week in the rock underneath Mufu-
lira," i.e. more hours per week than do NFCA or CLM under-
ground miners and, in effect, up to 365 days a year.U< Presumably, 
thousands of miners at MCM work that schedule, while workers at 
CNMC SML who HRW said work every day are far fewer, since 
SML only has about 400 employees and HRW only claims that 
workers in some departments do so. Media reports about the HRW 
study nevertheless have quite predictably asserted that long shifts 
are a general practice of Chinese-owned mining firms in Zambia -
and Chinese-owned mining firms alone- while the HRW report 
itself tells readers that they should infer something from it about 
Chinese practices in Africa generally. Unsurprisingly, neither the 
media nor HRW have noted that from 2012, all employees at Sino 
Metals work 8-hour days and have at least one day off a week.255 
D. Job Security 
The HRW report tenns CNMC a good investor, but bad em-
ployer; yet job security is a key part of employment and, while 
CNMC firms are still behind the "industry standard" of pay, they 
do better in job security. There were 63,000 workers in Zambia's 
copper mines when the financial crisis hit in late 2008. By spring, 
2009, 30% (19,000 workers) were laid off, but only by non-CNMC 
firms.256 The industry bad about 20,000 permanent emptor:e min· 
ers before the layoffs began and nearly half were laid-off. 7 After 
the recovery, some firms did not hire back many workers they laid 
254. Oavoes. The Other Face. In 2011, nurses otruct at Metorex's Cbibuluma Mine 
hospital tO protest being forced to wort 12-bour shifts in violation of Zambia's 8-bour 
day law. One nurse was fired and 24 Olbers issued "''1111Jl8S. "Cbibuluma Mine Fues 
Nurse over Post Anicle," TP, May 21. 2011. In early 20t2, CbibuiWNI management 
demanded that miners inerease their workdays to eight and a ball hours. "Strike 
Looms at 01lbuluma Mine," TP, Feb. 3. 2012. 
2SS. Interview, XU Xiliang, Deputy CEO, Sino Metals, Cbambishi. Aug. IS. 2012: 
Interview. Peter Kalasa. Assistant Manager of Administration & Human Resources. 
Sino Metals. Aug. IS. 2012. 
256. Cnsp1n Matenga. "The lmpoct of the Global Financial and f!a)oomic Crisis 011 
Job 1..os>es and Conditions of Wort in the Mining Sector in Zambia.· ILO, Lusaka, 
2010: Charles Muchimba, "The Zambian Mining Industry. a Status Repon Ten Years 
after Privatization," Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka, 2010: 27. 
2S7. Servant, Mined Out; "Zambian Copperbelt Reels from Global Crisis," w..,h-
ington Post, Mar. 25.2009. For lay-orr numbers as of early 2009 ror vark>us mines. see 
Manenga Ndulo. et at., "The Global Financial Crisis and Developing Countries: the 
Ctse or Zambia," The Global Financial Crisis Workshop, 001, Feb. II, 2009. London. 
www.odi.org.ut/e,entslpresen~t10Mi466.pdi 
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off: KCM had 11,978 of its own employees in 2008, but 9,696 in 
2010.:1j8 In 2008, MCM bad 10,000 of its own employees and 10,000 
contract worlters, but by May, 2009 it pared down to 7,500 perma-
nent employees; in 2011 it had 16,500 total, evenly divided between 
permanent and contract workers.259 
In early 2009, CNMC adopted a "three not's" (san bu) policy: 
to not lay off worlters, not cut back on planned investment, and not 
hesitate to malte new investments. A study notes that 
In Zambia, the Chinese mine [NFCA] showed a counter-
cyclical expansion, with acquisition and re-capitalization 
of a new mine and continuing investment in the MFEZ. 
The Chinese mine did not cut production, investment, de-
velopment projects and was also the only one, with the 
South African mine, not to retrench workers.260 
In Zambia, each miner, on average, is reckoned to support at least 
five family members.261 The study points out that the three not's 
also benefited CNMC firm suppliers, whose presence 
cballenge[s] the expectation that the Chinese mine would 
operate as an enclave ... Mine development was under-
talten by Chinese firms, but the bulk of extractive opera-
tions relied on a diversified basis of local, regional and 
foreign suppliers ... [ C)ounter cyclical investment to ex-
pand mining and refining capacity meant that pressure to 
cut costs, experienced by other mining companies, did not 
play a major role in the Chinese supply cbain."262 
CNMC firms, unlike other foreign investors, not cutting back on 
purchases presumably helped to maintain the livelihood of Zam-
bian suppliers. Beyond miners, their family members, suppliers and 
their dependents, the livelihood of additional Zambians' were prob-
ably protected by the three not's policy, as a study has shown that in 
258. " KCM Employees Reduced. • TOZ, JUDe 1, 2011. 
2S9. Zambian Parliament, Commouee: 18; "Copper Mine Pa.res M<><c Jobs," TOZ. 
May 6, 2009; Davies, The Other FIKlC. 
260. Fcssehaie, Development: 26; See also "Chibuluma to Keep Workers." TOZ. 
Doc. 19, 2008. 
261. "Sustainable De'·elopment in Zambia: Experiences ond Ways Forward." United 
Nations UoiveiSity, lostitute of Advanced Studies, s.d. 2006?, www.ias.unu.edu/sub_ 
paae.upx?catlD=107&ddiJ0;20?. O<MC bas stated that its htnn& of 2.2SO local min-
en at Cl.M beodined 20,000 local people. "OliDa Noofenous Metal MJIIIOJ Group." 
CRJEqlisll. Ocl. 14, 2010. bup-Jienabsh..cri.cD/71461201MOt'1<1121MI~.htm. 
262. FessdWe. Devetopmenc 60. 
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South Africa, where mining directly empl~s 500,000 people, 
"every mining job represents 26 livelihoods."2 
The three not's idea was CNMC's, but was adopted br, Cbina's 
Ministry of Commerce, despite a potential for great losses. 64 It per-
haps renects a conclusion drawn in a 2009 study of Chinese invest-
ment in Zambia: 
Historically, western FD!s in Zambia have come from pri-
vately owned corporations which are focused on profit 
maximization, generally with relatively short-time hori-
zons. By contrast, recent Chinese FDI comes from firms, 
which are either wholly- or partially state owned and are 
driven by broader objectives than merely profit 
maximization.265 
From 2012 moreover, all NFCA and CLM workers are permanent 
employees, while contract workers are still used in KCM and 
MCM.2"'<1 
To the extent that "good employers" exist at all in Zambian 
mining, CNMC was a good employer by not laying off workers 
when almost all other fums did so. In fact, it hired more when CLM 
acquired Luanshya during the financial crisis.267 In contrast, when 
Luanshya's Swiss former owner, J&W (Enya), acquired Luanshya 
in 2004, it re-hired only 1,000 of the 4,000 workers who had been 
employed there previously.- It then contracted mining develop-
ment to a South African firm that hired over I ,000 workers at hall 
263. "One Mining Job Benefi!S 26 Others: Bafoteng Study," Mini11g Wukly. July 16. 
2012. 
264. Luo Tao intemew. 
265. Jolly Kamw""&" ond Grayson Koy>. "Impact of Cluno-Africa 1nvestment Rela-
tions: the Case of Zamboo,": African Economic Researcb Consortium, 2009: 39, www. 
aercafrica.org/ .• ./Zamblainvestmentrelatlons.pdf. 
266. Wang Chunlai and Gao Xiang August 2011 interviews. Heavy use of oonlraCI 
workers is widespread in mining; in Peru - the world's second largest copper producer 
- in 2008 there were 8.5.000 minett. but only 16.000 permanent workers. whole in lbe 
early 19\lOs, almost all moners had been pennanenL 1CEM has observed that "many 
employers are using contract and agency labor [CAL) u precisely one of the ways to 
avoid a high unionization rate [and) thai many CAL workers have been dl•missed as 
soon as they joined a union .•. ICEM. "Contract and Agency Labor Camplligo, .ppt. 
2009, www.tucrivers.org/. 
267. CLM constituted 115 Zambian "orkforee by binng 1,448 workers laod off by lbe 
previous owner. 661 former contnctor's "orters and 341 from the open market. 
" Luanshya ())pper Mines has Produced Copper Valued 11 $12m Since Inception.- TP. 
Apr. 13. 2010. 
268. "Casual Labor Blamed on Weak Policy," TOZ. May I, 2004. 
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the regular wage. After taking over, CLM got rid of the contractor 
and made the 1,000 workers into CLM's own employees, doubling 
their salaries.269 In November 2011, AJbidon Ltd., 51% of which is 
owned by Chinese SOE Jinchuan, indefinitely suspended opera-
tions at its Munali nickel mine in Zambia, due to a sharp decline in 
global nickel prices and technical difficulties. Despite having to 
shut down production, it agreed however to continue to pay full 
salaries to its 200 or so workers.= It did so until at least the end of 
2012 and thereafter it continued with corporate social responsibility 
projects, including building schools and hospitals.271 
E. Unions 
The HRW report notes that MUZ complains it is excluded 
from CNMC's two processing plants, SML and CCS. It implies that 
MUZ was shut out due to its militancy,272 as well perhaps because 
of its connection with the PF and that MUZ's exclusion is a 
human rights violation. Senior Asia Researcher HRW Phelim Kine 
reportedly said "the Zambian miners were severely discouraged 
from associating with one of the two national unions, thereby de-
priving the miners of the right to associate.'>274 Yet, in 2011, at all 
four CNMC firms, at least one major union was present, while at 
CLM and NFCA, where four-fifths of CNMC firm workers are em-
ployed, the two unions, MUZ and NUMA W, bargained jointly with 
employers. In 2012, both unions were also present and recognized 
at SML. 
At the main Zambian copper mines, 50-70% of the workforce 
is said to be unionized,275 but when contract workers are taken into 
269. Oao Xiang interview. Luanshya MUZ branch chairman Stanislas Mwinbe con-
firmed this infonnation. 
270. "Albidon Suspends Operations at MunaU Nickel Indefinitely," ZW, Nov. 11, 
2011. 
271. "Over 200 to Looe Job6 at Albidon." OM, Dec. 12, 2012. 
272. Implications that MUZ is militant are problematic. It often urges striking min-
ers to return to work. See, e.g.. "Striking Copper Miners Threaten Zambia's Produc-
tion; Deutsche Presse Agentur," Jan. 4, 2012; "'There's Need to Address Mine 
Workers Stoppages,"' TOZ. Oct. 19, 2011. 
273. Since soon after PF became significant in Copperbelt, MUZ has denied that it 
bas worked with the PF against the MMD and has affirmed its "non-partisan approach 
to politics." MUZ Denies Undermining MMD," TOZ. Mar. 18, 2003. NUMA W has 
defended the PF government and criticized opposition leaders. "NUMA W Calls Cor 
Constructive Opposition Parties." TP, July 12, 2012. 
274. Lynch. Labor Abuses. 
275. Apotheker, Foreign Copper: 43. Of 47,836 employees at 13 Zambian mining 
companies surveyed in 2007, including all foreign-<>wned copper ntining firms (45,844 
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account, the percentage may be much lower, as at Kansanshi, where 
in 2011 two-thirds of the permanent employees, but only a fourth of 
the total workforce appeared to be unionized.276 Unionization of 
contract workers is exceedingly difficult, due to the fragmentation 
of contractors' workforces. For example, in 2010, KCM had con-
tracted with 43 companies, including such foreign ones as U&M of 
Brazil and Moolmans of South Africa. According to the MUZ, 
such short tenure agreements were "meant to kill the union move-
ment at the country's largest mining units. "277 To the extent that 
contractor's workers may be unionized, they may not be in either 
MUZ or NUMA W, but rather the Mine Contractors and Allied 
Workers Union of Zambia (MCA WUZ), a little-known organiza-
tion of unknown strength.:ns 
By 2008, 70% of NFCA workers were unionized.279 In NFCA, 
NUMA W is stronger, with 1000-plus members in August 2011, 
while MUZ had 400-plus. At CLM, MUZ had 1,100 members in 
August, 2012; while NUMA W had 1,346 members. MUZ is also rec-
ognized at 15 MCC, a CNMC company that has constructed the 
new Muliyashi mine for CLM.280 Both unions have staunch PF sup-
porters among their leaders.~' 
On the relationship between MUZ and CCS, a CCS employee 
told us in 2010 that "NUMA W is present, not MUZ. MUZ will 
employees). 52% were unionized. National Economic Advisory Q>uncil (NEAC). 
"Quantity and Quality of Employment in the Mining and Manufacturing Sectors in 
Zambia, 1991-2006": 19, 24 (author"s photocopy). 
276. Ngosa and van Alstine, Seeking Benefits: 7. 
277. "KCM Degrading Employment through Sub-Q>ntracting. • TP, Aug. 6, 2010. 
278. See " KCM Contractor Recalls 1,200 Retrenched Workers," TOZ, Jan. 21, 2012: 
"200 Moolmans Worken Lose Jobs," TOZ. Dec. 12, 2011. The union seems to have 
first appeared in 2010 or 2011; it is unclear whether it represents workers at contractor 
firms employed outside of KCM. 
279. Apotheker, Foreign Copper: 53. 
280. Mukuka interview; Interview. Adam Zulu. CLM worker. NUMAW national 
Vice-President, Aug. 17, 2012. 
281. Some NUMA W leaders suppon PF; some MUZ leaders do not. Alex Mwale. 
NFCA NUMA W branch chairman, is a local PF politician. Interview, Chingola, Aug. 
20, 2011. Stanislas Mwimbe, an MUZ branch chairman at CLM, was said in 2010 to 
have been a supporter of the (then-ruling) Movement for Multipany Democracy 
(MMD). "MUZ Warns MMD over Failure to Address Miners' Concerns," TP, Apr. 30. 
2010. MUZ leaden, including the former MUZ president and present (PF) Deputy 
Minister of Labor Rayford Mbulu, have praised the MMD government for its actions 
relating lo miners and economic development. See. e.g., .. Banda's Handling of Mining 
Sector Hurdles Cheer MUZ," TOZ. Dec. IS, 2008; NGP Receives Kudos for Acknowl-
edging Eeonomic Developments, TOZ. July, 13. 2011; "LiatoSiams Job Casualisation," 
Apr. 28. 2010. 
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probably be present eventually, but as of now they don't follow the 
national legal procedure to establish themselves at CCS, yet com-
plain that they've been shut out.•>282 The CCS employee said in 
2011 that contrary to HRW's assertion, CCS is not aware of any 
court order that requires it to recognize MUZ.283 
The issue of a court order and the reason why MUZ was recog-
nized by NFCA, CLM and 15 MCC, but not by Sino Metals and 
CCS, requires further investigation.284 It would however have been 
odd for Sino-Metals and CCS to display anti-MUZ animus when 
NFCA, CLM and 15 MCC do not. Sino-Metals, CCS, and 15 MCC, 
while distinct legal entities, are directed by NFCAW and "At CLM, 
both NUMA W and MUZ operate freely, whereas at NFCA, MUZ 
has operated a branch office since 2006, with NUMA W establishing 
its own branch office soon after the union's creation in 2003. "286 
There seems no basis then to imply that CNMC companies are hos-
tile to MUZ for political reasons; neither is MUZ particularly hos-
tile to CNMC: the MUZ branch chairman at CLM told us that 
"When Chinese came [to take over Luanshya], it was at a time of 
anti-Chinese sentiment. The union supported it [CNMC]."287 
What has most devastated union activism in Zambia's mining 
sector is not CNMC, but the sharp decline in membership due to 
retrenchment at non-CNMC firms during the financial crisis. 
MUZ's membership dropped from 26,000 before the crisis to 12,000 
282. Interview, CCS employee, Hong Kong. May 4, 2010. Another human relations 
CCS employee stated in 2012 that MUZ still had not met legal criteria for recognition. 
When MUZ applied for recognition, most workers listed were still NUMAW members. 
Zambian law provides that a worker must give 3 months notice to quit a union . Inter· 
view, Irene Tembo. Assistant HR Manager CCS. Chambishi. August 15, 2012. 
283. CCS employee e-mail to authors, Nov. 14, 2011. MUZ President Rayford 
Mbulu IOid us in an Aug. 28,2008 interview in Kitwe that MUZ had taken Sino-Metals 
to court and that MUZ had 4QO.plus members at NFCA. 
284. MUZ, despite not being formally recognized by CCS management, may still 
have input to the annual wage negotiations there. See "Chambishi Smelter Workers 
Strike." Mewls Week, Mar. 28. 2011 (''1'be secretary of the National Union of Miners 
and Allied Workers. Goodwill Kaluba, recendy said that unions including the Mine-
workers Union of Zambia had concluded negotiations with all the mining companies, 
which included the Chambisbi Copper Smelter"). 
285. Dan Haglund, Policy Evolution and Organitational Learning in Zambia's Min· 
ins Swor, unpub'd PhD dissertation, University of Bath (UK), Nov. 2010: 107. 
286. Chusa Sichone, "Workers Cry for Improved Conditions of Service," TOZ. Nov. 
14, 2011. 
287. Mwinbe interview. 
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in August 2011.288 Sino-Metals and CCS aie moreover not the only 
mining entities where there bas been only one union. Chibuluma 
has only MUZ.289 Interestingly, that has been seen as an aid to 
organizing: interviewees at Chibuluma have explained that because 
"the mine has only one union, the MUZ, (t)berefore the member-
ship is easier to mobilize for anything, as opposed to the situation in 
other mines were there is more than one union. "290 
The multiplicity of unions in Zambia has in fact been the result 
of an effort to weaken trade unions, which played a key role in the 
struggle against the decades-long presidency of Kenneth Kaunda 
(in power 1964-1991), which included the establishment of the 
MMD. In 1990, in an effort to derail the movement against him, 
Kaunda put in place a new Industrial Relations Act, designed to 
"liberalize" and thereby divide the labor movement. The Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), led by Frederick Chiluba, op· 
posed the Act. But after the MMD won the 1991 elections and 
Chiluba became Zambia's president, he endorsed the International 
Monetary Fund's neo-liberalizing structural adjustment program 
(SAP) and carried out privatization that weakened the labor move-
ment. SAPs led to changes that 
have produced a decline in formal-sector employment, 
more cutthroat competition, the increasing mobility of la-
bor and capital, and the growing casualization of labor. 
Whereas Zambia was formerly considered a middle-in-
come developing country in the 1970s, it now qualifies ... 
for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HlPC) debt relief 
291 
Moreover, "paradoxically, Zambian interest groups bad real influ-
ence under the former one-party structures and this influence was 
288. Mukuka interview. NUMA w. historically the smaller union. also has 12.000 
members. Kaluba interview. 
289. '"Olinese Firm Offer> Zambia Miner> 17% Pay Rise."' Reuter>, Mar. 23. 2012. 
290. John 1.-ungu and Sumbye Kapena. "South African Mining Corporate Govern· 
ance Practice in Zambia: lhe Case of Olibuluma Mine Pic."' in South African Research 
Watch. "South African Mining Companies in Southern Africa: Corporate Governance 
and Social Responsibilities." 2010. 47-97 (88). www.boell.org.za/downloadsiSARWbook 
FA.pdL 
291. M. Anne Pitcher. '"Whal has Happened to Organized Labor in Soulhern Af. 
rica:• lmemational!Abor and Working Class History 72 (2007): 134·160 (136). 
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reduced as a result of the combined processes of political and eco-
nomic liberalization. "292 
When some unions opposed the SAP, Chiluba ~promptly dis-
tanced himself from the trade unions and began a regime of anti-
labor policies that ultimately led to the division of the once solid 
ZCTU." This "state-ordered split" was fostered by the ~right" of 
workers in an enterprise to be represented by more than one union. 
As unions fought each other and were used for leaders' personal 
advancement, they experienced "a massive membership loss. "293 
[U]nion membership declined to about 250,000 members 
by 2000, consistent with the decline in formal-sector em-
ployment from about 750,000 workers in the 1970s to 
478,000 workers by 2000. In the important copper sector, 
union membership dropped precipitously from 62,000 in 
1990 to 25,000 in 1999 due to mine closures and job 
losses.294 
Since then, as a ZCTU official has noted, the "proliferation of 
unions in Zambia, a country where barely 15 percent of regularly 
employed workers are unionized" has continued, as "'A union 
leader who loses an election can sometimes leave with his support-
ers and set up another union to keep himself in a job," while unions 
are seen by some of their leaders "as a stepping stone to political 
advancement.'>295 MUZ president Chisbimba Nkole stated in 2012 
that "the proliferation of trade unions must be discouraged because 
it weakens their ability to effectively represent workers. 'This sys-
tem of forming many unions is not good at all. It is not healthy for 
the sector. It weakens us at the end of the day."'296 
Zambia's leading political parties, the main union federation 
and a human rights group have aU stated that having one union per 
workplace or even one per industry is advantageous to workers. 
The (MMD) Minister of Labor, speaking in parliament in 2011 on 
292. Lise Rakner, Political ond Ecvrwmsc Ub<rolisarion m Z..miM 1991-2()()1 
(Stcxkbolm. 2003): 178. 
293. Tayo Fasboyin, "Policy Reforms and Employment Relations In Zambia," Inter-
notional Lobour Organisation Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa. Issues Paper 
no. 29, 2008: 5-6, /www.ilo.or&tpublk:/englishlregjonlalprolborare/downloodlissues_pa-
per..29.pdf. 
294. Potcher. 143. 
295. "Demoos Faced by Zambio a l..es5or CO£ SA Unionists ln.ide Lobor," 1M Sar 
(South Africa). Mar. 4. :lnll. Sec abo '1loe Oeatiol1 oCSplontcr Unions by the MMD," 
ZW, Jan. 26. :lnll. 
296. "Di-.isioos in Mine Union lrts MUZ Boa." DM, July S, 2012. 
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having more than one union a1 mining firms, said "we are focusing 
on supporting the mosl represenrative group as a way of ensuring 
thai no confusion is crealed ... ,"indicating a policy of no! requiring 
recognition of more !han one union.297 The subsequenl PF Minister 
of Labor has exlended thai policy 10 whole induslries.198 zcru 
head Leonard Hikaumba has called on unions to merge, as "'some-
limes there is divided attention 10 issues where unions in the same 
secror consider lhemselves as rivals'" and "multiple unions in rhe 
same secror are leading 10 compromised an ineffective negotiations 
•• .''
299 zcru Generai-Secrerary Roy Mwaba has said !hat while 
freedom of association is a constirutional righl, il is being abused by 
the proliferation of trades unions and that "We need to have one 
union for each sector. ">00 Zambia's Democratic Governance and 
Human Rights Advocates leader Gerald Mutelo has said that 
"Having one union will represent the workers effectively."301 
Conversely, from the slandpoint of mining management, hav-
ing only one union carries disadvantages, including the inability to 
play unions off against each orher or at least gain leverage due to 
union leaderships warring wilh each other. Where a second union 
is presenl, but not recognized, non-recognition of !hal second union 
may lirnil the bosses' abiliry to reach an agreemenl when workers 
strike. For example, in 2012 there was a five week-long, violenl 
strike a1 the (while) Sourh African Impala Platinum (lmplats) 
Mine. The Nation Union of Miners (NUM) represented 70% of 
the workforce, some 17,000 miners. During the strike, the rival As-
sociation of Mineworkers and Conslruction Union (AMCU), which 
was seeking recognition without any formal process having taken 
place, recruited NUM strikers to join it and organized rock drill 
operators (RDOs) to attack NUM members who wanted to return 
to work. lmplats managemenl expressed ils frustration a! not being 
able 10 lalk with AMCU because NUM was !he only recognized 
union at its operation. -.n 
2'17. Debate, Mar. 22. 2011. www.parliament.gov.zmlindex.php?option=eom_cootent 
&taskovicw&idal410&ltem•d~l'mit•t&limitstart;l, 
298. "Shamenda Warns Companies Flouting Labor Laws," OM, Nov. 2S, 2011 ("On 
concerns by the public over many labor unions (the Minister of Labor! urged that each 
sector should have a big union for easy bargaining witb employers"). 
299. "ZCTU Ponders Merger of Same Sector Unions." DM, Feb. 17. 2012. 
300. "Trade Union Fragmentation Worries ZCTU," OM. Nov. 8, 2012. 
301. "Splinter Unions Setback to Bargaining Power," TOZ. Dec. 29. 2011. 
302. "lmplats Strike Esca!a1<>." M10eweb. Feb. 2. 2012; " lmplats Gets New CEO. 
but Worters Stay Av.ay." CAJ Ne"'S. Jao. 31. 2012. bttp:/lca)newsa&eocy.comfm· 
des.phptiovestiog137S·•mplats·&ets·ne.,.-ceo-but-worlters·•lly·lway. 1be strike was ille· 
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While workers are entitled under Zambian Jaw to set up more 
than one union in a workplace, it hardly amounts to a human rights 
violation if they have only one union, provided it represents their 
interests. In practical terms in fact, workers may find their rights 
violated when the presence of more than one union divides the 
workforce. That is what happened when three unions at KCM were 
involved in negotiating the 2013 contract. The result was a pay rise 
of 7.5%, by far the lowest rise among the mines that year. MUZ 
Secretary General Joseph Chewe observed that "(t)here was no 
unity among ourselves as union. We had some union officials who 
were pushing their own agendas. "303 
The US-based HRW must be aware that the principle of "ex-
clusive representation" applies in unionized workplaces. An eco-
nomics textbook has explained that the 
NLRA (National Labor Relations Act) provides that only 
one union can represent the employees in a bargaining 
unit. If workers in a unit decide to organize and are suc-
cessful in convincing the majority of employees who vote 
in the election to support the union, that union becomes 
the exclusive representative for those employees. No 
other union can represent any other workers in that unit. 
In addition, the union that wins that election acquires the 
responsibility to represent all employees in that unit, not 
just the employees who voted for the union.304 
Rather than amounting to a "labor abuse," US unions have 
seen exclusive representation as augmenting their power to a.chieve 
labor rights. An opposing argument can be made: that the presence 
of more than one union produces competition that usefully drives 
up bargaining demands, but that involves a political question, not a 
right.305 Laws may also be framed that provide workers the free-
gal and lmplats fired 17,200 workers. When the strike ended. it agreed to take back 
only 15,000. Among the 2,200 not rehired were the "perpetrators of the violence. • 
"lmplats Says Strike Over, Mining to Resume March 5," Miningm, Feb. 29,2012, www. 
miningmx.comlnewslplatinum._group_.metalsllmplat.s--says·strike-over·mining .. to-.re· 
sume-Marcb-S.btm 
303. KCM Workers. 
304. Paul F. Qark and Julie Sadler, "The Role of Labor Unions in Labor Markets," 
in Rbona C. Free, 21st C<ntury Economics: a R<ferene< Handb()()k (Thousand Oaks. 
CA: Sage Publications, 2010): 163-172 (169). 
305. A!)lles Akkerman, "Union Competition and Strikes: the Need lor Analysis at 
the Sectoral Level," Industrial & Labor Relations Review 61:4 (200&): http://digitaloom-
mons.ilr.comeJLedulcgi/viewcontenlcgi?article=1342&oontext=ilrreview. 
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dom to join other unions, but they have no "right" to be repre-
sented by them. As for CNMC miners in Zambia, they are almost 
all permanent employees, and thus they are not "barred from join-
ing a trade union at pain of dismissal," as contract workers, at 
MCM for example, have attested is the case for them.306 
HR W evidently made no effort to determine whether the ab-
sence of MUZ at SML and CCS had any practical effect on the 
workers situation. Needless to say, HRW has not publicly noted 
that since 2012, MUZ and NUMA W have jointly bargained collec-
tively at Sino Metals.307 It is thus likely that HRW raised the issue 
of dual union representation at CCS and Sino-Metals as merely an 
additional way to claim that CNMC is "the worst." That approach 
parallels what its report does with regard to wages. Although the 
report is supposed to have been written in order to pressure the 
Chinese government to have its SOE mitigate labor abuses,- the 
report's author has stated that "our report never makes a call to the 
Chinese companies to increase wages."309 That must mean that 
HRW does not consider that lower than average wages at CNMC 
firms amount to a labor rights abuse. The inclusion of an elaborate, 
albeit wholly misleading, discussion of wages in the report is thus 
little more than another way to frame CNMC as "the worst." 
m. METHODOLOGICAL CONFUSIONS 
The main method used in the HRW study is interviews, with 95 
miners from four CNMC operations and 48 from non-Chinese 
owned copper mining firms. On its face that is a sound way to learn 
about specific labor abuses that workers have experienced or wit-
306. Davies, The Other Face. The percentage of union contract workers at Zambian 
mines is unclear. Muneku, South African Multinationals in Zambia: 272, indicates thai 
350 of the 400 Chibuluma permanent workers - but no contract workers - were un~ 
ionized. A study, discussing Olibuluma contract workers. related that "Even though 
the law does not restrict trade union from organizing and representing casual employ-
ees the sub- contractor that normally engage these casual employees often inlimidate 
and warn them from associating wilb unions ... Oupa Bodibe. "The Extent and Effects 
of Casualization in Southern Africa," National Labor & Economic lnstiute, 2006: 131, 
www.sarpn.org/documenJSI .. JEffects_Casualisation_Nov2006.pdf. 
307. Kalasa ioterview. 
308. A repon that singles out Chinese firms ror criticism is unlikely to influence 
them and a poorly reasoned one even less so. See James Wan. "Zambia-China: Prag-
matism Prevails ("Beijing and Chinese firms pay lillie heed to Western judgments on 
[their) engagements in Africa). ThinkAfricaPress (TAP), Nov. 10,2011, hllp://thinkafri-
capress.comtzambialpragmatism-prevails-china-relations. 
309. Email message from Matt Wells 10 Y AN Hairong, Dec. 16, 2011. 
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nessed. The method becomes dubious however, where it is used to 
draw conclusions that cannot be inferred from the interviewee's di-
rect observations. Thus, the report asserts (p. 3) that "nearly all 
Zambian workers and union officials who spoke to Human Rights 
Watch said the Chinese copper operations were the country's worst 
when it comes to health and safety." It then implies that these state-
ments show that Chinese copper operations are the worst in 
Zambia on safety. Such an inference however is empirically in er-
ror and violates the basic logic of social science and law, the disci-
plines in which studies of human rights are grounded. There are at 
least six reasons why the comparisons made by HRW's interviewees 
are likely to be little or no value. 
First, national and mine branch-level union leaders do not gen-
erally hold that CNMC firms have the worst safety practices. MUZ 
President Munyenyembe rejected that notion and union leaders we 
interviewed all recognized that mine safety deficiencies generally 
exist. Given the fatalities in Zambia's largest, non-Chinese-owned, 
mines, these leaders' observations could hardly have been different. 
That at least some Zambian union leaders now see Chinese as un-
exceptional copper mining bosses partly results from CNMC's 
adaption to local standards, but also shows that these leaders, if not 
HRW, have broken with anti-Chinese discourse. 
Second, because CNMC finn miners do not necessarily know 
the conditions at other mines, they cannot judge how their em-
ployer's operations compare. They may not even generally know 
about conditions where they work, as each operation has several 
departments, severa l shifts, etc. HRW interviewed 95 CNMCfirm 
employees in a 6,000-plus workforce; yet without a random sample 
it cannot be determined whether these employees' experiences are 
even representative of those in their own firms. It also cannot be 
assumed that CNMC-firm interviewees have a basis to compare 
CNMC practices with those at other mines. Even if only interview-s 
and not a survey were possible and even if all interviewees agreed 
that ~the Chinese are the worst," that would still be conjecture, 
given that they have no comprehensive and current understanding 
of conditions at both their own mine and other mines.3' 0 
Third, even miners who work at a CNMC-owned operation, 
but formerly worked at other mines, may not make sound compari-
310. UIIIOQ activists wbo fonnerly -ed al ..-her fum may not oec:essarily see 
lhc:1t current OIMCeiiiJ>Ioyn 11 ...,..... Alex Mwale ......tr.ed f0< Ka.t and then NFCA 
and told us KCM is the: went =player. 
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sons. Safety conditions vary over time. A worker's observations of 
safety practices at KCM in 2008 and then at NFCA in 2011 is not an 
adequate comparison. That requires knowing safety practices at 
NFCA and KCM in 2008 and at NFCA and KCM in 2011.311 
There may also be a selection bias where such interviewees are 
concerned. Safety conditions for contract workers are much worse 
than for permanent employees. 312 As a Zambian analyst has noted 
A large contributor to a poor safety environment is casual-
ization - the situation in which a dual labor market de-
velops: a core of permanent workers with a periphery of 
workers on fixed-term contracts, or contracted as self-em-
ployed individuals. Casualization diminishes safety in two 
ways. First, it provides the employer the incentive to un-
dertake dangerous and reckless mining activities because 
the contracted labor is not fully tied to the mining com· 
pany. The expected cost to the employer when something 
goes wrong is therefore diminished ... Secondly, casual 
labor by its nature is less tied to the firm and therefore has 
minimal incentive to undertake mining activities that are 
safe for all employees in the long term. The most common 
accident in mines is "rock fall." These usually happens by 
casual laborers going mad developing [new seams) and 
leaving people exposed without support in roof sheets. 
Most of the development work in mining is done by casual 
laborers.313 
Many who labor at non-CNMC firms are contract workers, yet 
HRW does not tell readers whether the interviewees who worked at 
a non-CNMC firm before moving to a CNMC firm were contract 
workers. The interviewees who worked at both CNMC and non-
CNMC mining facilities were very likely from among the skilled, 
permanent workers who bad been employed by KCM or MCM and 
311. In social science parlance, such a comparison involves drawing diachronic infer· 
ences from synchronic data. Many studies have shown that witness testimony is also 
fragile and vulnerable to contamination, the more so as time passes. See Laura Beil, 
"The Certainty of Memory bas its Day in Coun." NYT, Nov. 29. 2011. 
312. MCM workers in 2005 blamed surging fa ta lities on increased use of controct 
workers, who Jack the skills of permanent employees. The Mines Minister noted lhat 
"The victims of accidents, the vast majority are employees of contractors." A union 
president said contractors recruit untrained workers off the streets and send them un-
derground the next day. •Zambia's Miners Paying the Prioe." DJN, Dec. 10. 2005. 
313. Chola, "Mining Reflections: Proposition Three," Zambian Economist, Dec, 2, 
2009. 
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were hired by CNMC companies after they were laid off by those 
other firms during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Few, if any, would 
have formerly been among the less-skilled contract workers found 
at some non-CNMC firms, as CNMC firms could in 2008-2009 pick 
from the sudden supply of more-skilled, ex-permanent workers.314 
The HRW interviewees thus probably experienced the better safety 
conditions of permanent employees at their old employers and not 
the worse safety conditions that the many contract workers experi-
ence. Their experiences thus cannot be seen as representative of 
workers at non-CNMC firms and they cannot speak authoritatively 
about how safety at CNMC firms compares to safety at their for-
mer, non-Chinese-owned places of employment. 
Fourth, as we have shown, it is much more difficult to make a 
UG mine safe than an OCone. All CNMC miners worked under-
ground as of 2011, but less than half of minders at other foreign-
owned mines did so. Even if the non-CNMC interviewees were 
representative of their workforces {which they are not), most would 
have worked in conditions necessarily safer, because they are above 
ground, than those worked by CNMC miners, who work under-
ground. That they are necessarily safer has nothing to do with the 
comparative safety practices of the non-CNMC mine bosses; it h as 
to do wl safety differences that are globally attributable to the UG 
and OC mining configurations. 
Fifth, HR W has stated that as to statistical surveys, "it does not 
deploy that methodology anywhere in the 90 countries where we do 
research. We rely on interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and 
other knowledgeable parties to provide evidence of human rights 
abuse. "315 Interviews can be useful for investigating specific inci-
dents of abuse, but cannot be relied on to draw general conclusions 
with comparative implications about the extent of abuse because 
they may reflect a form of bias known in social science as selection 
on the dependent variable; for example, seeking to learn the extent 
of safety violations by searching out those who have experienced 
them. No general conclusions about the overall situation in CNMC 
firms or how conditions there compare with other mines can be 
drawn from such attestations. Those objectives can however be 
achieved with random sample survey data. 
314. Interview. Gabriel Maseko, Head of Industrial Relations, CLM, Aug. 13, 2012. 
315. Sipho Mtbathi. "Critics Must Talk to Farm Workers," Busines> Day (South AI· 
rica), SepL 19, 2011. 
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In fact, Swedish researchers Louise Granath and Marika Lar-
sson surveyed, in 2012, 129 NFCA, CLM, JCHX, 15 MCC and 
Jinchuan miners asked questions about safety (availability of PPE 
and after-accident emergency care), as well as whether the miners 
were satisfied with their working conditions. Regression analysis to 
determine the relationship between the responses to the safety and 
satisfaction questions was carried out in light of the HRW claim of 
discontent about safety conditions at Chinese-owned mines. The 
researchers expected that safety would have a statistically signifi-
cant impact on miner satisfaction, but it did not. They reported the 
"unexpected outcome" that "there is a lack of empirical evidence 
that the issues concerning safety records are of major importance 
for whether employees with Chinese employers are satisfied with 
their working conditions or not." Granath and Larsson concluded 
that "one explanation to this unexpected result might be that the 
issue about safety record is more concerned in media than among 
the employees. "316 
Granath and Larson's result of accords with what union offi-
cials have told us: safety is not a sufficiently important issue at 
CNMC-<>wned facilities to be a subject of collective bargaining. 
The key factor for the surveyed workers' satisfaction was instead 
wages. If the workers do not regard safety conditions as impinging 
significantly on their satisfaction with overall working conditions, 
then it might be queried how safety conditions at CNMC mines rise 
to the level of a human rights violation. 
Sixth, where workers are racist or have an unconscious racial 
animus ("implicit discrimination" in the psychological literature) 
against employers, they may not accurately depict even conditions 
they say they experienced or observed. Studies show that racial 
prejudice and racialized discourse shape attitudes and distort evalu-
ations on a wide range of issues.317 Prejudice may affect even the 
perceptions of those with the most incentives to be objective.318 
3I6. Granath and Larson, Cllinese Foreign Direct Investment: SO. 
317. For example, in the US as to how people evaluate welfare measures. Paul Kel· 
Jested!, ~ Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). Racial prejudice also influences evaluation of job 
applicants and politicians ln the US. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullianathan, 
"Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisba and Jamal? A Field Experiment 
on Labor Marker Discrimination,"' Anu:ricon £co,wmic Rev;ew 94:4 (2004): 991· 1013; 
Spencer Piston. "How Explicit Racial Prejudiee Hurt Obama in tbe 2008 Presidential 
Election," Political Behavior 32:4 (2010): 431-451. 
318. For example, referees in professional sports. For an overview of the literature 
see Jordan Bass, et al., .. Racial Bias in NBA Referees: a Test of Line Movement." pres· 
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Bias also affects memories; for example, prejudiced witnesses may 
have a greater "perceptual memory trace" of wrongful acts when 
the perpetrator of those acts is from a racial group against which 
the witness is biased.319 Thus, in the existing racially-charged atmos-
phere, Zambian miners may have a greater perceptual memory 
trace of wrongdoings when the firm owners are Chinese than when 
they are not. A direct example of the interaction between prejudice 
and accuracy is the anti-Jewish discourse spread by politicians and 
media among white miners in South Africa a century ago. Many 
adopted it, affecting their ability to objectively evaluate the actions 
of Jewish mine owners.320 
One way in which such prejudice is stirred is by media signal-
ing of ethnicity. For example, two US scholars asked a 2009 survey 
of Americans "How much to blame were the Jews for the financial 
crisis?" A quarter of respondents placed moderate or higher blame 
on "the Jews," with the proportion much higher among the lower-
educated. They also presented to different groups of respondents 
the same news report, but which either signaled or did not mention 
that Bernie Madoff, a financier convicted in a well-known fraud 
scandal, is Jewish. The researchers then asked respondents their 
view of government tax breaks to big business to spur job creation. 
Those who were primed about Madoff's ethnicity were twice as 
likely to oppose the tax breaks, as those who were not.321 In 
Zambia, where a misdeed is allegedly committed by a Chinese, the 
media never fail to mention the supposed perpetrator's ethnicity, 
entation to the North American Society for Sports Management annual conference, 
Seattle, USA, 2012, myweb.fsu.edu/BassNewmanKimNASSMabstract.pdL 
319. John Edlund and John Skowronski, "Eyewitness Racial Attitudes and Perpe-
trator Identification: the Uneup Method Maners," North American Journal of Psychol-
ogy 10:1 (2008): 15-36 (30-31). 
320. Milton Shain, The Roots of Ami-Semirism in SouJh Africa (OtarloUesville: Uni-
versity of Virginia Press, 1994). South Africa's anti-Jewish discourse eventually fiXed 
on the National Partts claims tbat Jews are unassimilable because of their closed com-
munities and operation as a state within a state. Alena Norval. Deconstructing 
Aportheid Diswurse (London: Verso, 1996): 64. The same claim is made in the Otina-
in-Africa discourse. Michael Sata said in 2007 that wben a Chinese-run MFEZ in 
Charobishi comes on line "(the Chinese) will have their state within a state, and will 
truly be able to do as they please." Andreas Lorenz and Thilo Thielke, "Olina's Con-
quest of Africa," Der Spiegel, May 30, 2007. The MFEZ is now operational, but Oti-
nese law does not apply there and it is open to all nationalities. "MFEZ Open to All 
Investors," TOZ, Dec. 25, 20ll. 
321. Neil Malhotra and Yoram Margalit, "Anti-Semitism and the Economic Crisis," 
Bos1on Review, May/June 2009. http://bostonreview.net/BR34.31malhotra.;nargalit.php. 
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which they often do not do with regard to the misdeeds of other 
foreigners.322 
Views of conditions at firms about which pervasive negative 
racial and political discourse exists, as it does as to CNMC and "the 
Chinese" in Zambia, are thus bound to be skewed. Miners of the 
kind HR W interviewed have been the main targets for mobilization 
by the PF, which fanned anti-Chinese sentiment from 2005 onwards 
to bolster its electoral chances.323 Analysts have noted that "The PF 
enjoys overwhelming support on the Copperbelt Province, where it 
secured a large majority in the [2006 and 2008] presidential elec-
tions" and that "Sata won by a huge margin (in 2011] in the Cop-
perbelt Province, where he has enjoyed unwavering support since 
the 2006 polls."32A They have also noted that mobilization is rela-
tively easy there and found that many CNMC firm miners "hate the 
Chinese."325 In 2011, "The China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Cor-
poration ... became the maligned face of Chinese investment dur-
322. We extensively discuss such ethnic signaling in Zambian media in Barry 
Sautman and Van Hairong, "Bashing 'The Chinese': Contextualizing China's Collum 
Coal Mine Shooting ... fonhcoming in 2014 in Journal of Conumporary China. 
323. "Mining for Votes," Africa ConfidmtliJI 51:23, Nov. 19, 2010. 
324. Rohit Negi, "The Micropolitics of Mining and Development in Zambia," Afri-
can Studies Quanerly 12:2 (2011): 27-44 (37); "Zambia: Sata Goes Easy on China De-
spite Big Shake-up," Africa-Asia Conjidenlial, Nov. 10, 2011. 
325. Kopinski and Polus: 190; Peter Behar, "Mining Copper in Zambia," Fast Com-
pany, June 1, 2008, www.fastcompany.com/magazinef126/zambia-chinas-mine-shaft. 
html?page..0%2C2. PF leaders deny hating Chinese, but deprecate them generally. 
Michael Sata said in 1JXJ7 that "'Olinese coming to Zambia are crooks and prisoners" 
and be did not want Chinese to onme. "Chinese Flooding into Zambia to Take Over, 
Says Opposition Leader," Emerging Minds, Oct. 31, 2007, http://emergingminds.org/ 
Chinese-Flooding-inte>-Zambia-to-Take-Over-Says-Opposition-Leader.btml. MP Yam-
fwa Mukanga (in 2011-2012, Minister of Transport, then Minister of Mines) said in 2008, 
''I do not hate the Chinese, but what they do." Zambian Parliament, Debates, Feb 28, 
2008. www.parliament.gov.zmlindex.php?option•com_content&taskaview&id;;707& 
ltemid=86&1imit=1&Limitstart"". In 2009, he said "we [the PF) do not hate the Chinese 
... I hate what they do and their culture." Zambian Parliament, Debates, Oct.20, 2009. 
www.parliament.gov.zm/index.pbp?option=com..content&task=view&id=l043&Itemid 
=86&1intit• l&limitstart:3. PF MP Davies Mwila (in 2011-2012, Luapula Province Min-
ister) said in 2009, "We do not hate the Chinese, but we hate what they do." Zambian 
Parliament. Debates. Oct. 16, 2009, www.parliament.gov.zm!index.php?option=eom_ 
content&task=view&id=I041&1temid=86&limit=l&limitstart"". Such statements re-
semble Canadian aboriginal leader David Ahenakew's defense, during his 2008 trial for 
willfully inciting hatred: "I don't bate the Jews. but I hate what they do to people." 
"Canadian Aboriginal Leader Tried for Anti~Semitic Commenrs' .. Jerusalem Pos1, Dec. 
22.2008. . 
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ing a bitter election campaign. "326 In the view of Chinese officials, 
Sata carried out "vitriolic attacks against the Chinese in his election 
campaign messages. "327 Analysts have argued that "anti-Chinese 
rhetoric was key to the victory of former opposition leader Michael 
Sata in the 2011 Presidential elections."328 After the elections, Chi-
nese reportedly felt the need to ask the new government forJ'rotec-
tion,329 but anti-Chinese incitement by officials continues.3 
Even Zambia's Vice-President Guy Scott has acknowledged 
"anti-Chinese resentment among the unemployed and others" that 
has included "mild intimidation" and "manifests itself as anti-orien-
talism," so much so that "the Catholic church has had to send else-
where, priests from the Philippines who had been working in 
Zambia."33 ' Workers at CNMC enterprises have shown through 
their use of anti-Chinese slogans that they are influenced by the PF 
and Western anti-Chinese discourse.332 During strikes at NFCA, 
CCS and the private, ethnic Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine 
(CCM), there has also been violence and threats against Chinese, 
with mining firms and local police responding with violence of their 
326. "China Aims to Rewrite Perceptions on Africa Investments," Reuters, July 18, 
2012. 
31:7. "Sata Moves to Mend Zambia .Sino Relations," African Review, June 2, 20U, 
http://www.africareview. com/News/..J979180/1419182/-/g4r5g2zl-/index.html 
328. Mamodou Gaz.ibo and Olivier Mbabla, "How China Seduces Africa, • The 
Newsletter 60, 2012:24-25; "Michael Sata Wins Zambian Presidential Elections," 
Guardian (UK), Sept. 23, 2011. P<r conrra, see Henry Hall, "Sata Wins, Changes for 
China," France 24, Sept. 29, 2011, bttp://chinafrica.blogs.france24.comlarticle /2011109/ 
29/sata~wins-changes·china..O. 
329. "Chinese Investors ask Zambia President for Protection amid Labor Unrest," 
DIN, Oct. 31, 2011. 
330. Soon after his election, Sata said "there are too many Chinese coming into 
Zambia." "There are Too Many of You in my Country, Sata Tells Chinese Envoy" zw. 
Sept. 26, 2011. Three months later, Vice-President Guy Scott complained of a contin-
ued presence of Chinese workers. "Zambia: '"We're Ahead of the Game': Guy Scott," 
Africa Report, Dec. 21, 2011, www.theafricareport.com/index.php/2011122150178006/ 
politicians/zambia-%E2%80%9Cwe%E2%80%99re-ahead-of-the-game%E2%80% 
9D-guy-scou-50178006. html Anti-Chinese incitement under the PF government is dis-
cussed in Sautman and Park, Dragoo Slayers, Sautma.o and Yao, Bashing the Chinese 
and Sautman. The Olinese Defilement Case. 
331. Zambia'sTest. 
332. Han and Sheo, China's Harsh; HAN Wei and SHEN Hu, "Zambian Workers 
Return to Jobs at Chinese-owned Mine," Caixin Online, Oct. 23, 2011, http://eo-
glisb.eaixin.cn/2011-10-231100316622.html; "Chinese-Zambians in Fists of Fury," LT, 
Mar. 4, 2008. 
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own to workers' beatings, stone throwing, and arson.333 It is not 
rare for Zambians to perceive that their countrymen who work for 
Chinese firms are mostly anti-Chinese.334 
Miners and Zambians more generally may also have a general 
prejudice against Chinese and favor whites in mining. A long-serv-
ing Zambian political leader and enterprise manager told us in a 
2008 interview that 
The hollowness of knowledge about China and the Chi-
nese opens the door to demagoguery about them in 
Zambia ... The messages coming out of Washington, 
London and Paris about the Chinese presence in Africa 
has led to the cultivation of prejudices against the Chinese 
among some Africans who identify with the West. This 
kind of prejudice is also cultivated by political forces in 
Zambia ... The focus on the Chinese-owned mine has ac-
tually shielded the other foreign-owned miners from criti-
cism . . . There is a prejudice in Zambia with regard to 
Indian and Chinese mine owners, because Indians are 
seen only as shopkeepers and Chinese are not seen as 
knowing anything about mining. Only whites are viewed 
as having mining expertise.335 
The HRW report's attempt to establish that the Chinese are 
the worst in Zambian copper mining resembles an analysis pro-
duced by a Russian anti-Czarist militant - a human rights advocate 
of the day - about reasons for the 1881 anti-Jewish pogroms. His 
interpretation was that it "was an expression of the people's anger 
over being exploited ... The Jewish exploiters were more crafty 
than the non-Jewish ones ... "336 The HRW report draws readers to 
similar conclusions: that Zambian miners attack Chinese as the 
333. Mwale interview (threats and violence during strike. at NFCA). We disc\Jss 
anti-Chinese violence during strikes and protests at NFCA. CCM, and a KCM construe· 
tion site in '"Bashing the Chinese:· 
334. See Sarah Hard us, '"China in Africa: Consequences for Traditional Donor Aid," 
unpub"d M.A. thesis, Uruversity of Amsterdam, 2009: 62. 
335. Interview. Akasbambatwa Lewanika, Lusaka, July 21 . 21:JY1. The conception 
that Chinese do not know about mining exists even though, in 2008, China accounted 
for almost 15% of the value of global metal mine output. ECA, Minerals and: 33. 
Sata's positive view of wbites included calling for a return of British colonialists to 
Zambia. Lorenz and Thielke, China's Conquest. Sata confirmed his statemenl in an 
interview with us in Lusaka, July 17. 2007. 
336. I. Michael Aronson, Troubltd Waltr.t: Origins of the 1881 Anli.Jtwish Pogrom 
in Russw (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990): 208. 
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worst exploiters because they actuaUy are and tbat Chinese copper 
mining managers craftily attempt to cover up non-serious injuries in 
the mines, while non-Chinese (mainly white) owners do not.337 Yet, 
under conditions of racial prejudice, it is questionable whether 
workers may even reliably attest to their own experiences; or attest 
to whether conditions at CNMC facilities are indeed the worst. 
IV. CONTEXTUALIZlNG THE CLAIM 
The HRW report offered an explanation as to why a Chinese 
firm is the worst Zambian copper mining in terms of labor rights: 
Chinese insist on bringing their own labor practices from China, 
which include trivializing safety and paying super-low wages. We 
bave shown that each of the claims that "Chinese are the worst" is 
empiricaUy inaccurate and are often based on methodology not in 
keeping with the logic of social scientific and legal analysis. By the 
same token, an explanation or why HRW chose to focus on CNMC 
in Zambia is needed. 
Labor abuse in Zambian mining, while deplorable, is not an 
outstanding human rights issue in the context of Africa. Uke other 
parts of the world, tbe continenl experiences massive violalions and 
HRW has a guideline: "We respond to emergencies, but we also 
challenge entrenched, longstanding, or steadily deleriorating 
human rights problems."338 There is no emergency in Zambian min-
ing. Conditions at CNMC firms have seen modest improvement, as 
337. A 2008 South African Depnrtment of Labor study concluded that South African 
minina firms - mainly run by whiteo - bring in contract worken from neigbboring 
eountriC$ to avoid having direct responsibility for injuries and even deaths. ICEM. 
Contract and Agency. Crafti,... i> a common trope of anti-Ciunese pol•tical leaders. 
MIChael Sata. deoouncii!J "the Chinae" for "bringiin&) the ..-bole Chtna" to labor in 
Zambia. has stated that "No(w) amona the Zambian people the Cluneae are very crafty. 
I know the Chinese well. • ·s. .. ·o Verbatim tntel"'-iew oo Gay RigbiJ, • TOZ. Mar. 22. 
2011 . In the US. "Chinese craftmell" IS often connected .,;th the 1101>00 that "the Chi-
ncoe ore up 10 501Dethin& craf1y oo the currency ••. hinlii!J 11 c~a .. rdly behind-Jbe. 
JICCDCI Orienlal deviousness. • David Marsh. "Playing Polillcs WJ!b Cluneoe Currency; 
Markel Walch, Apr.lO, 2010. H151orian or China Maurice Meisner. alluding to a Seoa-
lor•s accusations that •crafly .. Chinese are spying in the US. hal wrlllen thai "opportu-
nistic American politicians now portray Otinese in stereotypical rashion. The 
lncrel!t~ingJy dominant images are of 19th century vintage: Chinese arc crarty. deceitful~ 
villainous aod hall-crazed automalons manipulated by evil rulers. • "Mulual Raeism and 
Arropnce Undermines lies,• Los Angtl<> Times, May 30. 1999. That view<. now tk 
r11utur in China bashing worb. suc:h 11 Woshingll>ll Times jouma!J>ts Brett Deeter and 
Wilbom Tripplel"s 1Jo>vin8 to Bn}mg· flow Bartldc ObwM 11 fiiiSt<nUif Amoie•'s D~ 
dmt •nd Ushering A Cor"'ry of~ DomiNidon (Wasbingtoo: Resn<rY 2011 ). 
338. HRW. "Our Reseatdl Methoclolo&Y." ..-.hrw.cqit>Odd?SI41 
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unions leaders cited above. The Chief of Research and Planning of 
Zambia's Human Rights Commission bas also observed that rights 
violation "problems are not exclusive to Chinese companies: 'Sev-
eral investors, whether from Europe, America, China, and even 
some Zambians, often don't adhere to Zambia's labor laws."339 
There has also been no shortage of critical studies and reportage 
about labor conditions in Chinese-owned mines in Zambia.340 In 
fact, that story has been the centerpiece of media attention about 
China-in-Africa since 2005, largely because of the PF's anti-Chinese 
incitement. 
Several factors may explain HR W's focus on the major Chi-
nese investor in Zambia. The report's author has provided one ex-
planation: that it was issued because "we have faced constant 
questions from African human rights allies, policy makers, and me-
dia for our opinion from a human rights viewpoint on China's grow-
ing investment in Africa. "~1 Such queries themselves however 
smack of "racial profiling" a form of policing that links criminality 
and other malpractices with a specific race, ethnicity or national 
origin. 
If indeed, HRW decided to investigate Chinese mining in 
Zambia based on "constant questions" about "China's growing in-
vestment in Africa," it did so in contravention of the approach 
HRW normally takes in selecting its investigation subjects. Asked, 
in a 2012 interview, "how do you select those samples or cases for 
your Human Rights Watch report[s]?," HRW Executive Director 
Kenneth Roth responded that "In any given country, the researcher 
will begin by consulting with local groups, What do you see as the 
most serious problems? What do you see as the problems that we're 
339. ·Ask Not What China Wan IS from Africa. But Wba1 Afnca Wan IS from China." 
Huffington Impact Umted Kongdom. June tl. 2()12, www.buffingtonpo6LCO.uk/racllael-
akidilafria~ina-aslt-not·wbat-<:hUUI·WiniJ. _b_1518719.html. 
340. Cbmg Kwan Lee. "Raw Eocounters: Chinese Manqers: A!nean Workers aod 
the Pobtic:$ of Casualization in A£rica's Chinese Enclaves," China Quortuly (CQ) 199 
(2009): 647-699: Dan Haglund, "In it for the Long Term? Governance and Learning 
among Chinese Investors in Zumbla's Copper Sector," CQ 199 (2009): 627~; Peter 
Kragelund, "Part of the Di'lease or Part ol the Cure? Chinese lnvcslments in the Zam· 
bian Mining and Construction Sectors, .. European Journal of Dtvtlopmtnt Resrarch 
21:4 (2009); 644-661; Austin Muneku, "Chinese Investments In Zambia." in Anthony 
Yaw Baah and Herbert Jauch (eds.), O.ints.lnvestmtnts in Africa: o LAbor Penpectivt 
(ALRN: 2009): 160-202. There arc hundreds of newspaper articles. See. e.g .. "NFC 
Afnca," Business & Human RoghiS Resource Centre, s.d., www.busmess-bumanrights-
ora-
341. E-mail from Man Wells to Van Hairoog. Nov. 2.5, 2011. 
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most able to do something about? We'll put together a list. "342 No 
one who knows Zambia would conclude that its major human rights 
problem is labor practices that affect one-tenth of one percent of 
the workforce and in the industry with among the best-paid workers 
to boot. Everyone who knows Zambia would also know that any-
one who made such a claim would likely do so for political reasons, 
i.e. as part of the opposition's anti-Chinese mobilization that is 
ongoing in Zambia. 
Given that HRW eschewed its normal approach to selecting 
investigations in taking up the case of CNMC in Zambia, it may 
well have done so as part of a political agenda. In the same inter-
view, HRW's Executive Director also asserted that "One of the 
things we found was that China had so much economic clout in 
Zambia that the Zambian government was reluctant to enforce its 
own laws on worker rights. It just feared China was too powerful a 
player. And you clid find that the Chinese supervisors were mis-
treating the workers in a way that an ordinary mine or factory in 
Zambia wouldn't have been allowed, but that went on in the Chi-
nese-owned mine because Zambia feared the repercussions of criti-
cizing the Chinese company." The HRW report however does not 
show that Zambia's government "feared the repercussions of criti-
cizing the Chinese company," nor is there any evidence for such 
"fear" elsewhere. It would be surprising if there were such fears, as 
CNMC is responsible for only one-twentieth of total production 
and is a much smaller player in the Zambian copper mining indus-
try than most other foreign investors. Moreover, from 2012 on-
wards, the PF, a party now in power that has never shrunk from 
strongly attacking "the Chinese," has not criticized CNMC. Indeed, 
some top Zambian officials have praised it, as clid Finance Minister 
Alexander Chikwanda343 - and this despite HRW's assertion that 
CNMC "still lags behind" other foreign investors in labor rights. 
HRW's invention of the Zambian government's fear of China also 
jibes with a political agenda. 
A focus that includes Chinese-owned business in Africa would 
not entail racial profiling. The queries to it reported by HRW and 
the HRW report itself however single out Chinese firms by report-
ing on malpractices at such enterprises, while neither similarly in-
vestigating wrongdoing at non-Chinese-owned operations nor 
342. Kenneth Roth, "Human Rights Watch: Promoting Ethical Behavior wben it's 
Contested." Carnegie Council Transcripts and Articles, Nov. 15, 2012. 
343. • Alexander Chikwand," Africa-Asia Co11jidentill/ 5:10 (Aug. 2012). 
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comprehensively evaluating how differences between the situations 
of Chinese-owned firms and other companies may account for vary-
ing levels or safety, pay, etc. 
The HRW report posed the wrong question to begin with. In 
law and social science, the proverb expressed by the renowned 
American novelist Thomas Pynchon appl.ies: "U they can get you 
asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about the an-
swers. "344 In politics, if you ask the wrong question, there may be 
more consequences - in this case a predictable heightening of anti-
Chinese sentiment, and not just anti-Chinese government, as 
neither the media nor the public evidently distinguishes the Chinese 
people from the Chinese state.345 
By singling out companies based on nationality, HRW ap-
proached its Zambia study differently from how other NGOs have 
done firm-level studies of foreign copper mining companies there. 
NGOs that studied KCM did so "because of its sheer size." Their 
report shows that development of Zambia copper mining has disad-
vantaged, rather than benefited society at large.346 They did not fo-
cus on KCM because it is UK-based or ethnic Indian-owned; 
neither did they critically distinguish KCM from other firms. A 
study of MCM's misbehavior, while specific, questions "the link be-
tween development and mining in general," makes nothing of the 
fact that MCM is a Swiss citizen or that its top officers are whites 
and points out that MCM is "far from a stand-alone case."347 Stud-
344. Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Ralnbcw (New York: Viking, 1973): 2SI. 
34S. Survey research shows much variation by coun1ry in unravorable attitudes to-
ward Chino and the Chinese. However, in most principle Western European SIJiteS, 
Japan. and India. there bas in recent years been a high degree or disfavor toward 1>01h 
China and the Chinese. See. e.g .. "24 Nation Pew Global Allitudes Survey." Pew, 2008: 
36-37, hllp:llwww.pewglobal.~l2/chapoer·3·v•eW>-of·elllnli. In cootrast a 
study based on sul'eys among Chinese found thai "Chinese olf.Wis, elites and the 
generol pubbe generally differentiate bet-..·een the American people and the US govern-
ment" and "dKI not find an anti-American bias" (defined as)a 'pervasl\e oondesc:ension 
and den•grauon." AJast.tir loin Johnston and Dan~ela Stodl:mann. "Cbmeg Attitudes 
toward the Unlled SIJitcs and Americans." 1n Peter KatzensltiD and Robert Keolwle 
(eds.), Anii·Amwc.,.ums m World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell Um>en•ty Press. 2007): 
IS7·19S (IS9, 192). 
346. Undermllllng Development? 
347. Counter Balanoe, The Mopani. A study of corporate social responsibility (in-
cluding labor praeti<:e>) in 2008, at NFCA and then Swiss-owned Luansbya, coocluded 
"In the perception of the employees interviewed at both mines. their employers fail in 
all elements of CSR," although perceptions at Lunn•hya were better on some points. 
Apocheker, Foreign Copper: 91. There was however no nnti-Swiss agitation in Zambia. 
lhcn or now. 
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ies of mining firms operating outside Zambia also do not focus on 
their nationalities or rank their labor practices among peers. For 
example, a global union group's report on labor abuses and other 
activities in Africa of Rio Tinto, the world's fourth largest mining 
company, ignores its citizenship and leaders' nationalities. It does 
not compare its record to that of other giant firms such as BHP 
Billiton, Freeport McMoRan, etc.:w8 
HRW however constructed a binary of CNMC, as a Chinese 
firm, versus the rest.:w9 Despite its focus on one company, the re-
port (p. 13) is self-<lescribed as "a useful magnifying lens into Qri-
nese labor practices in Africa." It thus tries to turn Lhat Chinese 
firm into a strikingly negative example of investment in Africa. 
HRW decided that its first study of Chinese investment in Af-
rica would be about an SOE that has had some problematic labor 
practices, but is also a unique object of racialized media attacks that 
portray its activities in Zambia as exemplifying malpractices by Chi-
nese investors throughout Africa. It was thus predictable that me-
dia reports about HRW's study would pour oil on the fire. They 
immediately did so;)~ so much so that China's media-savvy ambas-
sador to Zambia commented that in the Western media, "if you 
have not written something bad about China in a given day, then 
you have not done your job. •J" 
1 IR W's other studies of abuses in African mining are two im-
plicating Zimbabwe's government - a target of Western sanctions 
- plus one, issued after HRW's report on CNMC, on the non-coo-
348. lodu.striAII. "Rio Tin to in Africa: Global Citizen or Corporate Shame?" 2012, 
www.mdustriall-uoion.org/silcs/dcfaulllfilcs/uploads/doc umeoiJiindustnall-rio-tio!<Hif· 
nca-report.pdf. Rio Tmlo is UK·beadquartered, wilh bead otr1001 to Alblnlia; tts top 
mana,en and diredors are wb1te W~rs. 
349. Sllttes may be responsible for extra-territorial violations by thctr corpontions of 
tolemaliooal human rights, but ooo-<tale-owoed 6rms also may be requu~d to respect 
human n&hls. See Alice de Jonge. Trtt11Sn4llonal Corport11ioiU •nd lnttmtllion41 JAw: 
Accounrabl/ity in th• Global Bu.rintsJ Enwronmtnt (Oiellenbam: Edward Elpr. 2011): 
47-SI. There is !bus no need 10 single 001 SOEs in reportin& on corponle rights 
violatlon.s. 
3SO. See, e.g., "Rigllts Group Sloms China for Alleged Zambia Mine Abuses," Voice 
of America News, Nov. 3, 2011;" "Olina Ignores Wamin& Bells." Radio Free Asia, 
Nov. 1. 2011; "Zambia"s Go~mmenl Needs to Oo More to Addreu Chinese Mine 
Abuoe<." OJN. Nov. 3, 2011: Simon AUtJOO. "Hwnan Ri&hts Watch on Olloese Mines 
•n !be Country: Honor, Horror." D..ty Mavtridc (South Africa). Nov. J, 2011. 
lSI . StO\en Myula aud Anlbony MukW11a, "We are Here to Silty: Ouna." OM, Nov. 
10, 2011 
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troversialtopic of child miners in Mali.352 Another factor explaining 
HRW's choice to repon on CNMC thus may be ideological: a need 
to produce studies that accord with mainstream Western views of 
countries, such as China, that have authoritarian regimes, and con-
comitant positive views of the West Such an approach is likely 
prevalent among HRW's almost wholly Western base of financial 
support (see below) and belies the claim that the liberal discourse 
of human rights is based on apolitical moralism, as in fact the dis-
course is deeply immersed in politics.353 HRW itself is imbricated 
with liberalist Western political and media forces and mutual antag-
onism with the Chinese state. The latter is evidenced, on HR W's 
side, by its webpage entry of repons on "China and Tibet, "3sc a 
classification that implies that Tibet is not pan of China, even 
though neither the United Nations nor any state regards Tibet as 
independent.'" In separating China and Tibet, HRW follows a 
practice unique to the US government.'$(! Needless to say, HRW 
does not have such categories of reports as "Canada and Quebec," 
"Britain and Scotland," or "Spain and Catalonia," although sub-
stantial popular support for independence can be confirmed in 
those places. 
Its immersion in US political culture may also explain why, de-
spite its repon's fatal empirical and methodological flaws, and de-
spite some regarding it as "discredited and (h)aving many 
352. HRW, "Deliberate Chaos: Ongoing Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Dia-
mond Fields in Zimbabwe," June 20, 2010; HRW, "Diamonds In the Rough: Human 
Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe," June 26, 2009. There 
are severe abuses in the Maran&• diamond fields, but serious abuses as well in mining 
openotions that are not ln US and UK-prodaimed "roaue sUites." See, e.g. Geoffrey 
York. "Oaims of Sexual Abuse in Tanzania Blow to Barricl< Gold," Ole« & MaU,JUI>C 
8. 2011 (multiple l<i.l.liJ1&$ and rapes of "illegal mi.oers" by local and mone polo<e at Cana-
doan-oo.'IICd mloe in Tanzarua). 
353. Vasuti Nasiab, "Tbe Rose and Fall of the Human Roghts Empore," Foreign Pol-
ocy on Focus, June 28. 2012. www.fpif.org/anicle5itheJise_and_fall_of.the.human. 
rights_empire .. 
354. HRW, "China and Tohet," http://www.brw.org/asia/china. 
355. See, e.g. "The President's Meeting with His Holiness the XIVth Dalai Lama," 
The White House Blog (President Obama "Reiterat[es) the U.S. policy that Tibet is a 
pnrt of the People's Republic of China and the United States does not support indepen-
dence for Tibet"). www .wbltehouse.gov/blog/2011107117/presldent· .. meeting-bis-holi· 
neu~xiv.-dalai·lama. 
3S6. See. e.g. Thomas Lum. "U.S Assistance Programs on Chona.· Convessiooal Re-
search Service, RS22663. I'Oov. 10, 2011 (detailing prognoms on "Chona and Tibet"), 
http1-w.fas.org/SgplcrslrO"IRS22663.pd!. 
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shortcomings,"357 HRW has said it will wholly "stand by our re-
port. "358 Indeed, a year after the report was issued its author 
claimed that CNMC's goodwill in Zambia is being lost through its 
labor record and that "it still lags behind on ... key areas of safety 
in comparison to other companies. "359 US political actors habitually 
"stand by" whatever they have done and eschew apologies, regard-
less of the consequences of their actions.360 Many months after its 
issuance, Western media continue to publicize the report361 and 
HRW continues to ignore its predictable reinforcement of anti-Chi-
nese racism. Its refusal to recognize that the conclusions drawn in 
its report are misplaced stands in sharp contrast to the reaction of 
other NGOs when significant flaws in their studies have been 
adduced.362 
HRW is close to being wholly Western-funded: of donations to 
HRW, "almost 75 percent comes from North America and about 25 
percent from Western Europe."363 It issues reports about human 
rights violations by natural and corporate citizens of a range of 
countries. HRW rightly focuses much attention on Chinese govern-
ment rights violations, but seldom probes the actions of Western 
357. Sishuwa Sishuwa, "Sata and Zambia: Robert Rotberg Disappoints and Con· 
founds," TAP (UK), July 25,2012. 
358. HRW, "'Critiquing the Critique on Otina in Zambia: Human Rights Watch and 
Labor Abuses in Olinese State-owned Copper Mines," Pambazuka News, Feb. I, 2012, 
www.pambazuka.org/enlcategorylfeatures/7957()1prinL HRW continued to stand by its 
report in relation to CNMC's !PO in Hong Kong in 2012. See HRW, "'CNMC Public 
Listing Needs Investor Vigilance," Apr. 22, 2012, www.hrw.orglnewsl2012104122/china-
enmc-public-Jisting-needs-investor-vigilance. 
359. "Safety Still Concern at Zambia's Chinese-Owned Mines," Agenoe Franoe 
Presse, OcL 19, 2012. 
360. "It's Not Easy for Presidents to Say 'I'm Sorry," AP, Feb. 24, 2012. 
361. See, e.g, "Big Finns Latch on to Africa's Boom Time," Independent (UK), July 
7, 2012; "Enraged Zambian Miners Kill Chinese Manager," LM Angeles Times, Aug. 6, 
2012. 
362. For example, the International Land Coalition has recognized that a report on 
land grabbing it issued in 2012 contained highly dubious data about many projectS, es-
pecially those suJ>PO$edly associated with Olina. See Deborah Brautigam, "'Zombie' 
Olinese Land Grabs in Africa Rise Again in New Database!" China in Africa: The 
Real Story, Apr. 30, 2012, w-..'W.chinaafricarealstory.coml20121041zombie-chinese-land-
grabs-in.africa.html; Petrus Brenner, "Tbe Land Matrix: Much Ado About Nothing," 
Food Crisis and the Global Land Grab," Apr. 27, 2012, http11farmlandgrab.orglpost/ 
view!20405. 
363. "Human Rights Watch Visit to Saudi Arabia," July 17,2009, www.hrw.org/enl 
node/84512. 
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governments per se,364 even though the latter have conducted many 
wars and occupations of developing countries, supported many 
rights-abusing regimes, and structured the world's highly unequal 
neoliberal economic dispensation.365 A political agenda is likely re-
flected in HR W's failure to attribute large-scale human rights viola-
tions to Western governments per se, while singling out as an 
exemplary violator of African labor rights a Chinese SOE whose 
violations are far from large-scale. HRW's conclusion that "the Chi-
nese companies [are] the biggest violator of workers' rights among 
Zambian copper industry employers" (p. 22} in effect expands its 
negative appraisals of human rights inside China to include Chinese 
state human rights practices abroad. 
US media and other US human rights NGOs have expectedly 
followed HRW's approach. Time magazine, for example claimed 
that "The Sino-Zambian relationship is a microcosm of China's en-
gagement with the entire continent."366 Soon after the HRW report 
was issued, the webpage of New York-based Freedom House, 80% 
of whose funds in 2007 were derived from the US govemment,367 
featured an article by one of the organization's academic advisors in 
which he urged Sata's government to protect the rights of Zambian 
workers, "especially those employed in the growing number of Chi-
nese-owned mines and related industries," which he claimed "bear 
the attitudes and standards that prevail in the Chinese labor mar-
364. From 1991-2011, HRW issued 60 reports on Olina. These generally deal with 
conduct attributable to the government itself. Altllough Western governments have 
recently waged many wars. HRW reports usually limits its criticisms to individual politi~ 
cians and rarely attributes rights violations to Western governments per se, even tbough 
there is a close connection between wars and human rights violations. See Chandra 
l.ekha Sriram. et al., War, Ccnflict and Humon Rights: Tlw>ry and Practice (London: 
Routledge. 2010). 
365. William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA lmerverufon.s Slnce World 
War II (Common Courage Press. Monroe ME. 2000); Hilton Roo~ Alliance Curst: How 
the U.S. Lost the Third World (Washington. DC: Brookings Press, 2008); Uri Friedman. 
"America's Unsavory Allies," Foreign Polley. October 28. 2011; Ray Kiely, Empire in 
tlu! Age of 0/obalir.ation; U.S. Hegemony and Neoliberal Disorder (london: Pluto 
Press, 2005): Branko Milanovich, •·Global Inequality: from Class to Location, from 
Proletarians to Migrants," World Bank, 2011, http1/go.worldbank.org/A9QH4Z7H70. 
366. ··Human Rights Watch Reports Abuses in Chinese-run Mines in Zambia," Time 
(US). Nov. 4, 201 I. 
367. Diego GiJinnone, .. Political and Ideological Aspects in the Measurement of De-
mocracy: the Freedom House Case," Democratir.ation 17:1 (2010): 68-97 (75). 
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ket," where the "Communist Pari/ has assiduously suppressed even 
the most basic of labor rights. "3 
Labor rights abuses affect millions in Africa. CNMC in Zambia 
only employs about 6,000 people, one-tenth of the country's mine 
workers, little more than 1% of formal sector workers, and less 
than one tenth of 1% of Zambia's workforce.369 Even in terms of 
Chinese-generated employment for Zambians, the CNMC 
workforce does not play an overwhelming role, as Chinese invest-
ment in Zambia is reckoned to have created 50,000 local jobs.370 
Labor rights violations are almost certainly more common 
outside mining than inside it371 and conditions at smaller,less-prof-
itable Zambian-owned firms are often worse than those in foreign-
owned ones.372 For example, the fatality rate for artisanal ("illegal") 
368. Thomas R. Lansner, "After the Democratic Power Transfer, Zambia Must 
Tackle Olioese Investment Issues and Human Rights Reforms.," Freedom House. Nov. 
15, 2011, www.freedomhouse.org/bloglafter·democratic-power·transfer-zambia·must· 
tackle-cbioese-lnvesunent-issues-and-human~rights. A Zambian political scientist who 
nas consulted for US agencies, has written that "There are reports that the USA was 
supporting Sata because of the expectation that Sata, once elected would curb Chinese 
investments in the country. 1be UK was reported to prefer the PF over the MMD 
partly because of Dr. Guy Scott, a White Zambian of British ancestry, PF Vice Presi· 
dent and now Vice President of the country." Njuoga M. Mulikita, ''Zambia's 2011 Po-
litical Transition: What Impact on China-Zambia Relations?" paper presented at the 2d 
Meeting of the Chinese-Africa Think Tanks Forum, Bisboftu, Ethiapia, Oct. 12·13, 
2012: 176-178 (178). bttp://www.ipss-addis.orglsitesldefault/files/IPSS_Cbina·Africa.. 
Think_Tanlcs_Forum_Final%20(2).pdf. 
369. There were said to be 53,5n miners working in Zambia in March, 2011. "Minis· 
terial Statement by Hon. Maxwell M.B. Mwale ... " s.d. Mar. 2011, www.scribd.com/ 
doc/51570144/Ministeriai-Statement-Mining-Development-in-Zambia. Zambia's 
worldorce is 5 million, with 500,000 in the formal sector, half of those in the public 
sector. Zambia Business Survey, "The Profile and Productivity of Zambian Businesses" 
(2010): 7, www.pdfio.com/k-2?5981. html; "How to Create Jobs in Africa," Christian 
Scitnce Monitor, OCL 10, 2012. Of course, in the Zambian context, 6.000 formal jobs 
are no insignificant. In the construction sector for example, lbere are less than 14.000 
formal jobs. "The Chinese Loan Conundrum: Who is Beoefit.ting from Zambia's Phan-
tom Growth in Construction?" zw. Nov. 30, 2012. 
370. "Chinese Firms Create 50,000 Jobs," OM, Apr. I, 2012. If indirect employment 
is taken into account, CNMC firms have been said to ha,•e created one-fourth (12,500) 
of the jobs attributed to Chinese firms in Zambia. "CNMC to Invest $400m More in 
Zambia," TOZ. Sept. 28, 2012. 
371. See Silane K Mwenecbanya, "Legal Empowerment of the Poor: Labor Rights in 
Zambia," United Nations Development Program, 2007, web.undp.org/ .. Jreports/ .. J 
27_5J.abor..,Rigbts.pdf. 
372. For example, pay has been lower at Zambian-owned mining firms, such as 
Ndola Lime, Cbilanga Cement, and Kariba Minerals which, in 2007, had worlcforees in 
the 35().500 employee range. NEAC, Quantity: 19, 24. 
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miners in Zambia is much higher than that for workers in foreign-
owned copper mines. From the founding in 2008 of the Federation 
of Small-$cale Miners Associations of Zambia, through late 2011, 
231 of FSSMAZ's 4,300 members have died in mine collapses.373 
Zambia has some 180 informal mines, all of them Zambian-owned, 
where most miners work manually. They earn wages as low as $40 
a month and unionization is very difficult.374 
HRW recognizes that labor conditions at CNMC firms are im-
proving, yet there is no evidence of improvements among firms in 
Zambia generally. Instead, conditions in mining communities dete-
riorated after privatization of state-owned Zambian Consolidated 
Copper Mine's (ZCCM) assets,37s with "a 1999 survey of the local 
community on the privatization of ZCCM ... show[ing] that for the 
majority of Zambia, the sale of ZCCM has brought hardship and a 
decline in economic and social development. "37 Since then, labor 
conditions in the privatized firms that make up much of Zambia's 
formal sector have deteriorated. Moreover, as an elaborate study 
of the effects of the privatization of mining in Zambia has stated, 
lower gainful employment of the mineworkers, the degrading of the 
conditions of employment of mineworkers, and the substitution of 
local capacities to the mines with foreign capacities undermined 
rather than promoted local capacities.377 
It is not malpractices in mining arising from privatization that 
concern HRW, but only those it says are due to a Chinese state 
presence, even though privatization has been the major obstacle to 
373. "Miners Body Gives State Ultimatum," OM, Dec. 6, 2011; "FSSMAZ Seeks to 
Achieve Unity in Mining Sector," Maravi, May 28, 2008. http://maravi.blogspot.coml 
2008105/fssmaz-seeks-to-acbieve-unity-in-mining. btml. The FSSMAZ seeks legaliza-
tion and state allocation of MCM and KCM dumpsites to members, wbo make $3-5 a 
day. "The 'Blaclc Mountain' a Source of Livelihood for over 1,000 Men," TP, Dec. 25, 
2011. 
374. Interview, Sifuniso Nyumbu~ Pres., Gemstone and Allied \Vorkers Union of 
Zambia. Lusaka. Aug. 3, 2012. 
375. "Privatisations under Probe by the Sata Government," Maravi. Jan. 20. 2012. 
http://maravi.blogspot.com 12012101/mailing-list·privatisations·under-probe.html. 
376. Brenda Motya and Brighton Lubansa, "Privatiz.atioo of the Mining Sector in 
Zambia: The Case of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines,·· in Ernst von Weizsacker, et 
al. (eds.), The Limits of Privati.sation: How ro Avoid Too Much of a Good Thing 
(London: Earthscan, for the Club of Rome, 2005): 41-46 (44). 
377. Rahima Ahmed, "The Olanging Role of the State and Transnational Corpora· 
tions in the Development of Mining in Zambia: an Evaluation of the Influences of the 
Transition from the State to Private Ownershp of the Mining Sector." Unpub'd PhD 
diss .. University of Witswatersrand, 2010: 343. wiredspace.wits.ac.zal ... /Rahima%20 
Ahmed%20+rahima&type=autbor. 
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Zambian miners' demand for equal pay for equal work across the 
board. That aspiration cannot be realized while varied conditions 
impel uneven cost/benefit analyses by different companies. Indus-
try-wide coordination and, through it, the realization of worker as-
pirations for equal pay for equal work can occur only with a much 
higher level of public ownership than now exists in Zambia mines, 
yet both of Zambia's major parties oppose it.378 
HRW's study of CNMC labor practices in Zambia cannot teU 
us anything generalizable about Chinese investments in Africa or 
even in Zambia. It instead reinforces the skewed Western China-
in-Africa discourse and creates a new set of negative conclusions by 
the media about China and "the Chinese." 
V. CONCLUSION: WHY "THE CHINESE 
ARE THE WORST" 
In 2012, as the Eurozone financial crisis reached a peak, politi-
cians such as German ChanceUor Angela Merkel were discursively 
dividing Europe into two classes of "fiscally virtuous and industri-
ous northern Europeans and profligate and indolent southern 
Europeans."379 Greece was labeled "the worst" example of fiscal 
indiscipline. Greeks were commonly portrayed by northern Euro-
pean media as tax evaders, anti-business, lazy and corrupt. Harvard 
University Professor of Public Policy Richard Parker challenged 
these "moralizing cliches." While acknowledging Greece's prob-
lematic debt levels, he noted that Greece's taxes are a third of the 
GDP, about Europe's average; Greece has more small entrepre-
neurs per capita than any other European country; the Greek gov-
ernment workforce is around 20% of the total labor force, again 
Europe's average; and corruption in Greece is not generalized, but 
largely concentrated in the health care sector.380 
378. "Musokotwane Attacks Donors Advocating Higher Mine Taxes," TP, June 21. 
2011; "Zambia Won't Renationalize Mines," TOZ, Nov. 22. 2011. 
379. Alazar Kebede, "The Economic Crisis and tbe Emergence of Nationalism in 
Europe," Capital, Feb.6, 2012, www.capitaletltiopia.com/index.php?option• com..con 
teot&view=-article&id=49l:tbe-eco.nomic-crisis--and~the·emergence-of·nationalism·in· 
europe-&catid=52:footers. 
380. Richard Parker, .. A PERSONAL JouRNEY TO niB HEART OF GREECE'S DARK-
NESS," Fiflllnclal Times, Feb. 15, 2012. In fact, Greeks put in the longest bours annual 
total of work of any nation in Europe, fully six bours a week more than Germans, 
although the latter have mucb bigber levels of productivity. "Who Works the Longest 
Hours in Europe?" Guardian (UK) Data Blog, Dec. 8, 2011, www.guardian.eo.uk/newsl 
datablog/20llldec/081europe-working·hours. Surveyed Britons. Germans, Spaniards, 
and other Europeans nevertheless uphold a stereotype of Greeks as being the least 
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Two factors may explain these inaccurate stereotypes of 
Greeks and southern Europeans generally. They allow center-right 
northern European governments to denigrate the center-left polit-
ics more prevalent in southern Europe. They also reflect longstand-
ing northern European racism against southern Europeans. For 
example, when a cruise ship ran aground in the Mediterranean in 
early 2012, a leading German newsweekly's columnist commented 
"Hand to heart: is anyone surprised that the captain of the Costa 
Concordia is Italian? Can you imagine a German pulling a hit-and· 
run stunt like that, or a British captain?"381 
Whether or not HRW's report originated under similar biases, 
it was predictable that it would play into them. HRW could instead 
have undertaken studies of more significant violations of labor 
rights and other human rights violations created by foreign inves-
tors in Africa's mining sectors. Studies of mine labor conditions 
elsewhere in Africa or even in Zambia generally would reveal much 
more intensive rights violations than those at CNMC firms. The 
share of Chinese firms' in non-African investment in Africa gener-
ally and African mining specifically is, after all, nowhere near as 
large as is commonly conceived. China is not the major foreign in-
vestor in Africa and by some measures is not even a major one. A 
2011 study by the African Development Bank (AIDB), OECD 
UNDP and UNECA of FDI flows to selected African countries 
from 2005-2010 found that 43.7% was from EU countries and 
37.4% was from the US. China's share was only 0.9%.382 An 
econometric study of Chinese OFDI for 1991-2008 revealed that 
Chinese firms are in fact not metals-seekers, in the way they are 
motivated to seek fuels.383 A 2011 UN study observed 
hardworking nation in Europe. while respondents in every country surveyed. except 
Greece, believe Germans are the most hardworking Europeans. "European Unity on 
the Rocks." Pew Global Attitudes Project, May 29, 2012, www.pewglobal.org/2012105/ 
29/european-unity-on-the-rocksl. 
381. ltalienische FabrerOucht (Italian Hit·and·Run), Du Spiegtl Online Politik. Jan. 
23,2012, www.spiegel.de/ politikldeutschlandi0.1S18,811817,00.btml. 
382. AfDB, et al., A[ricon Economic Outlook 2011: 101, www.undp.org/contenVdam/ 
undpmbrary/corporate/ Reports/UNDP-Africa-20ll·Economic.Outlook.pdf. The se-
lected countries were: Morocco, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Gabon, 
Tanzania. Mauritius, Malawi, Nigeria~ Rwanda and Uganda. Ibid. 
383. K.C. Fung and Alicia Garcia·Herrero, •·Foreign Direct Investment Outflows 
from China and India," Chino Eccrwmic Policy Review 1:1 (2012): 1·15 (5. 10}. The oil 
sector. which is highly capital intensjve, aooounts for about 70% of cumulative commit· 
meniS of Chinese FDI in Africa. Africa Progress Panel, Africa Progress Report 2012: 
Jobs, Justice, Equity: 45, www.africaprogresspaoel.org] .. ./APR2012_FINAL_ VER 
SION_EN_FOR·PRESSPACK.pdf. 
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Chinese mining investments abroad are small relative to 
those from other countries. Less than 1 percent of total 
world mine production outside China is controlled by Chi-
nese companies ... Most investments have been in Aus-
tralia, with very few in operating African mines ... The 
number of investment projects in Africa indicates a grow-
ing Chinese presence, but progress is often slow. Chinese 
firms have yet to acquire the experience of large projects 
that many companies from industrialized countries 
bave.384 
Table 8: Stock of Investment in African Mining by Country 
Investment Stock 
Country of Firms Date (Billions) 
China End of2009 $29 
Canada 2011 $32 
us End of2009 $25 
Australia 2011 $20 
France Endof2009 $18 
Brazil 2012 t/.7 {Vale 6nn alone) 
Sources3~t~ 
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Canadian mining firms are in first place in African mining in-
vestment; their $32 billion in place by 2011 compares with the $39 
billion stock of Chinese global OFDl in mining at the end of 
2009.386 The centrality of Canadian firms in exploiting African min-
erals is to be expected: the Canadian stock exchanges "are horne to 
384. ECA, Minerals and Africa's Oevelopmenc 36-37. Africa accounted for 14.6% 
of global mining project investment in 2009, a bit less than Oceania and only about half 
of what Latin America drew. Ibid: 33. 
385. Wu Fang, Chinese Investment: 9 (China, US. France): Lucien Bradet, "A 
Reality Check on Canadian Mining in Africa." Canadian Council on Africa. Nov. 23. 
2011, http://ocafrica.ca/ {$32b stock reflects lOx increase in past decade): "Australian 
Miners Invest $20b in Africa; Billions More in Pipeline" MW. Aug. 31, 2011; "Africa: 
Brazil Forging Strategic Alliance with Continent." IPS, May 7, 2012. In 2012, an 
Australian official said there is $SOb of Australian investment in Africa in place or 
planned. "Australian Mining Investment in Africa More lban $50 Billion: OFAT," 
International Mining Development Centre. Feb. 14. 2012. http://im4dc.org/australian· 
mining-investment-in-africa-more-lhan-S<H>illion-dfatl. 
386. China Ministry of Commerce, 2()()9 Statistical Bulletin of China's OuJward For-
eign Dirtcl lnvmment {Beijing: MOFCOM, 2010) {mining 16% of $245b total o! Chi-
nese OFDI). 
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58% of the world's public mining companies and raise 60% of the 
world's mining capital."387 There are some 185 Canadian headquar-
tered firms with mining projects in Africa.388 By 2007, 17% of Ca-
nadian mining firms' cumulative assets outside Canada were in 35 
states in Africa and, apart from South Africa, "Canada dominates 
the rest of the continent."389 In 2010, one-tenth of Canadian mining 
investments in Africa was in Zambia.390 Contrary to common as-
sumption, the activities of Canadian firms are also no less problem-
atic than those of other countries.391 Nor are the activities of 
Canadian mining firms in Africa purely private: 
The growth in African mining operation is partly attrib-
uted to interventions by the Canadian government such as 
fiscal measures favoring mining interests, particularly in 
the internationalization of mining and exploration by the 
Juniors. Export Development Canada (EDC) facilitates 
outward investment and in 2007, supported projects total-
ing $22 billion worth of exports and investments in Cana-
dian companies in the extractive sector.392 
Studying labor matters at Canadian firms in African mining, using a 
comparative perspective, would thus likely contribute more to miti-
gating abuses than singling out Chinese-owned copper mining firms 
in Zambia. Unlike the HRW report's contribution to anti-Sinicism, 
it also would not contribute to anti-Canadian sentiment in the 
world, as none exists. The same might be said of the mining opera-
tions of Australian mining firms. 
Comparative study of labor rights violations requires empirical 
and methodological soundness, but also avoidance of condemna-
tions that lead to aspersions cast on the behavior of any nationality. 
Martin Luther King once responded to claims that Jewish landlords 
and shopkeepers exploit African-Americans by stating that "The 
Jewish landlord or shopkeeper is not operating on the basis of Jew-
387. Michael Schwartz, "$1 Billion and Counting," Resource Stocks. AprJMay 2012: 
50-52 (51). 
3SS. "Africa Mining Draws Canadian Miners," MW, Jan. 27, 2012. 
389. AU & UNECA, Exploiting: 17. 
390. Bonnie Csrnpbell, '"Do as You Please' Approach in Africa Comes at High 
Cost," Coii(Jdian Dimension 45:1 (2011), bttp://canadiandimension.oomlarticles/3982/. 
391. Karyn Keenan, "Africa: Bringing Canadian Mining to Justice, .. PN, June 23. 
2011, http://allafrica.com/ storiesi201106270n5.html; Campbell, Do as You Please: De· 
nis Tougas. ''Canadian Firms Dominate Mining Activities in Africa and have a Bad 
Human Rights Record," East African (Nairobi), Mar. 1. 2010. 
392. AU and UNECA, Exploiting; 18. 
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ish ethics; he is operating on the basis of a marginal businessman" 
and the solution "is for all people to condemn injustice wherever it 
exists. "393 Dr. King understood that structural, not cultural factors 
created the exploitation at issue. 
Given the context of anti-Chinese agitation in Zambia and the 
skewed China-in-Africa discourse, HR W could have studied rights 
violations in Zambian mining generally, to "condemn injustice 
wherever it exists," instead of singling out a Chinese firm. A study 
of that kind would likely have found that violations are common in 
mining. Indeed, a committee of the Zambian parliament, com-
posed of ruling and opposition party members, did just that in 2010. 
It researched the question of "The impact of the extractive indus-
tries on the Zambian economy in the post-privatization era: a case 
of mining." The committee visited two foreign-owned copper min-
ing firms (MCM and Chibuluma), two emerald mines, one zinc and 
one nickel mine. As to labor matters, it said of these mines that 
workers complained of poor working conditions, no salary 
structure, intimidation, lack of training programmes, lack 
of research and an increase in the number of foreign work-
ers ... [T]he lowest paid worker on average was paid 
about Kl million ... [A)ll workers were on contract for 
periods ranging from one to four years, and not all work-
ers were entitled to gratuity ... [Since privatization], the 
quality of jobs has gone down. There are also cases of 
mines employing more unskilled or semi-skilled foreign 
workers, unfavorable contract conditions, lack of skills 
transfer and other forms of training, intimidation and lack 
of respect of labor laws. Poor conditions of service are the 
other major problem for those working for contractors in 
addition to some having no union representation.394 
An example of a comparatively-grounded, non-racial profiling 
study that involves a Chinese mining firm abroad and that has some 
parallels with the case of CNMC in Zambia appeared in 2012. Two 
US scholars compared Shougang Hierro Peru's iron ore mining fa-
cilities, owned since 1992 by a subsidiary of a Chinese central-gov-
ernment SOE Shougang Group, with similar-sized foreign- and 
domestic-owned mining firms in Peru. 
393. Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, Troubling the Waters: Black..Jewish Relation• in the 
American Century (Princeton Unive .. ity Press, 2010): 223. 
394. Zambian Parliamen~ Committee on: I, 20, 23. 
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Shougang is the only Chinese mining firm in Peru large enough 
to allow for study. It has the worst reputation among mining com-
panies as to labor practices, especially safety and wages. The study 
found however that "Shougang does not stand out for labor viola-
tions." As to safety, it has a significantly higher rate of serious acci-
dents, but not fatalities, so that "Shougang does not appear to be 
the outlier that its reputation would suggest." While "Shougang's 
wages are lower than its counterparts ... this differential is both 
smaller and less central to worker welfare than others suggested." 
When benefits are added in, Shougang may pay its workers about 
the same as most other firms. Shougang moreover uses fewer con-
tract workers, who generally earn only half of what directly-em-
ployed workers earn, so that "Given Shougang's lower use of 
contractors, its average wage for indirect and direct workers com-
bined may exceed those of Antamina and Yancocha," Peruvian 
mining's two best paying firms. The Peruvian subsidiary of US-
based firm Doe Run "performed worse than Shougang on almost 
every indicator of labor standards."395 
HRW's fixation on CNMC operations in Zambia exceeds that 
of the US State Department in its 2010 US report on human rights 
in Zambia. Its section dealing with workers' rights is by no means 
even-handed: its examples of labor abusers are confined to a small, 
private, Chinese-owned coal mine and a Chinese employer of two 
household workers. The State Department report said nothing 
however about CNMC firms, even though they are the largest Chi-
nese-owned employers in Zambia.396 The State Department's 2011 
report on human rights in Zambia however devotes a third of the 
section on acceptable conditions of work to the HR W report, with 
the remainder merely describing relevant Zambian labor laws. 
Thus, the US government in effect adopts the HRW reports and, 
like HRW, singles out Chinese mines as the only nationality-fo-
cused example of unacceptable conditions of work.397 
395. Irwin and Gallagher, Otioese Investment: 11·12, 14-15. 
396. US State Dep't, "2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zambia." 
2011, http://zambia.usembassy.gov/2008human.btml. 
397. US State Dep't, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: 
Zambia," 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rlsthrrptlhumanrightsreportlindex.htm?dy· 
oaoUcJoad_id• 1862S51wrapper. In another section. the State Dep't report also 
claimed that "Asians and South Asians continued to be brought to and through Zambia 
for forced labor in the mining and construction industries. An increasing number of 
Chioese and Indian men recruited to work in Chinese or Indian owned mines in the 
Copperbelt region were reportedly kept in oooditions of forced labor by mining oompa· 
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The HRW study appears to apply to one Chinese SOE in Af-
rica the inaccurate claims set out in a 2006 statement on "China's 
Exportation of Labor Practices to Africa," by the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) Hong Kong Liaison Office 
(ILH0).398 Like the HRW report, the ILHO statement focuses on 
health and safety, wages and workers' right to join a union. The 
ITUC's fixation with labor practices of Chinese firms in Africa has 
continued: examples it gave of violations of trade union rights in 
Zambia in 2008 were almost exclusively about Chinese-owned min-
ing firms; the one exception was an Indian-owned construction 
firm.399 The HRW study also accords with the PFs 2005-2011anti-
Chinese campaign. Its findings fit in with the racial hierarchy pro-
pounded in 2006 by Guy Scott, a white farmer, deputy PF leader, 
and now Vice-President of Zambia: whites are better than Indians 
and "the Chinese are the worst. "400 This racialist view is embedded 
in some miners. For example, NUMA W's chairman at NFCA told 
us that "Chinese, sorry, are not good investors, but white people are 
very good." He added that "In China, you have too many people, 
so if someone dies, you don't care" and that white South African 
investment in Chibuluma mine was good, but that the ethnic Indi-
nies." There is no evidence however of such "'forced labor," although there was are-
port of Indian construction workers being poorly housed. 
398. www.ilho.org/CINTW/ArticlcLabourPracticeExport.html. ITIJC is a 2006 
merger of the (anti-communist) InternaUonal COnfederation of Free Trades Unions 
(ICFrU) and World Confederation or Labor (WCL). During the Cold War, the CIA 
financed the ICFT'U, which in tum backed anti-oommunist dictatorships. Anthony Ca. 
rew, et al., The lntunational Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Bern: Peter Lang, 
2000). The WCL was linked with Christian Democratic parties in Europe. The ITUC is 
now counter-posed to the .. anti-capitatist" World Federation o.fTrade Unions (WFTU). 
See "'The International Labor and Trade Union Movement in the 21st Century, .. 
WFTU, '111J7.www.wftucentraLorgl?page_id><40&1anguage.aen. 
399. ITUC, "Annual Survey 2009 of Violations of Trade Union Rights":71m www. 
unhcr.org/refworldlcountry, ITUC..ZMB.456d62Ie2,4c.'i2cabdc,O.html. 
400. "Anti-China Candidate Michael Sata Hopes to Become Zambia Presiden~" 
Telegraph (UK), Oct. 30, 2008. As Vtce-President, Scott said that "classifying people 
aa:ording to color is a waste of time." "Could this Guy become Zambia's Next Presi· 
dent?" The Cititen. Oct. 17. 2011. Scott has also opined that in Zambia, "People are 
nostalgic, not tor exploitation and division, but tor the standards of colonial rimes, when 
you wen[ to the hospital there was medicine, when you went to schools there were 
books, when you went to the shops there were goods to buy. There is a sense of these 
being ~white man's standards.' Whether rightly or not rightly is another matter." 
"Zambia's White Vk;e..President Hails 'Cosmopolitan' New Era."' Guordlan, Oct. 4, 
2011. 
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ans who own KCM, "are very different from white people" and 
"brought a lot of the Indians who are now walking our streets. "40' 
Like HRW, PF leader Michael Sata said in 2008 that "safety 
standards at Chinese-run mines and factories were miserable," but 
never produced evidence for his claim.402 If, however, PF leaders 
were convinced that safety at Chinese-run mines was worse than at 
other mines, they had a mechanism for determining whether that 
was so. In 2009, the Zambian parliament's Committee on Govern-
ment Assurances carried out tours to investigate safety levels in 
copper mines. The Committee was chaired by Chisimba Kambwili, 
PF MP from Roan Constituency, where the Luanshya Copper Mine 
had recently been acquired by CNMC. By then, CNMC's 
Chambishi Mine had been fully operational for six years. Kambwili 
is the most vituperative critic of "the Chinese" in Zambian polit-
ics.403 The Committee inspected four mines (MCM, KCM, 
Lumwana and Kansanshi), but despite the PF's supposed concern 
about safety in Chinese-owned mines, toured no CNMC facility. 
After undertaking firm-conducted guided tours and being assured 
by executives that all was well, Kambwili said the Committee was 
satisfied that adequate safety measures were in place.404 
Employing "vehement and systematic anti-Chinese rhetoric" 
Sata told Reuters newswire in 2010 that "Chinese and other Asian 
mining firms in Zambia are creating 'slave labor' conditions. "405 
HRW's conclusions equally echo unsupported claims by arch-China 
bashers, such as Peter Navarro and Greg Autry, who have written 
that "Regarding worker health and safety, there is nothing but fear 
and loathing in the factories and mines that Chinese bosses run in 
Africa and Latin America. For just as in China, it is a tale of long 
hours, low pay, unsafe working conditions, and incredibly abusive 
bosses . . . ":oM 
401. Mwale interview. 
402. Peter Hitchens, "Africa's Last, Worst Hope: A Continent that Withstood Euro-
pean Colonialism Welcomes Chinese Conquest," American Coltfe.rvative, Dec. 1, 2008. 
403. See, e.g.. "Chinese Labor Force Coming into the Country should be Reduced: 
Kambwili," LT, Jan. 24, 2012. 
404. "Second Report or the Committee on Government Assurances for the Fourth 
Session of the Tenth National Assembly, Appointed on 23rd September 2009": 64-74, 
bttpJ/www.scribd.comi'Zambian-Economist/dl 242Jl0962- Second -Report-of-tbe-Com-
mittee·Of·Government·Assurances-for-tbe-Third·Sess:ion·of·the·Tenth·Naliooai-As-
sembly; "MPs Commend Government," TOZ, Dec. 3, 2009. 
405. "Sata Accuses Chinese and Malaysian Investors of Slavery." LT. Jan. 21, 2010. 
406. Peter Navarro and Greg Autry, Dt4th by Chin4: umfronting the Dragon - 4 
Glob41 C411 w Action (New York. Prentice Hall, 2011): 102. Their assertion was accom-
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There are however PF leaders whose brief seemingly does not 
extend to racially profiling investors and who affirm that labor 
abuses are common among mining flllllS in Zambia and Africa. 
Wynter Kabimba, a lawyer, PF Secretary General, and now 
Zambia's Minister of Justice, spoke in 2007 on a panel at a meeting 
of the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ), the premier group 
of analysts of economic affairs in the country. Kabimba spoke to 
the question of whether it matters where foreign investment comes 
from. He stated that most analyses he had read "concluded that the 
foreign investors in Africa paid low wages and contributed to envi-
ronmental degradation and corruption" but, referring to mining, 
"He added that there was no distinction between the behavior and 
practices of European, American and Chinese foreign investors" 
and concluded that "the excitement about Chinese investments in 
Zambia was misplaced." Another panelist, zcru President Leo-
nard Hikaumba, expressed a similar view: " In his experience, Chi-
nese investors were not exceptional in offering poor conditions of 
service. Zambian employers were probably worse in their disregard 
for labor and employment regulations and destruction of the envi-
ronment." Moderator Muna Han tuba, CEO of Aflife, a major local 
financial firm, also questioned "whether Zambian employers be-
haved better towards their employees" than Chinese investors.407 
If CNMC is not "the worst employer," it does not mean that 
conditions at CNMC facilities should not be improved, especially 
salaries and safety. China's ambassador "has directed Chinese in-
vestors who engage local workers to pay them in accordance with 
Zambia's labor laws" and said that his government will "sternly 
'deal' with Chinese companies ... if they 'Douted' Zambian laws 
and abused workers ... because we do not want one single com-
pany to be responsible for damaging the international image of 
China." He has urged the Zambian government to "prosecute and 
panied by an onaocurate description al the 20t0 sboolonp 0( Zambwl auaen by two 
Chinese supen--. at tbe Coth1m COal Mine and Nanno and Auuys in""'tioo 0( a 
2010 "ma.sac:re" at a CNMC-owned mine. 
l!(f1. "What M ba~ learned from Foreisn Investment: Dots 11 Matter Wbere it 
comes from?" EAZ. Proceedings of Montbly Meetina, Nov. 22. '1iXJ7 (photooopy in 
possession ol authors): 2-4. About 90'll. ol semstone minina, lor eumplc. iJ coo trolled 
by Zambian finms. Zambian Pllrliamcnt, Committee: 22. There arc also Zambian-
owned industrial companies. For example, during a 2012 strike at a (wblte) Zambian-
owned eement plant, tbe United Mineworkers or Zambia revealed that the lowest-paid 
Among the more than 600 worken; received K900,000 ($180) n ntonth and the highest 
Kl.8m. "ZambeJJ Portland Worlr.en; Protest,'' TOZ, July 21, 20l2. 
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jail the particular offender ... ," but has also argued that Chinese 
mining f1rms were not Zambia's best or worst payers.408 
All of Zambia's foreign-owned mining firms exploit labor, re-
sources and environment. Working lifetime wages are so low that 
within six months of retirement, according to an NGO's report, 
miners are reduced to beggars,- unlike their counterparts at mines 
in the West owned by the same companies. On tbe wages they re-
ceive, most Zambian miners are poorly housed in hugely underser-
viced communities. As a Zambian commentator put it, "Towns 
housing the mines are in ruins, infrastructure is in a dilapidated 
state and the local people are living in abject poverty yet on a daily 
basis their land produces millions of dollars."• 10 Improvements 
across the board are called for, but that is less likely when attention 
is focused exclusively on Chinese firms as "the worst." The other 
improvement to be sought is in the quality of analysis of human 
rights deficiencies. There is a need for empirical accuracy, for appli-
cation of basic methodological principles, and, most of aiL for es-
chewing political bias that contributes to the deepening of racism. 
408. " Envoy Tells Cbinese to Pay Fair Wage:· OM. July 27. 2012; Myula and 
Mulcwha. We are Here. 
409. See Apotbeker. Foreign Copper: 61 . quoting "Annual report Caritas Ndola 
2007". 
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